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ABSTRACT

As cyber attacks become more sophisticated, the risk to all networked computer
systems increases. Whether public or private, whether federal, state, or local, the threat
is equally real. Consequently, local governments must respond accordingly to
understand the threats, take measures to protect themselves, and determine how to
respond in the event of a system breach. Additionally, since cyber criminals do not
respect geographic or administrative boundaries, local leaders must be prepared to
instantly interact with other governments, agencies, and departments to suppress an
attack.
Guided by the theory of intergovernmental management (IGM), this exploratory
research investigated how Information Technology (IT) Directors in Florida county
constitutional offices use intergovernmental relations and management activities as part
of their information security efforts. Specifically, this research sought to determine: 1)
which IGM activities do county IT Directors most often perform; 2) do county IT
Directors make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships; 3) is there a
relationship between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors
most often perform?
To answer these questions, an electronic survey was distributed to 209 directors,
of which 125 responded. Overwhelmingly, the findings indicate that these Directors
rarely

engage

in

IGM

government/department

activities

contacted.

regardless
However,

of
when

the

purpose

seeking

or

type

of

intergovernmental

assistance, it is most often horizontally with other Departments within their own
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government and least often vertically with Federal offices. The most frequently
performed intergovernmental activity is seeking technical assistance, however seeking
program/project information is also perform more frequently than the other activities
explored in this research. The least frequently performed activities involved seeking to
modify established IT partnerships. Further, there was evidence of relationships
between certain office/county demographics and IGM activity. The discovery of these
patterns and relationships can be used to aid policy and program development, as well
as to stimulate deeper inquiry into the intergovernmental dimensions involved in
protecting local elements of the U.S. Critical Digital Infrastructure.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research was to explore the roles intergovernmental
management, activities, and communication play in protecting the information systems
of our critical infrastructure. As cyber attacks become more sophisticated, the risk to
ALL computer systems increases (White House, 2003; Computer Science &
Telecommunications Board, and National Research Council, 2002; Information
Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; McCarthy, 1998). Whether public or private, whether
federal, state, or local, the threat is equally real (Misra, 2003). Consequently, local
leaders must respond accordingly to understand the threats, take measures to protect
themselves, and determine how they will respond in the event an attack occurs. As
such, the focus of this research was to investigate how county-level Information
Technology Directors and their staff use intergovernmental relations and management
activities in securing critical information systems under their charge.
From maintaining medical records to tax filing, computers and the Internet have
come to play a role in most every sphere of modern life (Careless, 2003; Nye, 2003;
Long, 2000; Libicki, 1995). As such, it should not come as a surprise that a wellcoordinated large-scale cyber attack has the potential to disrupt daily life in America and
across the global (White House, 2003; Walker, 2002; Noonan, 2001; Brock, 2000a,
2000b). Given that our social, health, economic, justice, and military systems
increasingly depend on networked information systems, any person or group, public or
private, regardless of Internet access, would be affected if critical computer systems
1

were rendered inoperable (Freund, 2003; Hansell, 2003; Reames, 2000; Stanton, 2000;
Everett et. al., 1997). In a post-9/11 report to Congress, the Gilmore Commission (2001)
clearly made this point when it wrote,
Our banking and finance systems, our just-in-time delivery
system for goods, our hospitals, our state and local
emergency services… all of these critical services rely upon
their information connections and databases… each is
critical to the American economy and health of our citizens…
and each can be shut down or severely handicapped by a
cyber attack (p. 53).
Amid increased global terrorist activity, a growing body of research and
intelligence information suggests that the probability of terrorist–orchestrated cyber
attacks on U.S. critical information systems is extremely high (Computer Science &
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002; Deibert, 2002;
Kremmen, 2002; Verton, 2002; Berkowitz 2001; McWilliams, 2001). Yet, the ability and
authority to prevent such a threat surpasses any lone industry or level of government. In
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland
Security the U.S. Comptroller General stated the indisputable need to “…clarify the
appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities and build a
framework for partnerships for coordination, communication, and collaboration” (Walker,
2002, p. 4). Per 2001 Executive Order 13231 section 5(a), the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board (CIPB) is charged to work with state and local
governments “…to ensure that systems are created and well managed to share threat
warning, analysis, and recovery information among government network operation
centers…”. Yet three years later, the information security of local and county
governments remains a major concern among security experts (Misra, 2003; Barrett,
2

Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Public Technology Inc., 2002). Adding to this concern is the
reality that local governments, such as counties, serve as first responders to crisis
(National Association of Counties, 2001A, 2001D; U.S. General Accounting Office,
2001c). As such, county communications and computer systems were rendered
inoperable by a cyber attack during a simultaneous physical crisis, the ability for officials
to coordinate relief efforts would be severely effected.
In 1999, the Emergency Response and Research Institute conducted a nonscientific

survey

of

local/county/state

administrators,

supervisor,

technology

professionals, and first-line responders which revealed that 85 percent believed more
research into computer attacks on local government offices needs be conducted
(Staten, 1999). Further, 85 percent believed hacking local, county, or state government
systems will become more of a problem in the future. Indeed, in the years since this
survey local governments, specifically counties, have been increasingly plagued by
Internet worms, viruses, and denial of service attacks. Mary Reynolds, Chief
Technology Officer for Illinois, states that cyber attacks occur “all the time", noting that
some government systems are attacked hundreds of times each month (Perlman,
2002b). She speculates that the majority of local governments remain unsuccessful at
fending off attacks and intrusions because they fail to patch software, properly configure
firewalls, use intrusion-detection systems, or scan their networks.
Despite the recent efforts of local officials to improve these practices (Barrett,
Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Monroe, 2002; Posner, 2002; Gonzales, 2001), poor
information security remains rampant in county governments (Kouns, 2003; O’Connell,
2003; Brock, 2000; Dacey, 2001; PDD-63, 1998; Smith, 1998; Crescenzi, 1996). This
3

reality was made publicly obvious during the summer of 2003 when a series of viruses
and worms penetrated county computer systems across the nation. For instance, nearly
the entire computer system for the Hillsborough County Florida school system
(approximately 10,000 computers) was shut down for several days late August due to a
virus (ABC Action News, 2003). In Christian County Kentucky, poor information security
forced the shut down of computers at the clerk's office and health department for
several days after falling victim to a computer worm known as "Nachi" or "Welchia"
(Leazer, 2003). This shut down completely halted numerous services, including motor
vehicles registration, voters registration, food stamp benefits, child support, Medicaid,
and payroll. Again in August 2003, poor county-level information security proved equally
damaging in Maryland where citizens were temporarily unable to renew drivers licenses
or register motor vehicles at 23 centers throughout the state (WBAL-TV, 2003). The
cause was cited as the "lovsan" or "MSBlaster" worm that exploited a Microsoft
vulnerability for which a software patch had been released a month prior as part of a
large public campaign to limit potential damage. The MSBlaster worm also forced illprepared officials in Riverside County California to shut down county web sites and
Internet services while they patched security holes throughout the county’s vast network
of 12,000 personal computers. For nearly 48 hours, Riverside County employees were
unable to access email, the database of court cases was no longer assessable online,
and jurors could not check their status online.
Further demonstrating the severe damage and disruption cyber attacks cause
county governments, consider the stealthy computer worm "NIMDA" which virtually
froze Fairfax County Virginia in the summer of 2001 (Perlman, 2002b; Gilmore
4

Commission, 2001). For a nearly a week, county officials had to lock network access to
the outside world to allow nearly 150 IT technicians to "scrub" the entire network of
9,000 PCs and 300 servers to remove the virus and repair the system. The severity of
the worm forced the county to shut down its web site which receives more than a million
hits a day as residents log on for a variety of services, from paying fines and purchasing
permits, to renewing library books. Making matters worse, county IT professionals
believed they had eradicated the virulent worm only to have it resurface and re-infect
the system. In an unrelated series of events during March 2002, an unauthorized private
information security analyst informed Harris County Texas that its wireless network was
completely open leaving sensitive information vulnerable to illicit access (Juhnke, 2002).
The independent analyst demonstrated for county officials how easily the system could
be tapped using a basic laptop and an inexpensive wireless card. The demonstration
prompted the county to disable its entire wireless network (Dornan, 2002).
Numerous aspects of local government depend on communication between
citizens and officials. The Internet and network-enabled computer systems have made
that process much more efficient (Bowser, 1998). As cyber criminals become more
sophisticated, the risk of an attack targeting or at the very least compromising local
systems increases (Misra, 2003). As noted earlier, local leaders must respond
accordingly to understand the threats and take measures to protect themselves from an
attack. A 2002 survey by the National League of Cities reported that cyber attacks are
among the top three terrorist related concerns of city governments. In an effort to tend
to these concerns, all survey respondents indicated that their city had increased
intergovernmental cooperation with other cities, counties, state, and federal bodies
5

since 9/11. Yet the study found that only 43 percent of large cities and 26 percent of all
cities have developed strategies to specifically address cyber-terrorism. Speculating on
these findings, the National League of Cities noted that federal agencies still provide
relatively little direct guidance and training regarding cyber terrorism compared to
biological and chemical threats. These disparities suggests that protecting localities
from cyber attacks needs more attention at all levels of government.
Despite efforts, this researcher was unable to locate any similar studies focusing
on county government. American City & County Magazine (2002) also addressed this
research lacuna noting that there is very little available data on county information
security efforts. However, without an understanding of county leadership and the
pervasiveness of vertical and horizontal communication with regard to information
security, our national security remains vulnerable. In a response to this need for
understanding and given the importance of critical digital infrastructure protection, this
research sought to observe the reality of information technology security as it occurs in
the trenches; county government. Again, the focus of this research was to investigate
how county-level Information Technology Directors and their staff use intergovernmental
relations and management activities in securing critical information systems under their
charge.
Due to the breath of issues stemming from safeguarding information technology,
information security research is not married to any discipline, let alone one theory.
However, in an effort to increase the practical utility and efficacy of this research, this
study was guided by the public administration theory of intergovernmental management
(henceforth, IGM). This theory was selected because at its core, it focuses on the
6

degree to which “…officials strategically interact with various actors for the purpose of
successfully designing and administering policies” (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983, p. 5). The
concepts, classification schemes, and propositions put forth by this theory were drawn
upon to shape definitions, operationalize concepts, and aid in linking variables through
the use of its established taxonomies.
Because the of role intergovernmental activities in county level information
security had yet to be studied, this investigation was exploratory. As such, this research
did not expressly set out to test hypotheses or establish causal relationships. Instead,
theory was used to guide research questions in an effort to discover and explain
patterns of activity (Chafetz, 1978). To that end, this research sought to answer the
questions: 1) which IGM activities do county IT Directors/staff most often engage in on
behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 2) do county IT
Directors/staff make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships on behalf of
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 3) is there a relationship
between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors/staff most
often engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure
protection? By uncovering patterns of similarities and differences in the type and use of
IGM activities, these preliminary finding can be used to stimulate deeper inquiry and
generate dialogue into the intergovernmental and administrative dimensions involved in
protecting the U.S. critical digital infrastructure.
While disciplines such as criminal justice, legal studies, and computer science
have been actively involved in information security research; the results are often
fragmented and discipline-specific. Further, little attention and even less research has
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been given to roles intergovernmental relations, communications, and management
play in information security. This research, however, recognizes that critical digital
infrastructure protection is a complex social, economic, and administrative issue that
affects the health, welfare, and security of the citizens in all communities. As such, a
unique aspect of this research is that it approaches what is seemingly a technological
concern as a public affairs issue were understanding and solutions require an
interdisciplinary approach.
Again, the aim of this research was to explore the roles intergovernmental
management and interorganizational communication in protecting county information
systems. To this end, the literature of this study begins by discussing network and
information technology and the connections and interdependencies they create. Next,
the nature of the U.S. critical digital infrastructure is explained, including why it is
vulnerable and to what. Focus then turns to general government use of network
systems with specific emphasis on local and county governments. After discussing the
inadequate state of these systems, information security and the critical role of
management is highlighted.
Following the literature review, the theory of intergovernmental management is
explicated. Then a discussion clarifies the intrinsic and critical relationship between
information security and intergovernmental management activities. Following is an
explanation of the methodology used, the analysis, and a presentation of findings.
Finally a discussion of the implications for the public affairs arena complete this
research endeavor.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Internet: A Network of Networks

The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace released by the White House
declared the Internet “…the nervous system of our country” (p. 6). Yet few comprehend
how it works or its inherent vulnerabilities. In order to understand these matters, it is first
important to have a basic understanding of computer networking. To begin with, a
computer, or single system, is usually controlled by a single owner and is located in a
known physical location. With the addition of specific software and hardware to provide
communication protocols and physical channels, several single systems can be
connected to create a network of systems. Individual systems can be added or removed
from a network at any time, making it dynamic in structure and operations. The size of a
network can range from two systems to thousands of systems and these different
systems can be housed in different physical locations, manufactured by different
vendors, and even owned by different organizations (Committee on the Internet in the
Evolving Information Infrastructure, 2001; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1998).
When a network remains private, as a “closed system of systems”, it is called an
intranet (Phoha, 2002; Sunshine, 1999). Intranets are most often used to share
information between employees as part of day-to-day business operations. This type of
network is the most secure as it does not directly connect to the Internet. A variation of
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this is an extranet, which occurs when a private network connects to the larger Internet
to provide public access to a limited amount of content which is sectioned off from the
rest of the main intranet (Jordan, 1997). There are few physical limitations to the scope
and breadth of either category of network as they can traverse organizational and
national boundaries if resources are available. However, it is the joining of extranets and
public networks into a “network of networks” which serves as the foundation of the
Internet (Miller & Gregory, 2002).
Linking computers from distant locations to share information was only brought to
fruition in the early 1960s (Everett, Dewindt, & McDade, 1997). The RAND proposal,
written by Paul Baran in 1964, outlined principles of a non-local network designed to be
robust and flexible (Mayr, 1995). The original impetus for this project was to preserve
the integrity of the military command and control network under warlike conditions, even
a nuclear attack. This new network would have no central authority, all the ‘nodes’
would be equal in status, and each node could send and receive messages. In principle,
if one node was destroyed, the rest of the nodes would still be able to communicate.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded the first test
of the concept in 1969 and the first nodes were installed at UCLA, Stanford, University
of California at Santa Barbara, and University of Utah at Salt Lake City (Lipson, 2002;
Sewell, 2002). The network was fundamentally simple, consisting of scientists at these
remote locations passing findings and research notes back and forth. ARPAnet, as it
was initially known, was successful and rapidly adopted. By the end of the first year, it
was increasingly being used like a data mailbox and in the years to follow its uses
continued to evolve and expand. In 1983, the military and nonmilitary elements were
10

split apart and the nonmilitary section grew into what is now called the Internet
(Sunshine, 1999; Everett, Dewindt, & McDade, 1997).
The Internet is a collection of thousands of networks linked by a common set of
technical protocols which make it possible for users on any one of the networks to
communicate with, or use specified services of any of the other networks (Committee on
the Internet in the Evolving Information Infrastructure, 2001; Fraser, 1997). To operate,
the Internet requires several layers of technology, some of which are obvious and
physical; while others are logical and operational. As such, the Internet is the sum of all
of the information and communication technologies that support its sundry protocols.
This includes such elements as computers, peripheral components, telephone lines,
fiber optic cables, satellites, hosts, users, Internet Providers, data standards,
applications, protocols, routers, code, servers, hubs, and of course, the information
content contained therein.
Information sent across the Internet from one computer to another is broken into
small packets of data that contain information regarding the origin/destination of the
data, as well as a portion of the total data (ISC2.com, 2003; Zakon, 2003; Phoha, 2002;
Smart Computing, 2001). These packets travel separately through telecommunication
channels which connect the Internet and then are reassembled at the destination or
receiving computer. There are two primary protocols, referred to collectively as TCP/IP,
that enable these data packets to traverse the complex networks and arrive in an
understandable format (Lipson, 2002; Miller & Gregory, 2002). First, Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) decomposes the data into packets. Next, Internet Protocol (IP)
guides or routes the data packets across the Internet. Upon arriving at the final
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destination, TCP ensures that all of the necessary packets are properly reassembled.
However, TCP and IP are but two of the many protocols that govern the network
transfer of digital information (Collins, 2001; Fraser, 1997; Ruthfield, 1995). Others
include File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Post Office Protocol (POP3), Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP), Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), to mention a few. Yet it was the
1990 development of an experimental protocol known as Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) that transformed the Internet into the social and economic backbone of
modernized nations in less than a decade (Roos, 1998).
HTTP works by the use of web enabled pages (i.e. files written in Hyper Text
Markup Language or HTML), web servers (which “serve up” or deliver the web enabled
pages), and web browsers (which present the “served pages” to the end user) (Zakon,
2003; Phoha, 2002). The key to the World Wide Web is “hyperlinks” which are
embedded in web enabled documents. The advent of hyperlinks provided a new way of
conceptualizing and organizing information and enabled users to exchange documents
regardless of the protocol they were using (Bowser, 1998). Webpages accessed using a
web browser or client, such as Netscape Navigator or Internet Explorer, proved an
easier way to navigate the Internet than older protocols such as gopher and FTP (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1998). Both computer programmers and the public quickly
embraced the combination of user-friendly web browsers and the easy to learn coding
language HTML. In 1992, the World Wide Web was comprised of only 50 web servers,
by 2003, just a decade later, there were over 35.5 million (Smart Computing, 2001).
The Internet and World Wide Web continue to grow and recent numbers estimate
that globally 500 million people go online in a given month (CyberAtlas.com, 2003;
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Digital Divide Network 2003; Nielsen NetRatings, 2002). While this is a staggering
number, it actually represents less than 10 percent of the world’s entire population. Yet
of those half-billion users, 41 percent are located in the United States and Canada.
Perhaps this is not entirely surprising considering that the United States operates more
computers than the rest of the world combined (Digital Divide Network, 2003). A
national telephone survey conducted by Pew Internet and the American Life Project
(2003) found that U.S. Internet penetration rates have remained around 60 percent
since late 2001. Of this population, 49 percent use the Internet at least once a day
either from home, work, or both. This means that on an average day, about 61 million
Americans go online to do such things as send email, read the news, and make
purchases. With so many users, there is much potential for irresponsible use, abuse,
and exploitation (Doddrell, 1996).
To demonstrate the global presence and dominance of the U.S. Internet
infrastructure, consider some of the following numbers. According to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (henceforth, OECD) (2002a), the relative
development of a country's Internet infrastructure can be measured by the number of its
Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants1. In late 2000, the United States far outpaced any
other OECD country2 by maintaining more than 234 hosts per 1,000 inhabitants (OECD,

1

A host is a domain name that has an IP (Internet Protocol) address associated with it. In an internetwork environment, a host is any computer with full two-way access to other computers on the Internet,
or a computer that runs a web server for one or more web sites (Phoha, 2003; Sans.org; 2003). Since
some systems can not be detected because of the use of firewalls, an estimate of hosts should be
thought of as an indicator of the minimum size of the public Internet (OECD, 2002a).

2

The 30 member countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
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2002a). The average for the European Union was only 37.4 hosts per 1,000 inhabitants.
Additionally, of the 90 million Internet hosts registered to OECD countries in 2000, a full
70 percent were registered to the United States. The second largest concentration of
registered hosts was in Japan, which maintained only 4.6 percent of the OECD total,
followed by the United Kingdom with 3.5.
While the number of Internet hosts gives an indication of the size of a country's
Internet infrastructure, the number of active web sites provides information on a
country’s relative development of Internet content. Again, the United States leads web
site hosting with 12.6 million sites hosted as of July 2000 (OECD, 2002a). This figure
translates into 46.5 web sites per 1,000 U.S. inhabitants. Germany and the United
Kingdom were the only other OECD countries hosting more than one million sites, with
1.8 million and 1.4 million hosted sites respectively. Collectively the European Union
only maintains 12.7 web sites per 1,000 inhabitants.
Another measure of the depth of a nations’ information and communication
infrastructure is the use of the Internet as a transaction channel for electronic commerce
(henceforth, e-commerce). While e-commerce has revolutionized economic activity, it
has taken off more slowly than predicted (Council for Excellence in Government, 2002;
Denby, 2000; Reames, 2000; Sager et al, 2000; Litt, 1997). Despite the turbulence
resulting from collapsed “dot.coms” in the late 1990s, the U.S. Department of
Commerce (2003) reported that domestic Internet retail trade (the general focus of ecommerce attention) grew rapidly both in volume and share of total U.S. retail trade

Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (OECD, 2003).
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from 1999 to 2001. Its share increased from 0.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 1999 to
1.3 percent in the fourth quarter 2001. During 2001, approximately 38 percent of U.S.
Internet users ordered products online (OECD, 2002b) which translated into $35 billion
in sales (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003)3. In terms of both dollar value and share
of economic activity, e-commerce varies markedly among key U.S. economic sectors.
For example, manufacturing leads all industry sectors with e-commerce shipments that
account for 18 percent ($725 billion) of total manufacturing shipments. Merchant
wholesalers rank second with e-commerce sales that represent 10 percent ($270 billion)
of their total sales. Forrester Research (Global Reach, 2001) predicted that by 2004,
global e-commerce would reach $6.8 trillion and that 47 percent of that could be
attributed to the U.S.
Much of the success of e-commerce depends on the security of cyber
transactions. Yet the more the Internet is used to transfer funds, the more likely data
transmissions and the underlying infrastructure itself will become targets (Moteff, 2002;
Rathmell, 2000; Reames, 2000). Both industry and government appear aware of this
growing threat as the number of secure servers in OECD countries increased by 223
percent from July 1999 to January 2002 (OECD, 2002b). However, a full 65 percent of
all OECD secure servers are located in the United States. To put that number in
perspective, the United Kingdom boasts the second largest concentration of secure
servers with only six percent of the total. This disparity is quite alarming as the Internet

3

The total value of on-line retail sales should be considered as a lower bound, as certain categories that
are included in other surveys, such as on-line travel services, financial brokers and dealers and ticket
sales agencies, are excluded.
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is borderless and the vulnerabilities of one system can adversely affect the security of
all others to which it is connected (Moore, 1997). As such, no one nation or government
can alone secure cyberspace (White House, 2003; Institute for Information
Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Frank, 2002; Hecker, 2002; Sewell, 2002; Tritak, 2001b;
Rathmell, 2000).

Borderless and Connected

Cyberspace, a term coined by William Gibson in his 1984 sci-fi novel
Neuromancer, is a metaphor to describe the non-physical terrain created by networked
computer systems (Zakon, 2003). In the topography of cyberspace, national boundaries
have little meaning (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Tyrrell,
2002). Supported by information and communication technologies, the Internet
seamlessly links nations across the globe (Held et al, 1999). Yet as Everett, Dewindt,
and McDade (1997) ominously point out, “History has given evidence to the fact that
when some new technology brings mankind brightness, a shadow is cast
simultaneously”. The Internet has proven no exception. For while it is highly efficient; it
is alarmingly vulnerable. Recent history has proved that a well-executed cyber attack
can breach computer systems globally in a matter of hours, in some cases minutes, with
no regard for organizational or sovereign borders (White House, 2003; Freund, 2003;
Lipson, 2002; Tritak, 2001b; Vatis, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001c;
Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection &
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the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 1998; Litt, 1997). As such, by using the
Internet, a malicious actor can compromise literally millions of systems, thousands of
miles away, at very little cost.
Case in point, in January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm (also known as
“Sapphire”) exploited a known Microsoft vulnerability for which a repair patch had been
available for six months prior to the attack (Fisher, 2003a; Associated Press, 2003). Due
to widespread neglect for installing the patch in such counties as South Korea, the
worm caused considerable damage internationally via cascading network outages,
canceled airline flights, and automated teller machine failures. The worm infected more
than 90 percent of vulnerable computers worldwide within 10 minutes of its release on
the Internet. The U.S. General Accounting Office (Dacey, 2003a) reported that the worm
doubled in size every 8.5 seconds and achieved its full scanning rate (55 million files
scanned per second) after about 3 minutes, making it the fastest computer worm to
date.
The ease with which this worm spread was directly due to the rampant presence
of vulnerable systems within larger networks, demonstrating the adage “security is only
as strong as its weakest link” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999, p. 4). Doddrell
(1996) expands on this adage by offering a likely scenario whereby a government office,
for instance, within a larger network implements security measures such as a firewall,
while another office within the same network simply connects to the Internet with no
protection. A hacker could theoretically enter the network via the insecure office and
navigate to the more secure office rendering the best efforts ineffective. This plausible
situation leaves governments in a precarious position; each one can do only so much to
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secure its own presence in cyberspace as the connectedness of the Internet presents
vulnerabilities that cannot always be controlled, let alone foreseen.
In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, there has been a greater awareness of
importance of network security, not only for each individual organization, but also for the
vitality of the nation as a whole. As Charles McQueary, Undersecretary for Science and
Technology at the Department of Homeland Security pointed out, "September 11 didn't
make us more vulnerable, but made us more aware of our vulnerabilities” (Amarelo,
2003). However, the United States' increasing dependency on the Internet and
information technologies to manage and operate its critical infrastructures provides
terrorists with a tactical target (Vatis, 2001).

The Critical Digital Infrastructure

The US Critical Infrastructure (henceforth CI) consists of public and private
physical and cyber assets that are considered vital to society, commerce, and national
security (White House, 2003; Isenberg, 2002; Allor & Lindley, 2000; Dearth, 2000;
Tyrrell, 2000). The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP,
1997) declared that the critical infrastructure constitutes the life support system of the
United States and Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63, 1998) referred to it as
the structural foundation of a society. A well-executed physical and/or virtual attack on
major infrastructure elements could affect millions of people, both domestically and
abroad.
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Specifically, the U.S. Critical Infrastructure consists of eight sectors, namely,
information and communications; electrical power systems; gas and oil transportation
and storage; banking and finance; transportation; water supply systems; emergency
services; and government services (Moteff, 2002; Tritak, 2001a; PDD63, 1998). While
identified as separate sectors, they are highly interdependent. For example, the banking
and finance sector relies on the telecommunications and computer sector, which in turn
relies on electrical power systems, which are dependent on oil & gas transportation and
so on. In an interview with The New Atlantis (2003), a journal for technology and
society, former vice chairman of the White House’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Board, Howard Schmidt discussed the complex interrelationship between the
information and communication sector and seemingly disparate elements of the national
CI. He gave the following scenario to illustrate the critical linkages,
For example, if a computer system is down for the national
rail system, you could still physically move trains, but you
wouldn’t want to, because you won’t know where perishable
items are supposed to be delivered. Or perhaps chemicals
that need to be moved to help water treatment plants won’t
get there—so within a matter of time, water treatment
facilities would be having problems. The underpinning of all
these critical infrastructures are computers that must be
protected (The New Atlantis, 2003).
Increasingly, each sector is reliant upon networked computers, the Internet, and
the larger information and communication infrastructure to provide CI services (White
House, 2003; Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Lipson, 2002;
Moteff, 2002; Executive Order 13231; Death, 2000; Long, 2000; Tyrrell, 2000). As a
result, the Department of Justice (1998) recognized the Internet as the single most
important critical infrastructure element today. The information and communication
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sector, also referred to as the critical digital infrastructure (henceforth, CDI) consists of
and connects many different elements, systems, and networks, which are owned by an
array of governmental, private, and commercial entities. These networked elements
play an instrumental role in the day-to-day operations of both public and private
organizations with regard to such tasks as managing payroll; tracking inventory and
sales; as well as research and development activities (Executive Order 13231; Dacey,
2001). Yet, our reliance on information technology is far more profound than just the use
of spreadsheets or network-enabled communications like telephones, fax, and e-mail
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003; Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 2002;
Lipson, 2002; Rathmell, 2000). For years, computer systems have been used to
manage and operate such essential CI components as power grids; gas and oil
distribution pipelines; water treatment and distribution systems; nuclear power plants;
hydroelectric and flood control dams; oil and chemical refineries; air traffic control
system; elements of the financial infrastructure; and other physical systems (Dacey,
2003a; Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research
Council, 2002). Further, the last decade has seen the control and execution of
numerous critical functions and procedures shift to publicly networked computers
without a great deal of thought for security (White House, 2003; Nye, 2002; Collins,
2001). Additionally, in an effort to reduce costs, SCADA systems (supervisory control
and data acquisition systems) have been widely adopted (Graham-Rowe, 2003;
Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection &
the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 1998). These programs, which allow supply
systems to be managed from a central and often remote control point, used to be
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custom-built software for isolated systems. Increasingly however, they are now largely
stock versions which are internationally available. On discussing this shift, Bill Flynt,
former director of the Homeland Infrastructure Security Threats Office for the US Army,
noted that it has “…left us with generic SCADAs gateways to the companies operating
on publicly accessible networks. These days, one cyber-attack fits all" (Graham-Rowe,
2003). This likelihood is not lost on terrorist groups. In early 2002, the FBI’s National
Infrastructure Protection Center issued a bulletin stating it believed members of al
Qaeda were trying to gain remote control of U.S. water supplies and wastewater
treatment plants (Isenberg, 2002).
By networking vital control systems via the CDI, organizations have been able to
reduce operational costs by supporting remote maintenance, control, and update
functions (Dacey, 2003a; Graham-Rowe, 2003). Yet these efforts have created many
interdependent architectures that cross organizational boundaries such that often no
single entity has sole control or responsibility for security (Sewell, 2002; Anderson,
1999). Because of the highly connected nature of intranets, extranets, and the Internet,
unrelated networks and systems have potential access to one another which increases
access points for would-be attackers (Tyrrell, 2000; Jordan, 1997). The United States'
increasing dependency on information technology to manage and operate such a wide
array of critical infrastructure services from power supplies to health and social services,
provides terrorists with a tactical target and has inadvertently created a national
Achilles’ heel (Computer Security Institute, 2002; Isenberg, 2002; Moteff, 2002; Dearth,
2000). Operating in such an unsecured environment presents tremendous challenges
when one considers that our economy and society rely on the secure transmission of
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data, whether command, control, proprietary, intellectual property, financial, or
otherwise.
Although U.S. governments only control roughly 15 percent of all U.S.
infrastructure systems, they nevertheless perform essential services that rely on the CDI
-whether to interface with the other infrastructure elements or the public (Sarkar, 2003;
Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Sewell, 2002; Worthen, 2002;
Bettelheim & Adams, 2001; Tritak, 2001a). As such, national debate has emerged over
where to focus security efforts; on physical structures or on cyberspace (Council for
Excellence in Government, 2002; Nye, 2002; National Infrastructure Protection Center,
2002). As the tragic events of 9/11 demonstrated, physical attacks can result in massive
damage and loss of life in a very short period of time. Although the damage from a
cyber attack is unlikely to manifest in such a manner, the potential damage is high
(Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research Council,
2002; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001a). For example, military officials are acutely
aware that a compromised computer system could kill people just as effectively as
bombs or bullets (Krebs, 2003). Consider that an enemy could infiltrate a vulnerable
military network to inject misleading information about the location of allied and enemy
forces, leading to friendly fire casualties or an ambush. Further consider that the U.S.
military's use of networked and satellite communications increased by more than 3,000
percent from the first Gulf War to the second (Shachtman, 2003).
While an isolated cyber attack can be severely damaging (Computer Security
Institute, 2002; Moore, 1997), the impact of a successful attack on CDI elements is
likely to have a global reach (Stanton, 2000; Anderson, 1999; Roos, 1998; Everett et al.,
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1997). Evidence has shown that a cyber attack can spread so rapidly through the
nation’s networks that many victims rarely have a chance to respond (Drogin, 2000;
Clarke, 1998). Even when forewarned, it is unlikely that networked organizations would
have sufficient time to protect themselves as effective defenses can take months, even
years, to develop, test, and implement (White House, 2003).
An attack targeting the CDI would likely cost lives by interfering with medical
information systems and devices; rendering communications and electric distribution
difficult or impossible by disabling control systems; compromising financial transactions;
and disrupting transportation and shipping (National Infrastructure Protection Center,
2002; Nye, 2002). Fire, EMS, police, and others might be unable communicate to one
another at the scene of critical incidents. Dangerous fugitives or potential terrorists
could unknowingly be admitted into the country or released from custody because
police are unable access databases containing criminal histories. Overall, numerous
daily functions could grind to a halt which would likely impact both local and global
economies. As such, the question presents itself; is the nation prepared and capable of
operating “off-line” on short notice?
While the impact of a CDI attack could be shocking, simultaneous cyber and
physical attacks, referred to as swarming attacks, would endanger lives directlyaffecting both physical safety and well-being (Dacey, 2003a; Hennessy, Patterson, &
Lin, 2003; National Infrastructure Protection Center, 2002; Verton, 2002; U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2001a). A swarming attack would be used to worsen the effects of a
physical attack. For instance, a cyber attack could be used to trigger the release of fuels
or gas from a pipeline in the area of a planned physical attack thus stalling or even
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stopping emergency efforts. If the airline hijackings of 9/11 were accompanied by a
successful cyber attack on the air traffic control system efforts to clear the skies and
scramble fighter jets would not have been as effective. Had those terrorists launched a
coordinated cyber attack on communications channels, rescue teams would not have
been able to coordinate responses or evacuate first responders from the towers.
General panic among the public would have been even more likely.
While an increase in malicious cyber activity in recent years has been widely
reported (White House, 2003; Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Freund, 2003;
Deibert, 2003), the issue remains whether national leaders believe that cyber attacks
are truly a threat to national and economic security. They may feel that we should stay
focused on protecting the physical security of our citizens from terrorism believing that
future threats will most likely take similar forms. However, if anything, these recent
events point to the need for us to be prepared for the unexpected; to recognize that our
enemies have the will and ability to coordinate large scale sophisticated attacks.

Breadth of Criminal Cyber Activity
A national telephone survey conducted by Pew Internet and the American Life
Project (2001) found that Americans are deeply worried about criminal activity on the
Internet. While their revulsion at child pornography is by far their biggest concern (92
percent of Americans say they are troubled by child pornography on the Internet), 87
percent of Americans say they are concerned about credit card theft online; 82 percent
are concerned about how organized terrorists can wreak havoc with Internet tools; 80
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percent fear that the Internet can be used to commit wide scale fraud; 78 percent fear
hackers getting access to government computer networks; 76 percent fear hackers
getting access to business networks; and 70 percent are anxious about criminals using
computer viruses to alter or wipe out personal computer files. The question arises: how
realistic are these fears?
For the last seven years, the Computer Security Institute has teamed up with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Computer Intrusion Squad to conduct a nationwide
survey of computer crime and security (Computer Security Institute, 2002). This
longitudinal effort has helped researchers and industry alike understand the baseline of
such activities. The numbers released for 2002 found that for the fifth year in a row,
more respondents cited their Internet connection as the point of attack (74 percent)
versus their internal systems as a point of attack (33 percent). Forty percent detected
either Denial of Service attacks and/or outside penetration attacks on their systems.
Seventy-eight percent detected employee abuse of Internet access privileges (for
example, downloading pornography, use of pirated software, or inappropriate use of email) and a full 85 percent detected computer viruses.
Computer Security Institute further reported that during 2002, 90 percent of
respondents (primarily large corporations and government agencies) detected some
form of computer security breach and 80 percent acknowledged that they suffered
financial losses as a result. Of the 44 percent of respondents willing to quantify their
losses, the total figure eclipsed $455 million for 2002 alone. Yet only 34 percent of those
that experienced a security breach reported the intrusion to law enforcement. Figures
released by the Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie Melon University
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stated that nearly 35,000 attacks were reported in the first 10 months of 2001 alone.
This proved a 60 percent increase over the entire previous year (McWilliams, 2001).
Further, a 2001 study by researchers at the University of San Diego found that Denial of
Service attacks, such the one that froze Internet traffic in 2000 to such large sites as
CNN.com and Ebay.com, are currently being launched at a rate of nearly 4,000 per
week (Costello, 2001). Collectively these findings indicate that there is much more
unauthorized

and

criminal

activity

going

on

in

cyberspace

than

commonly

acknowledged.
Further, an overwhelming number of sources (Department of Homeland Security,
2003; Costello, 2001; Vatis, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001c; European
Committee on Crime Problems, 2000; Reames, 2000; Stambaugh et al., 2000; Stanton,
2000; Triagaux, 1998; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998) note that the
speed, virulence, and maliciousness of cyber attacks have increased dramatically in
recent years. Criminals have used the Internet to penetrate such high profile
organizations as the Pentagon, the White House, the FBI, the Department of Defense,
NASA, Los Alamos, Microsoft, and AT&T (Computer Security Institute, 2002; Bettelheim
& Adams, 2001; Costello, 2001; Dacey, 2001; Vatis, 2001; Cheney, 1999). Additionally,
in recent years powerful worms and viruses have been used to launch numerous cyber
attacks globally including the widely publicized ‘Melissa virus’, ‘I Love You virus’,
‘SirCam worm’, ‘Code Red I/II worm’, ‘Nimda worm’, ‘SQL/Sapphire worm’, to name a
few (Symantec.com, 2003; Dick, 2001; McDonald, 2001; Rhodes, 2001). According to
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (White House, 2003) the Code Red worm
infected 150,000 computer systems in just 14 hours. Conservative estimates of 2001
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corporate losses from the Code Red and Nimda worms are over $3 billion due to lost
productivity and costs to disinfect systems (Freund, 2003). The SQL Slammer worm (ITISAC, 2003; Fisher, 2003a), infected over 200,000 computers and generated more than
7 million error events in North America alone. Worldwide it affected between 400,000
and 700,000 computers, clogged networks, and stalled Internet-enabled devices.
Despite the evidence, some critics (Koerner, 2003; Deibert, 2003; Shachtman,
2002; Verton, 2001; Roos, 1998; Smith, 1998) still speculate that the actual threat to the
critical digital infrastructure is over inflated, much like the dot.com technology market of
the late 1990s. Indeed, attacks targeting the CDI itself remain rare (Computer Science &
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002). However, in October
2002, NIPC reported that the 13 root-name servers that provide the primary roadmap
for almost all Internet communications were targeted in a massive Denial of Service”
attack (Dacey, 2003a; Associated Press, 2002). Seven of the servers failed to respond
to legitimate network traffic, and two others failed intermittently during the attack.
Howard Schmidt, former vice chairman of the White House’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board, avers that the threat is undeniably real and indeed
serious, stating, “…the more we depend on the critical infrastructure being run by IT
systems, the harder we’ll have to work to make sure we don’t fall into the situation
where these threats become more than just an inconvenience” (The New Atlantis,
2003). So what exactly are the threats to CDI elements and who is vulnerable to them?

27

Exploiting Vulnerabilities
In order for a threat to exist two conditions must be present. First, there must be
the capability for a threat to occur, such as the presence of a vulnerability. Second, it
must be possible to exploit the vulnerability (Anderson, 1999). As a principle of
computer security risk management, a vulnerability is “the absence or weakness of a
safeguard in an asset that makes a threat potentially more harmful or costly, more likely
to occur, or likely to occur more frequently” (Miller & Gregory, 2002). As such any
information and communication technology element from information systems and
internal controls, to implementation methods and design could potentially contain an
exploitable vulnerability (Phoha, 2002; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996b). Often
even the best security systems are unknowingly vulnerable. Only a few years ago a
private research and development company was hired to covertly determine the security
of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) network systems (Goodman, 1997). Within
the first week, the ‘hacking team’ successfully broke into 65 percent of all DoD systems.
Further, the DoD only detected 4 percent of the occurrences.
According to many sources (White House, 2003; Department of Homeland
Security, 2003; Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research
Council, 2002; Noonan, 2001; Wulf, 2001), vulnerabilities are surfacing faster than the
country's ability and willingness to respond. Between 1995 and 2003, Computer
Emergency Response Center (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University documented over
10,000 computer technology vulnerabilities. While certainly an alarming number,
remedies known as “patches” or “fixes” have been made widely available to correct
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many of these vulnerabilities (Fisher, 2003a; Computer Science & Telecommunications
Board and National Research Council, 2002). Even still, the technology research firm,
the Gartner Group (Associated Press, 2002) projected that through 2005, 90 percent of
computer attacks will continue to succeed by exploiting known vulnerabilities for which a
corrective patch is available but simply not installed.
The most recent Internet Security Threat Report (2003) released by Symantec
Corporation, a global leader in Internet security technologies, states that approximately
60 percent of all documented vulnerabilities remain easily exploitable either because
exploit tools are widely available or are not required at all. The report further notes that
of the vulnerabilities newly identified during 2002, a full 85 percent were recognized as
moderate or severe. It has been estimated that as much as 95 percent of today's
successful attacks exploit these commonly known flaws using widely available
automated tools (Forman, 2003). As such, a savvy attacker with a modest degree of
sophistication can easily exploit numerous vulnerabilities found in today's commercial
software products. Addressing this state of affairs, a security bulletin on the Microsoft
website (2003) offered a somewhat bleak and condescending suggestion to network
administrations ”…don't hold your breath waiting for a patch that will protect you…
sound judgment is the key to protecting yourself…”.
The Internet Security Threat Report suggests a trinity of events has led to the
dramatic increase in system vulnerabilities of recent years. First, the IT industry has
come under increased pressure from media coverage of high-profile attacks which has
creating a push for responsible disclosure of known flaws. Second, researchers are
using new methods to discover software bugs and fix vulnerabilities before would be
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attackers exploit these defects. Finally, the report along with other research (Verton,
2003a; 2003b; Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Computer
Science and Telecommunications Board, and National Research Council, 2002;
Denning & Baugh, 2000) suggest that a significant portion of software and hardware
flaws can be squarely attributed to vendors, who, in the rush to get commodities to
market, fail to make security a priority during product development.
The critical digital infrastructure is dependent on the availability of reliable and
secure networks (Anderson, 1999). Yet it is well documented that many of the features
that make the underlying information systems so successful, such as distributed
networking and plug-and-play compatible software/hardware, make the CDI inherently
vulnerable to attack (Dacey, 2003b; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2001;
Public Technology, 2000; Sunshine, 1999). For example, consider that electronic mail
systems, commonly referred to as email, have long been a source for intruder break-ins
(Rhodes, 2001; Fraser, 1997). This is because by its very nature, an email system
requires access to the outside world and most email servers accept input from any
source. A 1999 study found that 84 percent of respondents admitted to regularly
sending and receiving personal email at work (Naughton, 1999). By digitally interacting
with so many potentially unsafe sources, employees unknowingly introduce threats into
otherwise protected networks- and would be attackers know this. For instance,
concerns about instant messaging security were heightened by the recent disclosure of
six vulnerabilities in America Online Inc.'s instant messaging software ‘Mirabilis ICQ’.
Cnet.com (Lemos, 2003) reported that the most recent version this software has been
downloaded from its site more than a quarter of a billion times; no doubt a countless
30

number of these were onto government computers. If left unpatched, exploiting these
ICQ vulnerabilities could create dangerous holes in enterprise firewalls, leaving
sensitive data exposed on public networks resulting in the unprotected transfer of files
(Vijayan, 2003).
Another seemingly innocuous technology is the Domain Name System (DNS)
that is used to match and verify network names to host addresses (Phoha, 2002;
Fraser, 1997). This one system is absolutely vital to the secure operation of any
network. An attacker who is able to successfully control or impersonate a DNS server
can re-route or divert network traffic to a compromised system. Likewise, they could
trick users into providing confidential information such as passwords or credit card
information. Finally, consider wireless technologies that are being widely adopted
because they allow users to move handheld devices or laptops from location to location
without wires and without losing network connectivity. Forecasts made by IBM and
Symantec at the 15th Annual Canadian IT Security Symposium warned that by the
decade's end viruses, hacking, and security breaches of wireless-based systems will be
a top problem for IT administrators (Careless, 2003). The inherent vulnerability and risk
to wireless technologies lies in the underlying communication medium, the airwaves,
which is virtually open to snooping intruders. This makes wireless communication more
prone to loss of confidentiality and integrity. Among the biggest challenges of wireless
connectivity is that an infected device can upload viruses or malicious code directly into
an organization’s network whenever it is synced (NetScreen Technologies, 2003b).
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Threats and Attacks
Just as each technology has inherent weaknesses as well as distinct security
safeguards, each is also accompanied by an array of unique threats (Institute for
Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Fraser, 1997). In other words, means and
methods of exploiting vulnerabilities have become as diversified and specific as the
targets. For instance, email servers are highly vulnerable to viruses and worms.
Commonly used threats and techniques include sniffers, backdoors, DoS, worms, logic
bombs, social engineering, probing, false authentication, tunnels, spoofing, Trojan
horses, malicious applets, war dialing, password crackers, et cetera (Hansell, 2003;
Freund, 2003; Hobbs, 2000; Sager et al, 2000; U.S. Department of Justice, 1999;
Trigaux, 1998).
The same as the means of each threat differs, so do the aims. Yet
fundamentally, there is a limited number of archetypal threats to information security,
namely, denial of service; unintended disclosure of information; unauthorized disclosure
of information; and unauthorized access to resources/information (Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1998; Moore, 1997; Fraser, 1997). Depending on intentions,
compromises due to threats can be either observable, such as an active virus, or
clandestine, such as espionage in search of classified information. Would be attackers
could use a combination of both to plot future cyber strikes or swarming attacks by
mapping U.S. information systems, identifying key targets, and lacing infrastructure
elements with back doors and other means of access (Goldberg, 2003).
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Additionally, threats can either be deliberate or accidental (Computer Science &
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002; McWilliams, 2001;
Moore, 1997; Mills, 1995). Accidental compromises occur because of either natural
causes, such as a lightning surge that causes part of a network to fail, or human error,
such as a programming mistake that creates a weakness in a network or unintentionally
cutting a communications cable during excavation. However, deliberate compromises
are the result of conscious human action. Security experts often refer to the efforts of
these malicious actions as attacks.
As the number of individuals with computer skills has increased, so to have the
number of readily available and relatively easy to use intrusion and hacking tools.
Security experts note that there are thousands of websites that offer free digital tools
that let people snoop, crash, modify, or even hijack computers (Dacey, 2003a; Tritak,
2001a; Bissett & Shipton, 2000; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998).
As such, a person's technical skills o not have to be very sophisticated to cause
damage (Wulf, 2001; Sager et al, 2000). However, in recent years it seems the goals,
methods, and means of attacks have been changing (Computer Science &
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002; Anderson, 1999).
During the 1990s, most hackers operated like vandals,
…attacking vulnerable targets with an experimental, shotgun
approach. Malicious hackers concentrated their efforts on
destructive viruses and swiftly spreading worms that crawled
haphazardly across the Internet, infecting individuals and
corporations indiscriminately (Freund, 2003).
Today there are far more dangerous and targeted attacks carried out by highly
skilled hackers motivated by financial gain and armed with the expertise to cause
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serious damage (Freund, 2003). Hackers have moved beyond basic tools like viruses
and port scanners to more sophisticated techniques that use such tools in concert
(Hobbs, 2000). For instance, there are now computer worms that can remotely open
back doors on networks. These mechanisms monitor traffic, intercept passwords, and
establish secret communication channels for the hacker to use to pluck sensitive
information at will. Additionally, recent attacks involve ‘rapid mutation’, where the level
and source of cyber-threat changes rapidly in unpredictable ways. This is generally
combined with the characteristic of ‘diverse origin’ where an attacker need not be
localized in relation to the target. Aas such an attack can be orchestrated by any
number of globally distributed actors. While attacks have always exhibited this quality,
greater experience combined with more sophisticated attack strategies and techniques
have made the identity of cyber-attackers increasingly difficult to ascertain (McDonald,
2001). Further, attacks are increasingly utilizing stealthy attributes of criminal espionage
to launch more effective and destructive attacks with minimal warning. As such, not all
attacks are created equal as some are more destructive than others.
Despite the real and growing threat from cyber attacks, most cyber offenses fit
under the umbrella of “internet fraud” (Cheney, 1999). These offenses involve “any type
of fraud scheme that uses one or more components of the internet, chat rooms,
message boards, Web sites, or e-mail, to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective
victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, or to transmit the proceeds of fraud to
financial institutions or to others connected with the scheme” (Department of Justice,
May 8, 2000, p. 1). In 2002, 47 percent of all fraud complaints filed with the Federal
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Trade Commission were Internet-related, up 16 percent from just three years earlier
(Shim, 2003).
Until recently, the majority of computer fraud and network intrusions were
committed by current or former employees, referred to as insiders (Nash, 2003;
Computer Security Institute, 2001; McCarthy, 1998; Goodman, 1997; Charney, 1994;
Hurewitz & Lo 1993). Katz and Carter (1998) state that the reason for this is that
“…insiders are familiar with their employers’ data processing operations and the type of
data each system and application is storing and processing… and therefore know
exactly where to look for information” (p. 224). These criminals often act because they
feel the company owes them something. As such, motivation could be for profit by
stealing and selling intellectual property or the offender might feel that the organization
wronged them and thus destroying data and software would be revenge (Dacey, 2001;
Dick, 2001). Additional motivation exists as mere opportunity.
Upon addressing the threat of insiders, the National Manager of NITSSC,
Michael Hayden, reminds how information systems contain “…vast amounts of sensitive
and classified mission critical data. The potential for abuse is obvious” (NSTISSAM
INFOSEC, 1999, forward). Yet criminals continue to obtain sensitive IT jobs because
organizations, including elements of the US government, often fail to require
background checks on new technology workers. For instance, the leader of an
international hacking ring credited with a series of attacks against U.S. computer
security organizations between 2000 and 2002 was found working as a support
technician in a U.K. office of Siemens Communications (Roberts, 2003). While currently
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it is not know whether the man compromised his employer or client systems, the point is
criminal hackers work right under our nose within the information infrastructure.
The 1997 report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection recommended allowing limited exemptions for private employers to request
consensual background checks and to administer polygraphs to employees in sensitive
positions. Yet background checks and polygraph examinations are not the industry
standard. In an interview for Computer World Magazine (Verton, 2003a), the CEO of a
U.S. executive search firm remarked, "I'm surprised at how few of my clients actually do
background checks on their information security professionals... at most, they require
me to do a reference check." This alarming habit demonstrates the potential ease with
which ill-intending individuals can get hired into sensitive positions.
Complicating the issue, consider the serious challenges and vulnerabilities
accompanying the growing reliance the U.S. software industry has on overseas
developers in such countries as India, Pakistan, Russia, and China. A recent study by
Gartner Inc. predicted that by 2004, more than 80 percent of U.S. companies will
consider outsourcing critical IT services, including software development to foreign
companies. Opportunistic foreign employees could potentially program backdoors into
vital software that can later be exploited. In light of recent changes in the global security
environment, this scenario poses a very real threat (Verton, 2003a).
While insiders will continue to pose a threat to information security for these and
other reasons, a recent study by Deloitte & Touche found that 90 percent of network
and system attacks are now coming from external forces and only 10 percent from
inside sources. This shows a marked change from recent years were 60 to 70 percent
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of attacks were internally sourced. When asked about this shift, a spokesperson with
Deloitte & Touche commented, "As organizations become more connected there are
more doors people can rattle to get in" (Nash, 2003, online). According to Symantec
Corporation (2003) attacks originating from within the United States accounted for more
than 35 percent of all of the attacks reported during 2002. Rounding out the top five
sources of cyber attacks were South Korea, China, Germany, and France. Launching
23.7 attacks per 10,000 Internet users, South Korea appears to have the most attackers
per capita among countries with large online populations. The U.S. is not in the top 10
of this list.
The FBI (Dacey, 2003a) notes that increasingly terrorists, transnational criminals,
and foreign intelligence services are using information exploitation tools to destroy,
intercept, degrade, or deny access to data. As of yet, the White House (2003), does not
believe that any traditional terrorist group has used the Internet to launch a assault on
the US infrastructure. However, former White House cyber-security czar Richard Clarke
recently said, "…[information technology] has always been a major interest of al-Qaeda.
We know that from the laptops… we've recovered that have hacking tools on them. It is
a huge mistake to think that al-Qaeda isn't technologically sophisticated, a fatal one"
(Fisher, 2003b).
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Government and the CDI

Increasingly, government units at all levels are turning to information and
communication technologies to improve and increase the services they provide (Council
for Excellence in Government, 2003; Dunn, 1999; National Research Council, 1999;
Center for Technology in Government, 1997a). A certain extent of this technical
migration is mandated by federal legislation (Committee on the Internet in the Evolving
Information Infrastructure, 2001; Government Electronics and Information Technology
Association, 2001; McDonald, 2001; Tritak, 2001a), for example, the Federal Paperwork
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. §3501) and more recently, the Government Information
Security Reform Act (NetScreen Technologies, 2003a). In some instances, state
legislatures impose their own technical mandates on subunits of government, as is the
case in Florida with statute 282.5004 which required Y2K compliance; statute 943.08
which mandates the coordinated sharing of criminal justice and other public safety
system data; and statute 408.913 which requires the development of a comprehensive
health and human services eligibility access system (Florida Statutes, 2002). By and
large, however, updating services and procedures through the implementation of
advanced digital and communication technologies remains at the voluntary discretion of
each individual government, often at the departmental level (Council for Excellence in
Government, 2002).
One of the more publicly touted government uses of IT is known as “electronic
government” (henceforth, e-government). E-government is “…the use of technology,
particularly web-based Internet applications, to enhance the access to and delivery of

38

government information and services to citizens, business partners, employees,
agencies, and other entities” (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 2003, p.6). The wideranging goal of e-government is to seamlessly integrate back-end business processes
involving suppliers, contractors, and partners with front-end processes aimed at clients
and customers (FTAA, 2002; Anderson, 1999). Such efforts often necessitate the
creation of new departments and procedures; hiring IT and security experts; and
regularly call for multi-year initiatives (Kayyem & Howitt, 2002). When these matters are
successfully addressed, e-government can provide citizens and businesses with 24/7
self-serve access to services in the areas of income taxes, social security,
un/employment, official records, passport applications, drivers licenses, car registration,
building permits, public libraries, and more (Arrison, 2002; Dacey, 2001; Deloitte
Research, 2000; Dunn, 1999). Electronic services to businesses are equally vast and
generally deal with permits, records, taxes, licenses, declarations, and procurement,
among other services. In 2002, the Center for Digital Government predicted that state
and local governments would spend $78.1 billion on IT in that year alone (Pratt, 2002).
The benefits of e-government are numerous and documented (FTAA, 2002;
Council for Excellence in Government, 2002; Rathmell, 2000; National Research
Council, 1999). For example, a 2003 report released by Intergovernmental Advisory
Board found, "States that implemented E-government programs for grants management
streamlined their processes, eliminated paperwork, reduced application processing time
and saw their staff costs reduced by as much as 35%" (p. 13). However, incorporating
networked information and communication technologies into government is far from a
service-delivery panacea as it introduces numerous issues pertaining to data privacy,
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accessibility, and of course security. For example, in a recent report prepared for the
House of Representatives, the U.S. General Accounting Office revealed that a review of
Internet security of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exposed almost 900
weaknesses across the 11 IRS organizations (Dacey, 2003a). The report stated that
while most of the weaknesses were in the areas of access and authorization, all of the
weaknesses could be traced to the incomplete implementation of an agency-wide
security program. Corroborating these findings was former White House cyber security
czar Richard Clark (Fisher, 2003b) who criticized that the government is actually less
capable of securing its networks that it was a year ago and additionally it is doing an
unacceptable job of helping the private sector lock down critical infrastructures.
Perhaps the most disconcerting account of the state of overall government
computer security is the annual congressional report card on computer security
conducted by the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management & Intergovernmental Relations in conjunction with the General
Accounting Office (Dacey, 2002). The 2002 analysis reported that the computer security
of nearly two-thirds of the federal government's 24 major agencies earned failing marks.
Among the failing department were the Justice Department, State Department, Office of
Personnel
Department,

Management,
Interior

Treasury

Department,

Department,
Agriculture

Energy

Department,

Department,

Federal

Emergency

Management Agency, and Transportation Department. The analysis concluded:
…federal systems were not being adequately protected from
computer-based threats, even though these systems
process, store, and transmit enormous amounts of sensitive
data and are indispensable to many federal agency
operations (p 12).
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Defense

Commenting on the report, Rep. Stephen Horn (R-CA) stated "September 11
taught us that we must be prepared for attacks. We cannot allow government
operations to be compromised or crippled because we failed to heed that lesson"
(Krebs, 2002). Indeed these attacks have spurred a detailed re-evaluation of many
spheres of life as Americans have become acutely aware of how vulnerable and
interconnected all of infrastructure systems are (Hecker, 2002; Kayyem & Howitt, 2002;
Bettelheim & Adams, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001c).
As outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (1998), the basic federal
approach to critical digital infrastructure protection has remained a strong policy
preference for consensus-building and voluntary cooperation rather than regulatory
actions (Tritak, 2001a). Yet experts have long warned that local, state, and national
agencies have yet to fully achieve consensus or truly function in the spirit of cooperation
(Whitehouse, 2003; Dacey, 2003a; Monroe, 2002; Posner, 2002; Collins, 2001;
Willemssen, 2001; McCarthy, 1998; Dalrymple, 1998; Center for Technology &
Government, 1997a; 1997b). Further, they do not share enough information and
generally lack a working plan to deal with cyber attacks (Bettelheim & Adams, 2001).
Among the challenges is that the nature of security concerns for the federal
government, local governments, the military, and industries differ. This has led to
problems since these sectors often share infrastructure elements for reasons of
efficiency and economy (Schumacher & Ghosh, 2000).
The U.S. General Accounting Office (Dacey, 2003a) reports the need for federal
agencies to provide outreach efforts to state and local government to increase their
infrastructure protection efforts. The current Homeland Security initiative designed to
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meet this need is The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which endorses
partnership, exchange, as well as local and private buy-in, which are all seen as
essential to success (White House, 2003). Supported in large part by the newly created
Department of Homeland Security, the strategy calls for coordination and outreach to
state and local governments through collaborative pubic-private activities, such as
sharing best practices; evaluating and implementing new technologies; raising
cybersecurity awareness; increasing criminal justice activities; and developing national
security programs to deter future cyber threats (Hecker, 2002; Walker, 2002).
Billed as a strategy rather than a plan it calls for a change in thinking on the part
of computer security professional and the public. Yet realizing this strategy will involve
more than jargon. It will call for grants, regulations, tax incentives, regional coordination,
and accountable partnerships. It will require the systematic identification of the unique
resources and capacities of each government unit followed by an accurate matching
between these capabilities and specific tasks (Posner, 2002; National Research
Council, 1999). It will also entail identifying and then tackling weaknesses.

Local Government
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at
what is weak (-Sun Tzu, The Art of War).

Typically, local government information systems are not directly attacked
because they do not yield enough valuable information commiserative with the effort
and risk involved (Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003; Public Technology, 2000). Yet as
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local governments continue to connect more systems to the Internet and offer more
services via these networked systems the amount of “exploitable information” will
increase. Conversely, so to will the return from breaching these systems. Currently,
however, local systems are generally attacked because successful breaches create
media attention, and/or quite simply, because these systems are generally weak
(Gartner Consulting, 2000).
According to Symantec Corporation (2003), opportunistic attackers often locate
and strike any vulnerable system connected to the Internet regardless of who owns the
system or the specific function of the system. In this situation a victim is not targeted but
rather selected after being recognized as vulnerable. Targeted attacks, however, are
directed at a specific organization. In theory, individuals who launch these types of
attacks have identified a target and have made a deliberate attempt to gain access to its
network. In this situation, an attacker looks for ANY weakness that will enable him/her to
gain access to the targeted organization (Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection, 2003; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). Therefore, in
both cases weak systems are targeted.
State and local government information systems and security procedures have
increasingly come under fire for being weak links in the larger national infrastructure
protection efforts (Dalton, 2002, Yim, 2002a; Davies, 2001). A study by Gartner
Consulting (2000), noted that for most small and medium size local governments
information security is not approached as a full time job thus leading to the creation of
significant security issues. Public Technology Inc. (2000) also noted that local
jurisdictions often have either inadequately trained staff or simply lack an adequate
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information security staff. This, in combination with insufficient security budgets, creates
vulnerable systems.
Weak information security efforts among local governments have been
documented for years and continue to be highlighted (Brock, 2000; Dacey, 2000; PDD63, 1998; Smith, 1998; Crescenzi, 1996; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996a;
Solomon, 1995; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). As a case in point, the “2002 State of America’s
Cities Survey” revealed that only 26 percent of city officials (n=725) indicated that cyber
threats were addressed in their city’s planning; even though 85 percent indicated that
they were concerned or very concerned about cyber attacks as a form of terrorism
(Hoene, Baldassare, & Brennan, 2002). Several reasons are regularly cited for why the
information security of local governments continues to lag behind including smaller
budgets, lack of available skilled personnel, entrenched cultures, parochial concerns,
general inertia, and fragmentation of local and state governments among others
(Hecker, 2002; Yim, 2002b; Davies, 2001). Like many small organizations, local
governments often lack the experience to adequately inform themselves about cyber
threats to their networks and systems. Operating from this uninformed position, they
often cannot justify allocating the resources for protective measures (Information
Assurance Advisory Council, 2001).

County Government
Among those facing these challenges are county governments (Gonzales, 2001;
U.S. General accounting Office, 2001c). Often called ‘invisible governments’, counties
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are generally responsible for maintaining such diverse services and programs as natural
resources; fire protection; water supply; housing and community development;
sewerage; cemeteries; libraries; parks; roads and highways; hospitals; education;
airports; utilities; and records (National Association of Counties, 2001c; Altshuler, et al.
1999). More than states or cities, counties interact with differing levels of government on
a day-to-day basis (Barrett, Greens, & Mariani, 2002). With limited power, counties are
continually squeezed by the governments above and below them. According to the
2002 Local Government Directory released by the U.S. Census Bureau there are
87,849 units of local government identified as being either general-purpose (3,034
counties, 19,431 municipalities, and 6,506 townships) or special purpose (13,522 school
districts and 35,356 special districts). As such, an average county has 28
general/special purpose sub-county governments operating within its jurisdiction.
All but two U.S. states (Connecticut and Rhode Island), and the District of
Columbia have operational counties governments 4 (National Association of Counties,
2001c). The number of counties per state ranges from three in Hawaii to 254 in Texas.
Geographically, counties span an equally broad range varying in size from just 67
square kilometers (Arlington County, Virginia) to the 227,559 square kilometers of North
Slope Borough, Alaska. The mean county population is just under 80,000 people yet
three-fourths of all counties have populations smaller than 50,000. Despite the
averages, counties remain as diverse as the populations they serve. For instance,
Loving County, Texas, serves approximately 150 inhabitants, while Los Angeles

4

Alaska and Louisiana refer to their counties as boroughs and parishes respectively.
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County, California, serves more than 9 million. In addition to the 3,034 traditional U.S.
counties, 31 are chartered to operate as city-county governments where functions are
consolidated (i.e., Duval/Jacksonville, Florida; San Francisco, California; and New York,
New York). Regardless of charter distinctions, administrative rights and responsibilities
are generally vested by state constitution or statute (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002a;
Altshuler, et. al. 1999).
According to the National Association of Counties (2001c), there are three main
types of county governance, Commission/Administrator, Council Executive, and
Commission. The commission form of government, the oldest form of government in
America, remains the most widespread (72 percent). A descendent of the old English
shire-moot system (Iowa State Association of Counties, 2003), counties are
characterized by an elected governing board, usually comprised of three to seven
members, which holds both legislative and executive powers. The board serves as the
governing body for the county and is responsible for the budget, passing resolutions,
and enacting locally relevant ordinances and regulations.
Strained interorganizational communication and cooperation are commonplace
within county government, whether between officials, departments, or municipalities
(International City/County Management Association, 2002). These relationships can be
difficult and even acrimonious. Among the greatest challenges is the structural reality
that counties are run by numerous elected officials who do not have to report to the
Board of Commissioners or single county administrator. For in addition to the board,
several constitutional posts are filled through general elections to head major county
offices. These often include Sheriff, Property Appraiser, Supervisor of Elections, Tax
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Collector, and Clerk of Court, though this varies considerably from county to county.
These department officials often claim that their mandate comes directly from the voters
and as such they do not need direction from an external administrative body (Barrett,
Greene, & Mariani, 2002). This is especially true with regard to IT related issues were it
is common for agencies to invest in solutions aimed specifically at meeting only their
needs without general thought to the interplay between the agencies themselves
(National Research Council, 1999). For example, in Palm Beach County Florida, the
Property Appraiser, Tax Collector, Clerk of the Court, State Attorney, Sheriff, Public
Defender, and Supervisor of Elections all have their own autonomous IT staffs and
systems (Governing.com, 2002). Compounding these IT challenges are the barriers
which exist between local, state, and federal governmental bodies. According to one
county official,
Inter-jurisdictional coordination and cooperation is a major
challenge. Many government services and work processes
transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Despite the willingness
of the parties, it is often difficult to align the focus, priorities
and capabilities of the agencies (Governing.com 2002).
Many counties are beginning to assess how to restructure relationships among
contiguous local entities to take advantage of economies of scale; promote resource
sharing; and improve coordination of preparedness and response on a regional basis
(Monroe, 2002, Posner, 2002). Counties are also rethinking roles and responsibilities
with regard to information security as they are becoming increasingly aware of the
vulnerabilities of their information technology systems (Kouns, 2003; O’Connell, 2003;
Barrett, Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Gonzales, 2001). In recent years, counties across the
nation have created steering committees and appointed information security executives
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(known as Chief Information Officers, Chief Technology Officers, or Chief Information
Security Officers) to work towards greater IT security (Lee, 2001; West & Berman, 2001;
Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). These information security executives are
generally brought in to provide technological vision and management. In addition, they
are often responsible for technology planning such as sponsoring collaborative planning
processes; establishing strategic partnerships; coordinating divisional initiatives; general
infrastructure and application development; ensuring ongoing investment; and
outsourcing (Gartner Group, 2002; Frazer, 1997).
Along side national and state leaders, county IT directors work on the front lines
to balance public demands and entrepreneurial growth with cyber security and national
defense. An online survey conducted by CIO Magazine (2002) revealed that the
majority of IT executives spend more of their time engaged in strategic planning than
pure technology. While they take an obvious leadership role in terms of the
organization, systems, and the underlying IT infrastructure; they dispense a
considerable amount of energy attempting to steer knowledge management and the
valuation of intellectual capital. It is often the case that IT directors report to senior
executives, commissioners, and elected officials who do not necessarily have a great
deal of technology-related knowledge (Sarkar, 2002; National Research Council, 1999).
As Gartner Consulting (2000) reported in a recent study, ”The cold hard fact is that most
elected officials, city managers, and chief administrative officers do not understand the
internet or its profound influence on government operations and citizen demands” (p. 9).
As such, part of the job of an IT director is selling not only the value of technology but
also the value of security (Forman, 2003; Perlman, 2002a).
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Information Security: More than Technology

Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not
the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army
without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence (-Sun Tzu,
The Art of War).

The nature of the Internet is an intrinsic trade-off between utility and security
(Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research Council,
2002; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; McCarthy, 1998). As a rule
(Collins, 2001), the best and most secure systems are the ones built with security in
mind from the ground up. However, security is not built into the Internet itself, thus, as a
society we are now tasked with retroactively securing a living system that was designed
to be open for easy connectivity with few controls (Bettelheim & Adams, 2001; Cohen,
2000). Consequently, information security remains an unpredictable circle of action and
reaction (Doddrell, 1996). When vulnerabilities are corrected, attackers look for new
paths to exploit and so on. Yet security is still practiced only half-heartedly throughout
much of the government and corporate America (Dacey, 2001; Willemssen, 2001). In
the journal Issues in Science and Technology, author George Smith (1998) frankly
suggested, “If organizations don’t intend to be serious about security, they simply
should not be hooking their computers to the Internet”. While undoubtedly a valid
suggestion, this option is simply not realistic.
To understand information security, it is important to note that information
systems, both automated and manual, are composed of three basic elements:
information transfer links, information processing nodes (including storage), and human
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factors (Phoha, 2002; Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection & the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 1998).
Fundamentally, information security is the protection of information systems, whether
transfer or processing, against unauthorized access, modification, or denial of service to
authorized users (Schumacher & Ghosh, 2000). Information security includes those
measures necessary to prevent, detect, document, counter, and mitigate such threats
(Guel, 2001; Center for Technology in Government, 1997a). It involves “…determining
what you need to protect, what you need to protect it from, and how to protect it. It is the
process of examining all of your risks, then ranking those risks by level of severity”
(Fraser, 1997, p. 4). The more complex a system is, the more likely critical
vulnerabilities will exist and potentially be overlooked (Collins, 2001).
If for a moment one assumed that all technological holes could be secured today,
there would still be the introduction of new vulnerabilities at some future point and of
course human error (Wulf, 2001). Many compromises result from improper configuration
(Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003; Computer Science & Telecommunications Board
and National Research Council, 2002). For example, a system firewall may be
improperly configured to allow web access when, in fact, the system should only
transmit and receive e-mail or an operating system may lack a critical "patch" because
the system was restored from a backup tape that did not include the patch in the first
place. In light of the numerous points for error, information security is best approached
holistically bearing in mind how technological, managerial, organizational, regulatory,
economic, and social aspects interact (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection,
2003; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003; Everett, Dewindt, and
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McDade, 1997; Korzyk & Wynne, 1997). With so many aspects involved in executing
even the simplest functions, points for error are potentially innumerable. Consequently,
maintaining a holistic vantage to information security is vital as one weak link can topple
even the strongest systems.
At the heart of information security are three ideas commonly referred to as the
information security triad (Miller & Gregory, 2002; Wulf, 2001; Fraser, 1997). These
ideas are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality can be thought of as
privacy, secrecy, or control of information. When a system lacks confidentiality, there
can be a “leak” of information and resources. Integrity commonly refers to the quality
and reliability of data. When integrity is lacking, system data can easily corrupted or
modified

by

attackers.

Data

integrity

includes

protecting

data/systems

from

unauthorized modification and ensuring that transferred data is safely sent/received
between known reliable sources. Availability is simply that; having systems and
functions available when needed by those authorized to use them. The opposite of
availability is commonly referred to as denial of services, denial of use, denial of
information, or simply denial. Taken collectively, an IT manager is therefore concerned
with the level of risk associated with loss of privacy (i.e. unauthorized individuals
reading of confidential information), loss of data (i.e. corruption or loss of information),
and the loss of service (e.g. running out of data storage space; denial of network
access; or overburdening computational or processing resources).
To simultaneously achieve these three qualities, information security is layered
whereby some layers are designed to protect, some to detect, and others offer fail-safes
(Collins, 2001). Additionally, security is compartmentalized, like a honeycomb with trap
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doors, where flexible layers are set up as defense barriers to contain breaches to the
smallest area possible. The “Common Body of Knowledge” (henceforth, CBK), also
referred to as the “ten domains of information security”, encompasses the breadth and
base of knowledge deemed necessary for information security professionals to
successfully apply and integrate these vital layers (Miller & Gregory, 2002). The CBK,
maintained and amended by the nonprofit organization International Information
Systems Security Certifications Consortium (ISC2), is the international compilation and
distillation of security material relevant to IT security professionals. Briefly described, the
10 areas are (ISC2.com, 2003):
1. Access Control Systems and Methodology: Mechanisms that work together to
create a security architecture for protecting information system assets.
2. Applications and Systems Development: Security as it applies to application
software development.
3. Business Continuity Planning: Preservation and recovery of business operations
in the event of outages.
4. Cryptography: Principles, means, and methods of disguising information to
ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.
5. Law, Investigation and Ethics: Computer crime laws and regulations as well as
technologies used to investigate computer crime incidents.
6. Operations
Security:
Controls
for
hardware,
media,
operators/administrators with access privileges to said resources.

and

the

7. Physical Security: Protection techniques for an entire facility from the outside
perimeter to inside office space, including all information system resources.
8. Security Architecture and Models: Concepts, principles, structures, and
standards to design, monitor, and secure operating systems, equipment,
networks, applications, and controls used to enforce confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.

52

9. Security Management Practices: Information assets and definitions for the
development, documentation, and implementation of policies, standards,
procedures, and guidelines.
10. Telecommunications, Network, and Internet Security: Network structures,
transmission methods, and transport formats used for transmissions over
private/public communications network.
Staying on top of each of these knowledge areas is a near Herculean task for IT
professionals. Yet, the Computer Science & Telecommunications Board together with
the National Research Council (2002) report that isolated human error is usually not the
cause of security problems, rather it is management practice. Indeed, faced with everdynamic technology innovations, IT managers are frequently pressured to make quick
decisions based on incomplete information, limited staff, short budgets, and imposing
demands from executive management. Common decisions involve trade-offs between
services offered, ease of use, and costs on one hand, and security, confidentiality,
integrity, and availability on the other. In the end, security administrators must not only
be adept with all areas of the CBK but must also be knowledgeable of government
regulations, physical security, public-private sector partnerships, and management
practices (Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003; Radcliff, 2002; Cohen, 2000).
Overwhelmingly, the information security literature emphasizes the importance of
methodical and meticulous management as the key to information security and
homeland defense (Whitehouse, 2003; Perlman, 2002a; Posner, 2002; Collins, 2001;
Willemssen, 2001; Anderson, 1999; McCarthy, 1998; Dalrymple, 1998; Center for
Technology & Government, 1997a; 1997b). For example, the U.S. General Accounting
Office (1996a) cautioned that the “introduction of newer, faster, cheaper technology is
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not a panacea for flawed management practices or poorly designed business
processes” (p. 5). The Accounting and Information Management Division of the U.S.
Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems (Brook, 2001; 2000) avers that the
underlying problem with government information security is poor management.
Research by Public Technology Incorporated (2000) found that effective information
security is not just a technology issue to be left to the ‘technology people’ but rather
requires strategic and business acumen on the part of IT management. Research by
West and Berman (2001) conclude that IT officers need to combine their technical
expertise with management savvy to successfully work across departments and
functional areas to achieve strategic objectives. Further, the Institute for Information
Infrastructure Protection (2003) determined that well-designed information security
“…require[s] expertise in information management and security technologies, as well as
an understanding of policy requirements, business models, and organizational
processes" (p. 24).
Fundamentally, information security management involves ensuring that
adequate information security tools are properly in place; that staff is trained to use
these tools; that enough time is available to use them properly; and that all personnel
are held accountable for their information security practices (Computer Science &
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002). Yet it is ultimately
more complex as administrators are required to interface with processes and
organizations beyond their immediate functional areas. IT security managers must
possess a unique understanding of information-related risk and the ability to make
prudent decisions on the interaction of many divergent elements, often with incomplete
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information (Cohen, 2000). Mark Forman, Chief of Information Technology for the Bush
administration, affirms that government IT leaders need to possess three distinct
knowledge and skill areas, namely, an understanding of the business of government, an
ability to effectively manage resources, and the possession of solid management skills
(Frank, 2001). The task then for these individuals is to understand this balance, to
understand how to leverage the technology, to understand how to instigate change, and
to be able to motivate action up and down the organization. As such, information
security strategies lean toward managed progress, rather than natural growth in an
attempt to control influences (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999).
Literature on information management (Cowings, 2001; Center for Technology in
Government, 1997a; Moore, 1997; NIST Bulletin, 1995; August, 1994) highlights three
responsibilities unique to IT managers, (1) anticipating and understanding technological
change, (2) anticipating and understanding information security, and (3) maintaining
effective communication between IT and non-IT divisions. Merging these ideas, Everett,
Dewindt, and McDade (1997) suggest that managers strategically approach information
security as a mosaic, whereby each piece, or element, is understood in terms of the
effect on the sum total. This also includes a mindfulness of elements which exist outside
of a manager’s immediate area of responsibility or authority, such as other
organizations with which relations take place. This is perhaps most especially true with
regard to government information systems, for as the Center for Technology and
Government (1997a) points out, "No government information system stands completely
on its own. Each system is implemented in a work environment that includes people,
processes, organizational relationships, and other systems" (p. 36).
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Indeed, the

Intergovernmental Advisory Board (1998) has noted that current approaches to
managing governmental information technology are evolving and key among the new
approaches is intergovernmental management. Further, Frank McDonough (2002),
Deputy Associate Administrator of the U.S. General Services Administration, firmly
states that intergovernmental management will be the challenge for information security
in the next 20 years. He notes several converging conditions which support this position
including a Presidential administration focused on improving information security; a
demonstrated need to integrate distinct databases to meet homeland security needs;
the presence of program overlap between numerous agencies in a time of budget
deficits; and the need to acquire/train IT staff after a decade of personnel freezes.
Collectively, these conditions point toward the growing importance of integrated
systems and collaboration which are at the heart of intergovernmental management.
To appreciate the interplay of these activities as they relate to governmental
information security, it is essential to comprehend the nature and theory of
intergovernmental management (henceforth, IGM). As such, it is necessary to first
understand intergovernmental relations (henceforth, IGR) as they are the bedrock of
intergovernmental management. Therefore, the next chapter discusses IGR as an
identifiable organizational endeavor at the heart of IGM before presenting contemporary
applications of the theory of intergovernmental management in the context of
information security.
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III. THEORY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Intergovernmental Relations

The American system of government is a delicate balance of partnerships
between national, state, local, and private bodies (Carlson, 1988; Elazar, 1964). Since
inception, this system has been marked by an undercurrent of shared powers and
responsibilities rather than merely their separation (Stenberg, 1984). In practice, the
distinctions between governments are often blurred whereby no unit truly operates
independently (Ellison, 1998). This degree of interdependence requires not only
increased levels of transparency and accessibility but also the skillful use of
compromise, negotiation, and coordination on the part of intergovernmental partners
(Governments Without Boundaries, 2002; Nelson, 2001; Luke & Caiden, 1999;
Stenberg, 1984). As such, inherent to the American system of government is the
practice of intergovernmental management; however, as a theory IGM is relatively new
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001).
The origins of IGM can be traced to the notion of intergovernmental relations that
rose to prominence in the 1930s when the federal government undertook this initiative
to reduce the turmoil of the Great Depression via innovative intergovernmental
programs introduced as part of the New Deal (Wright, 1992; Macaluso, 1984).
Consequently, the term “IGR” came to be associated with liberal, progressive, and
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active government ideas that defined that era. However, the first official (statutory) use
of the term IGR did not occur until 1953 when Congress created the temporary
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Wright, 1983). Over time, the subtleties
and distinctions of intergovernmental relations continued to evolve and reflect the
political movements and events of the day; proving the scope of IGR to be broader than
its early characterization.
Differing from traditional federalism, which emphasizes independent levels of
government and divided functions (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983), IGR focuses on
relationships between governments which develop in the pursuit of a common goal.
However, a review of the literature reveals no singular definition of intergovernmental
relations. Therefore, a sampling of several definitions will help to provide a framework
from which to begin this discussion. According to Denhardt (1995), IGR encompass
“…all the complex and interdependent relationships among those at various levels of
government as they seek to develop and implement public programs” (p. 75). Cooper et
al. (1998) aver that IGR consists of the connections and competition which characterize
the way public sector managers deal with one another and with the body politic.
Frederickson (1997) contends that IGR is "the wide range of types of organizations and
institutions that are linked together and engaged in public activities” (p. 84). Regardless
of how they are defined, intergovernmental activities and partnerships permeate the
national landscape as they are utilized to deliver an array of federal, state, and local
programs for everything from food stamps to hazardous waste cleanup.
While the breadth of situations for which intergovernmental solutions are
employed is vast (Allen, 1994), often, the legal and political incentives for government
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units to operate separately are much stronger than the incentives to cooperate.
According to interorganizational theory, which focuses on the relations between
organizations by looking at interdependencies and strategies (Kickert, Klijn, &
Koppenjan, 1997), there are six general drives for relationship formation, namely, out of
necessity, to balance asymmetry, for reasons of reciprocity, to increase efficiency, to
foster stability, and to produce legitimacy (Oliver, 1990). The decision to pool resources
and share authority with another organization is largely based on weighing risks against
returns (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). The resolution to proceed requires that
both the structure and dealings of a proposed intergovernmental relation will respect
existing jurisdictional boundaries (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983). Yet, even when
agreements on such matters are reached, Turner (1990) suggests that tension between
governments may remain problematic for power sharing near guarantees that relations
will remain unstable.
Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2001) note that there are only four ways in
which IGR are actually created. They are; 1) through formal constitutional change,
which redefines the roles and responsibilities; 2) through non-statutory agreements that
set out obligations and commitments for specific policy areas, such as the environment;
3) via statutory and binding obligations, such as intergovernmental transfers; and 4) the
final way in which most intergovernmental relationships are created is by means of
informal agreements among political leaders or managers to undertake a certain course
of action. Research (Cooper et al., 1998) has found that regardless of how they are
created, intergovernmental or cooperative agreements usually pertain to a single
activity; concern services rather than facilities; are not permanent but contain provisions
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for future renegotiations or termination; have stand-by provisions that come into effect
when certain conditions arise; and are endorsed by higher levels of government.
The Intergovernmental Advisory Board (1998) suggests that intergovernmental
collaboration is warranted when “…no single agency or organization has the authority,
resources, or expertise to address a problem that cuts across geographic and political
boundaries” (p. 7). However, Powell et al. (1996) point out that such collaboration
should not be viewed simply as a means to compensate for a lack of internal resources.
Rather IGR can be a means to further develop and strengthen the existing internal
competencies of an organization as well as “…deepen [its] ability to collaborate, not just
by managing relations dyadically, but by instantiating and refining routines for
synergistic partnering” (p. 199).
Deil Wright notes that once agreements are reached IGRs bear several
fundamental qualities. In his 1982 book titled Understanding Intergovernmental
Relations, Wright outlined five distinctive features of IGR that still pervade the literature
on the subject over twenty years later. First, governmental units of all types and levels
participate in IRG activities and relationships. As such, IGR encompass not only the
national-state exchanges at the heart of the federalist system but also the essential
associations and affairs between national-local, state-local, and interlocal units (Luke &
Caiden, 1999; Cooper et. al, 1998; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; Agranoff &
McGuire, 1998). As explained by Wright (1983), “IGR suggests that the U.S. system
(singular) is in fact a system of systems (plural)” (p. 423). The second aspect common
to IGR is the human dimension. William Anderson (1960) pithily addressed this tenet
over 40 years ago when he wrote; “It is human beings clothed with office who are the
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real determiners of what the relations between units of government will be” (p. 4). The
influential, yet highly amorphous human component includes the attitudes, perceptions,
and general aptitude of the individuals occupying positions in the various governmental
units (Denhardt, 1995, Gargan, 2000). The third distinctive feature of IGR is that officials
regularly interact with officials from other jurisdictions. Whether these interactions are
for the purpose of exchanging resources, information, or views, they are not one-time
occasional occurrences; rather they underscore day-to-day patterns of contact (Agranoff
& McGuire, 1999). Further, these interactions are not capriciously or arbitrarily
undertaken but are instead targeted efforts to realize specific aims (Luke & Caiden,
1999; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983). A fourth mark of IGR is that from Senators to
community program directors all public servants are potential participants in
intergovernmental processes; whether they simply phone another organization to ask a
question or they design an interlocal service delivery system. The fifth and final aspect
common to intergovernmental relations is policy. Many researchers (Denhardt, 1995;
Ellison, 1998b; Bohte & Meier, 2000; Gargan, 2000) contend that public policy is
formulated and achieved in an interactive and intergovernmental context. That is,
behind the obvious macro workings of political gears, policy is in large part generated,
implemented, and maintained by the micro interactions and activities of governmental
officials (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). These actions also include inactions,
intentions, discretion, and their combined consequences (Wright, 1983). The melding of
these mercurial micro-elements into the backdrop of policy-making often produces an
unpredictable environment for practitioners (Ellison 1998b; Denhardt, 1995; Oliver,
1990).
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Wright provides a crisp summary of these five distinguishing attributes of IGR in
a piece which appeared in the 1983 Handbook of Organizational Management (p. 425):
IGR encompasses linkages among all governmental entities
in the U.S. political system, emphasizes the human
dimension of the cross-boundary relationships, includes
exchanges among officials (especially administrators),
acknowledges that the exchanges are frequent and follow
regular patterns, and incorporates policy or purposive
behavior as a prominent element in the study and practice of
the field.
While IGRs share these fundamental characteristics, understanding modern
IGRs in this country requires understanding that relationships among governmental
units are multi-dimensional. Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2001) note that each
individual intergovernmental arrangement may vary on a number of unique structural
traits, such as, whether the relationship coordinates horizontal (peer) or vertical
(superordinate and subordinate) groups; is formally mandated or informally voluntary;
structurally or procedurally driven; or institutionalized rather than ad hoc. IGRs can also
vary in the number of participants (bilateral, multilateral, or regional); the types of
participants (bureaucratic, political, private, or nonprofit); or the nature of the interaction
(consultative or decision-making). Furthermore, a unit of government may have
simultaneous and overlapping relationships with different jurisdictions, at various levels,
to address a single issue (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Wright 1993).
Despite structural differences between IGRs, successful cooperation and
administration can produce several advantages for participating governments, such as;
the creation of a united front for building public support for regional programs; increased
political power through multi-jurisdictional cooperation; shared liability; consistent laws,
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regulations,

policies,

or

practices

across

affiliated

jurisdictions;

and

efficient

management of pooled resources (Cooper et al., 1998). In addition, IGR can create
interagency committees to study various issues; launch or coordinate proactive or
reactive initiatives; coordinate local developments within the bounds of national or
statewide plans; provide ways to lessen overhead through merged planning and
administrative requirements; as well as call attention to fiscal, regulatory, and other
impacts of pending legislation (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001; Stenberg, 1984).
The interdependencies which underlie contemporary policies, programs, politics,
and economics connect governmental units more closely than ever before (Gargan,
2000; Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Wright, 1998). Through intergovernmental
collaboration, information, resources, and ideas are exchanged, but for IGRs to be
successful, participants must think beyond to needs of their immediate organization and
develop a shared vision. Through concerted efforts or simply via frequent and repeated
interaction, managers can not only establish rules and patterns necessary for
intergovernmental collaboration, but can also develop this important sense of common
purpose (Kickert & Klijn, 1997). Cooper et al. (1998) point out that understanding the
extent and role of intergovernmental relations facilitates a better awareness of the
scope of public administration in the American political system; the type of activities that
public officials regularly perform; the major actors involved in the delivery of public
goods and services; and the ever-changing administrative structure for addressing
critical policy issues. This awareness brings into focus patterns of behavior fundamental
to policy development and program administration that are otherwise obscured.
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Initiatives that cross government boundaries not only introduce participating
organizations to new patterns of cooperative behavior to but also to new complexities
(Nelson, 2000; Luke & Caiden, 1999). The interdependence born of these relations and
initiatives can impede self-governance and complicates administration. Agranoff and
Lindsay (1983) note that interdependent governments face challenges arising from
overlapping legal and statutory authority; issues of agency autonomy or turf protection;
the lack of high-level administrative support for or incentives to coordinate; the lack of
perceived independence; and general difficulties in standardizing interjurisdictional
procedures. Group Decision Support Systems (2002) points out that cross-agency
initiatives often lack a comprehensible connection between vision, strategy, and
management. This can be due to several causes such as; the lack of a detailed
assessment of the current situation; a lack of clarity of the leader's intent; the lack of
continuous involvement of the leaders; fragmentation at the top; a general lack of
communication; and/or the initial rationale is no longer relevant.
Underlying these intergovernmental challenges is the need to achieve balance
between the autonomy of subnational government units and the federal need to retain
control of such units (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). Adding to this complexity,
each partnering jurisdiction has its own governance, structure, procedures, and
authority (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983). It is often the case that collaborating governments
have different budget cycles, application formats, monitoring procedures, decisionmaking processes, and reporting procedures. Taken together, these matters force
program managers and administrators to contend with some difficult tasks such as,
delineating

accountability,

determining

funding
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obligations,

and

standardizing

interjurisdictional procedures (Stenberg, 1984; Macaluso, 1984). Addressing these
matters and meeting the challenges inherent to intergovernmental programs and policy
implementation are of central concern to government managers and administrators.
Research (Bolman & Deal, 1999; Luke & Caiden, 1999; Cooper et. al, 1998; Wright,
1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983) has shown that intergovernmental management can
provide essential skills, techniques, and direction to minimize these challenges.

Intergovernmental Management

From overlapping authority, to issues of autonomy and turf protection, the
intricate issues inherent to operating within and across intergovernmental associations
create many challenging tasks for managers. Balancing goals against these complex
challenges requires coordination and cooperation between government units. As such,
intergovernmental concerns call for intergovernmental management (Gargan, 2000;
Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997). According to Wright (1998), the
most distinguishing and apparent feature of IGM is its emphasis of the management
process. For that reason, it is important to briefly discuss management in the classic
sense before addressing the details of IGM.
In the purest form, management has been described as “…the organization and
direction of resources to achieve a desired result” (Allison, 1999, p. 16). Yet managing
is more complex than just determining a goal and enrolling actors towards achieving
that end. Peter Drucker (1973) describes management as “…the organ of leadership,
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direction, and decision…” in an organization (p. 17). He explains that management is
equally a function, a discipline, and a task to be done. Existing within the dovetail of
these roles, management is simultaneously concerned with knowing and predicting the
future; being analytic and quantitative; as well as being rational and systematic
(Wakeley, 1983). The breadth of these concerns compels, if not requires, managers to
be functionally involved in near all aspects of the organization or department under their
charge. It involves implementing multifarious strategies, often amid disagreement and
under inconsistent conditions, to achieve cooperative solutions that affect both senior
and staff elements of an organization (O’Toole, Hanf, & Hupe, 1997).
In a classic piece from 1937, Gulick and Urwick outlined seven general
management functions: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting,
and budgeting. These functions translate into activities such as structuring and
designing an organization; setting goals for an organization; and ensuring that goals are
met (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). Exactly which specific actions fall out of these
key management functions depends on a matrix of variables not limited to the character
of an organization, decision-making patterns, and the distribution of authority (Allison,
1999; Wright, 1983).
With increasing frequency, managerial activities often need to be carried out
across formal legal jurisdictions and involve different public and/or non-profit
organizations. The routine occurrence and observance of such interjurisdictional
managerial activities is generally referred to as “intergovernmental management”
(Intergovernmental

Advisory

Intergovernmental,

1996;

Board,

Mandell,

2003,

1998;

1979).

Like
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Advisory

Commission

intergovernmental

on

relations,

intergovernmental management has been characterized many different ways causing
scholars to acknowledge that there is no set or consensual definition (Wright, 1998;
Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Agranoff & McGuire (2001) posit that the reason for this
variation is that, as a term, IGM is “…of recent vintage, specialized usage, limited
visibility, and uncertain maturity because it includes so many disparate actions…” (p.
672). Indeed, a review of the literature reveals several descriptions whereby
researchers fix upon different components of IGM. Some emphasize the role of
managerial activities (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 1999, 1998; Bolman & Deal, 1999;
Wright, 1998, 1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; Mandell, 1979); others focus on the
importance of strategy and policy (Gargan, 2000; Radin, 2000; Ellison, 1998); while still
others highlight structural integration and collaboration (Nelson, 2001; Perry & Kraemer,
1999; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998).
Despite the various points of emphasis, interpreted collectively, IGM is the
melding of interorganizational communication, strategic planning, and management
actions to achieve collective goals and manage interdependencies that arise from
intergovernmental relations. While IGR delineate connections and outline obligations
between government units, IGM goes further by employing activities aimed at
maximizing goal attainment and minimizing the challenges inherent to these
associations. Whereas IGR identifies who the actors are and how they relate, IGM is an
action-oriented process that allows administrators at all levels the wherewithal to act
constructively (Mandell, 1979). Intergovernmental management provides the capabilities
to take useful actions to enable intergovernmental relations to succeed. As such,
intergovernmental management is an extension of intergovernmental relations.
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Typical IGM actors are managers, such as information technology managers,
program officers, and elected officials who are charged with maintaining intricate public
programming (West & Berman, 2001; Cooper et al., 1998). However to one degree or
another, most public managers and officials have engaged in some form of IGM
whether or not they were consciously aware of it (Wright, 1999, 1983; Anderson, 1960).
Agranoff & McGuire, (1998) assert that IGM techniques are enacted when three
elements converge namely, strategic activity, interdependence, and multiple actors.
That is, when conditions are uncertain and complex (requiring strategic activity); when
problems and/or solutions have a direct effect on other governments (evidence of
interdependence); and when collaborative efforts span multiple governments, sectors,
or organizations (multiple actors). Striving to solve problems and meet goals in such an
environment requires balancing and accommodating the mercurial political, legal, and
technical idiosyncrasies of simultaneous and even conflicting formal relations and
informal entanglements. Doing so commonly includes the complex execution of
decisions and the mutual adherence to agreements as determined by participants.
In and of themselves, the outcomes of IGM activities generally do not change
social structures or eliminate complex problems. The reason is that intergovernmental
management is less concerned with macro changes that amend the larger political,
economic, and social equilibrium (Radin, 2000; Bolman & Deal, 1999). Rather IGM
regards policies, programs, systems, and structure principally as given and
concentrates more on “…incremental adjustments in managerial activities that enhance
service delivery” (Wright, 1998, p. 420). The foremost objective of IGM is achieving
positive results through skillful public management. In practice the “nuts and bolts of
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substantive issues” are of principal importance in intergovernmental management
(Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983, p. 229). Because of this utilitarian nature, intergovernmental
management can be employed ad hoc in response to conditions that arise across
affiliated governmental units.
While the unstructured application of IGM techniques are seemingly common, as
a developing theory several distinctive functions of IGM have been identified. In the
manner of Gulick and Urwick’s 1937 assessment of the general functions of classic
management, Wright (1983) identified three general, yet not wholly mutually-exclusive
functions of IGM. He posits that the most prominent courses of action in
intergovernmental management are 1) problem solving; 2) networking; and 3) providing
coping mechanisms.

Problem Solving
Among the tasks common to all managers is to solve problems in a responsive
and responsible way (McGowen, 1998; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997). Yet Wright (1983)
suggests that in an intergovernmental context problem solving is more than a task; it is
the driving force of all activity. From this vantage, intergovernmental management is “an
effort and a process where problem identification and strategies to problem resolution
are the guiding notion” (Wright, 1983, p. 431). To be successful, participants must
assume a joint-task orientation to problem solving because eventually, technical
problems, authoritative issues, and political pressures must be overcome so that
working solutions can be produced. Yet rising above these matters to arrive at viable
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solutions can be challenging. Research by Ellison (1999) has found that cooperative
rather than coercive mechanisms work better when intergovernmental associates share
similar objectives. When intergovernmental linkages are grounded in reciprocity they
are typically characterized by balance, equity, and mutual support, rather than by force
and conflict (Oliver, 1990).
While technological and logistical issues are comparatively easy to resolve, the
more thorny points to working intergovernmentally involve

bridging

different

governmental cultures (Nelson, 2001). Among the leading concerns for problem solving
within multi-jurisdictional settings are the legally established roles and relationships.
Such jurisdictional demarcations regularly connote separate political, fiscal, and
bureaucratic systems. To deal with these challenges, IGM actors must proceed slowly,
incrementally, and on an issue-by-issue basis to devise jointly-owned solutions. This
involves developing “…perceptions of similarities and common concern, relatively open
exchange of information, and search and selection of alternatives that benefit more than
one party” (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983, p. 235).
Research by Agranoff & Lindsay (1983), which indirectly explored problem
solving as an undertone of IGM, found that intergovernmental collaboration appears to
be the most successful when the driving force behind cooperative efforts is developing
solutions to specific matters at hand. Keeping the collaborative focus on a common
issue(s) instead of on the morass of cooperation imbues efforts with a purposeful
directive that appeared to be a particular component of success. Also essential was
regular testing and renegotiating of resolutions, as well as the willingness of key actors
to make adjustments and even submissions in the service of reaching solutions.
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Intergovernmental problem solving often involves extensive 'nuts and bolts’ work,
such as, in-depth analyses of the current state of a problem, examining similar
experiences in other communities if possible, investigating the current and potential role
of various partners, and budget permitting, hiring consultants (Nelson, 2001; Radin,
2000; Oliver, 1990). Regardless of the various ways and potential means, for
intergovernmental problem solving to be successful eventually decision makers must
reach agreement, put it on paper, and implement the resolutions in the relevant
jurisdictions. Jurisdictions and the actors representing them should remain focused on
real issues while working toward reaching decisions that produce courses of action to
ultimately solve problems (Stever, 1993; Stenberg, 1984). According to Agranoff &
Lindsay (1983) two of the most important ingredients enabling distinct governments to
effectively cooperate are maintaining a consistent focus on the problem at hand and
making adjustments to resolve that particular problem.
Through intergovernmental problem solving, government bodies often make
arrangements with other governments whereby the solutions require subsequent and
regular interaction (Wright, 1990). As such, an essential element of IGM problem
solving is coordination. The lack of measured coordination and cooperative interaction
can damage, stall, or even halt seemingly well-designed solutions and/or polices during
formation or implementation (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). In order for
coordination to succeed, intergovernmental initiatives demand an understanding of the
needs and wherewithal of all participating organizations (Governments Without
Boarders, 2002). These insights can be developed and harnessed via networking.
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Networking
The swift evolution of communications, transportation, and information
processing have connected governments such that the problems and programs of one
government can have both immediate and delayed effects on another (Luke & Caiden,
1999). Notions of wholly-autonomous or isolated government operations have been
displaced by intricate networks of interdependence. Whether joined through subtle or
explicit interdependences, government units at all levels find themselves enmeshed in
intentional

and

unintentional

intergovernmental

relationships

(O’Toole,

1997).

Consequently, working within and across multiple intergovernmental relations are now
key public management undertakings (Posner, 2002; Frank, 2001; Osborne, 2001). As
a result, intergovernmental networking and managing interdependencies have become
undeniably more widespread and routine. Therefore, in addition to problem solving, a
major function of intergovernmental management is to deal with these network-like
circumstances, that is, to navigate interdependencies (McDonough, 2002; Davies,
2001).
Successful management in a world of complex intergovernmental problems,
programs, and policies requires that jurisdictions locate actors who possess the
additional

resources that they need to achieve their goals. To this end,

intergovernmental managers will find themselves regularly networking with numerous
agencies, managers, and directors to stay abreast of the exploitable strengths and
transmittable weakness of each but will only actually collaborate with the ones that can
provide targeted or categorical resources (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998). As such, a
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critical element in intergovernmental problem solving, and hence goal achievement, is
employing networking techniques and strategies to strengthen intergovernmental
relationships whereby a jurisdiction is well-positioned to quickly and successfully
interact with critically positioned or endowed actors.
Minimizing barriers, such as local political opposition, misunderstandings, and
lack of information is a critical component of successful IGM activity (Chi, 2000).
Intergovernmental management makes use of networks and networking strategies as
positive

means

with

which

to

navigate

intergovernmental

relations

and

interdependencies (Mandell, 1979). Increasingly, public administrators recognize that
quality intergovernmental management includes being attuned to the subtleties of
partner governments. As such, intergovernmental initiatives should be preceded by a
thorough understanding of the needs and capabilities of all participating governments
(Nelson, 2001). While developing this insight requires a large investment of time and
resources, understanding the challenges and functional realities of intergovernmental
allies can clarify misperceptions, which in turn, can augment trust (Dearth, 2000;
O'Toole, 1997). As such, whether formal or informal, dealings with intergovernmental
partners

are

just

as

important

as

internal

dealings

from

the

vantage

of

intergovernmental management (Denhardt, 1995). Research by Agranoff and Lindsay
(1983) found that awareness of partisan issues, differences, ideological stances, and
political undercurrents contributed to successful intergovernmental cooperation and
coordination.
Networks and networking, within the context of intergovernmental management,
should not be confused with network management. Technically, network management
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could be an intergovernmental activity if it occurs in a government setting where no
single central authority or hierarchical ordering exists. However, in essence, network
management is enlisted to maintain structural stability among formally recognized
linkages and policy-driven connections (Kickert & Klijn, 1997; O’Toole, 1997). As Kickert
& Koppenjan (1997) point out, network management assumes three general purposes,
namely, intervening in existing patterns of relations, consensus building, and problem
solving. It is important to note that these purposes are in the service of the network; that
is to maintain the network. Intergovernmental management, however, enrolls
networking strategies and fosters networking connections in situations where multiple
stakeholders need to agree on goals and strategies (Luke & Caiden, 1999). As such
networking activities, as used via intergovernmental management,, are in service of
solving an intergovernmental problem rather then in service of general coalition building
and maintenance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Wright, 1998; O’Toole, 1997).
Although similar, network management focuses on harmonizing strategies that
exist within a set network; whereas intergovernmental management employs networking
techniques to foster intergovernmental collaboration to craft joint strategy to address a
specific problem or utilize others as resources. Network-oriented techniques which are
regularly employed via intergovernmental management include mediation, arbitration,
and mobilization (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997; Oliver, 1990). In practice, these skills
translate into such intergovernmental management activities as assessing one’s
connections to make a rough inventory of principle contingencies and alliances; looking
for opportunities to coordinate resources and goals amongst allied governmental units;
routinely striving to locate key allies at crucial nodes; and building trust among partner
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governments to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation in the interest of solving or
coping with problems (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1993; Stenberg, 1984).

Coping Capabilities
Whether emanating from federal, state, or interlocal sources, not all
intergovernmental policies and programs emerge with stable or clearly delineated
procedures to delegate responsibility, allocate resources, or assign authority (Falcone &
Lan, 1997). Nevertheless, subnational governments are regularly required to comply
with vague policies and implement ill-fitted programs which filter down through the
federal system (Agranoff, 2001). Yet local jurisdictions do not just acquiesce to the
impulse and wish of state and national leadership and mindlessly adopt policies and
programs as they appear (Stever, 1993; Turner, 1990). Rather they strive to adjust
policies and programs to best serve their own local social, political, and economical
needs (Bohte & Meier, 2000; Cooper et al., 1998; Stenberg, 1984). Sometimes local
governments are successful; sometimes they are not.
Coping mechanisms, like such time-honored techniques as bargaining and
negotiating, are often used to try to facilitate these adjustments. Yet administrators are
not encouraged “…to exercise bureaucratic discretion since their role is believed to be
executing policies crafted by legislators” (Chi, 2000, p. 301). At the same time, however,
public managers are expected to behave like their private sector counterparts and
“…maximize efficiency, engage in risk taking, and gain reputations as entrepreneurs”
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(Gargan, 2000, p.649). In an effort to walk this fine line, local managers enroll problem
solving techniques and call upon networked allies in other governments and/or offices to
make intergovernmental initiatives as effective and productive as possible. However,
there are instances and circumstances which can not be ‘solved-away’ or altered. In
such situations, where a policy must be adhered to as is or a program produces
unintended negative outcomes, a primary function of intergovernmental management is
to provide coping strategies and mechanisms.
Localities often revert to coping strategies when rules, standards, or guidelines in
and of themselves function as impediments to the general purposes for which higher
level and local managers are working (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998). As such, coping
strategies generally attempt to either change official policy/program specifics or seek
regulatory/statutory relief, flexibility, or waivers (Radin, 2000; Wright, 1983). Yet as
Falcone and Lan (1997) point out, intergovernmental actors from all levels of
government routinely draw on an untold number and variation of coping techniques,
depending on the assembly of subtle nuances unique to each situation. For example, in
one situation an appropriate strategy might involve continuously assessing one’s current
strengths and weaknesses to avoid unforeseen outcomes; another set of circumstances
might call for seeking media attention to invoke public protest concerning, for example,
unfunded mandates; or a situation could simply require creating or modifying formal
communication structures.
From the perspective of intergovernmental management, coping is fundamentally
a management function, whether it entails the implementation of a minor technique or
takes the form of a multilateral strategy. Equally, coping can be carried out in isolation
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by a jurisdiction, such as to achieve its own ends within an intergovernmental
partnership or to serve its unique needs within the bounds of a compulsory program and
policy. Field studies conducted by Agranoff & McGuire (2001) found that considerable
managerial time is spent engaged in intergovernmental transactions trying to fit local
programs into national or state standards, rules, and regulations. In these instances, a
jurisdiction might request a suspension or alteration of particular program requirement
or regulation; it might attempt to redefine its program as a model or experiment; or it
might seek to trade off strict compliance for increased flexibility.
Mounting interdependencies linking legally separate and distinct jurisdictions
simultaneously generate problems and opportunities (Luke & Caiden, 1999). Whether
used to stave off emerging and seemingly unavoidable problems or to seek a closer fix
betwixt

policy/programs

and

localities,

coping

strategies,

as

a

function

of

intergovernmental management, are vital to the success and maintenance of
intergovernmental relationships and initiatives. Yet, employing coping techniques and
mechanisms do more than just accommodate jurisdictional idiosyncrasies; they
inadvertently test and refine the details, structure, and overall viability of the very
relationships and initiatives they preserve.
By challenging policies, rules, procedures, and relationships, coping strategies
enacted via intergovernmental management extend the principle of checks and
balances and enliven experimentation and innovation. Radin (2000) expressed a similar
sentiment when he wrote that regulatory discretion was not only “a way to meet the
unique needs of individuals states, [but] it has also been closely tied to a research and
development strategy, providing latitude to non-federal jurisdictions for experimenting
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with new innovations and new ways for delivering services” (p. 154). By implementing
reactive coping techniques, intergovernmental managers can more effectively and
efficiently fulfill mutual goals without a prolonged period of laboring through legislative
channels (Chi, 2000). However adaptation and innovation require an investment of time
and resources which often works to discourage such endeavors. When these barriers
can be overcome, the coping function of intergovernmental management has the ability
to generate more mature initiatives and foster progress (Falcone and Lan, 1997).
While presented here separately, the primary intergovernmental management
functions of problem solving, networking, and implementing coping strategies naturally
overlap in practice. And in recent years, the scope and complexity of these functions
have risen significantly due in large part to external circumstances that directly impact
the shape of intergovernmental relationships (Governments Without Boarders, 2002;
Nelson, 2001; Gargan, 2000; Ellison, 1998). Among these influences are the increased
prevalence of polices/programs that demand unconventional forms of organization and
management; more willingness from federal /state governments to accommodate local
conditions; the resurgent role of state governments in creating intergovernmental
programs; and finally, increased local sophistication and capacity to work within the
larger intergovernmental system. The theory of IGM suggests that navigating these
conditions occurs within two distinct planes or environments, vertical and horizontal,
with each often employing specific management activities (Schiavo-Campo &
Sundaram, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 1999; Wright, 1983).
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Vertical and Horizontal Environments
The vertical environment includes interactions between lower and higher levels of
governments, such as local interacting with state, local interacting with federal, and
state interacting with federal (McDonough, 2000; Intergovernmental Advisory Board,
1998). The nature of federalism, combined with a historical perception of inferior local
government management, has made vertical the dominant environment in American
intergovernmental relations and management (Stever, 1993). In addition, as the federal
government oversees the intergovernmental system from the apex of this hierarchy,
state and local governments are controlled more than they are controlling and
dependent more than they are autonomous (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998).
Vertical interaction is often facilitated by the propagation of national norms, goals,
and funding guidelines (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). This ‘top-down model’ is
seemingly predicated on “…the growth of national programming and tipping the balance
within the federal system toward executive control, with the federal government
somehow "managing" its programs through state and local government managers”
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, p. 672). Through such vertical intergovernmental
management the different levels of government seek to assure top-down policy
coherence from lower governments.
In a vertical environment, local governments primarily contact state political
entities, such as the legislature; governor; or state agencies (i.e. the Office of Statewide
Technology or State Department of Law Enforcement); and federal agencies (i.e. the
Federal Communications Commission or Department of Defense) (U.S. Advisory
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Commission

on

Intergovernmental

Relations,

1993).

Activities

mainly

include

information and discretion seeking behaviors, such as seeking general program
information or funding; interpretation of standards or rules; program or project guidance;
regulatory relief, flexibility, or wavier; changes in official policy; or technical assistance
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001, 1999, 1998; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998).
The horizontal environment includes interactions among units operating within
the same level of government and the corresponding civic levels of nongovernmental
organizations (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001; Wright, 1998, 1983). Consequently,
there are several horizontal planes where interaction occurs, such as between federal
agencies; between the government bodies of different states; between agencies within
the same state; as well as between local governments, such as counties, townships,
special districts, cities. Local horizontal interaction can also occur between local
governments and semi-private agencies, such as chambers of commerce, foundations,
neighborhood associations; and with quasi-governmental organizations, such as utilities
commissions, public-private partnerships, and private industry councils (Leach, 1998).
Horizontal or bottom-up jurisdiction-based IGM activities primarily involve
policy/strategy making, resource exchange, and project based behaviors (Nelson, 2001;
Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Cooper et al., 1998; Oliver, 1990). Managing horizontally
means working within an interdependent setting and can encompass a broad range of
activities, such as building bases of support; agreeing on viable courses of action;
developing bilateral or even multilateral coping strategies; engaging in both formal and
informal partnerships; joint policy making; pooling resources and integrating differential
contributions; consolidating problem solving efforts; employing joint financial incentives;
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and acquiring technical assistance (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; Turner,
1990; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983).
The initial view of intergovernmental management processes was largely vertical,
focusing on how independent state and local governments worked to achieve nationally
established objectives (Wright, 1999, 1983; Mandell, 1979; Sundquist, 1969).
Historically, certain matters have been determined so significant to national interests
that a commanding federal role is generally accepted, such as with issues of controlling
contagious disease or defense of critical infrastructures. The vertical environment
remains equally dominate in situations where a federal role is deemed necessary
because

a

problem

transcends

state

lines

(U.S.

Advisory

Commission

on

Intergovernmental Relations, 1996), such as when polluted air from one state traverses
another state or when governmental information nodes are poorly secured in one locale,
directly affecting the security of all other nodes to which they are networked.
Yet, the last two decades have seen a considerable surge in devolution and the
push for increased responsibility among local and state governments (DiIulio & Kettl,
1999; Downs & Murray, 1996; Turner, 1990). While senior political and administrative
decision-makers are involved in the creation of formal and informal intergovernmental
partnerships, more often, the operational details are left to the operatives
(Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). With less federal help, states and localities
have been forced to strengthen their own capacitates and resources to meet this
transfer of responsibility in the face of increasingly complex intergovernmental problems
(Radin, 2000; Rivlin, 1999). As a result, the view that vertical situations lead to
predominately top-down, federally-dictated arrangements has evolved to recognize that
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vertical environments and intergovernmental relations are actually more interactive as
subnational governments increasingly make use of techniques and channels to
negotiate for their own needs (Cooper et al., 1998; Falcone & Lan, 1997). The tug-ofwar over program and policy leadership that has ensued has forced managers to find
new ways to balance federal accountability and the discretion provided to state and
local governments.
As policy responsibilities between the national and subnational governments
have evolved, authority and influence amid the different levels of government crisscross
to the point where vertical and horizontal actors often interact simultaneously (Agranoff
& McGuire, 2001; Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). Consequently, vertical and
horizontal relationships often merge, overlap, or at the very least intermingle when
issues are complex, such as protecting the critical digital infrastructure. Indeed, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Allor & Lindley, 2000), U.S.
General Accounting Office (20021c), and the Department of Homeland Security (2003)
have declared that protecting America's critical infrastructure is the shared responsibility
of federal, state, and local government in active partnership with the private sector.
Frank McDonough (2002, online), Deputy Associate Administrator of the U.S. General
Services Administration, asks government leaders “Can we afford not to collaborate”?
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Application of Theoretical Ideas

As a concept, intergovernmental management conveys an enterprise that
“…moves beyond federalism's traditional application to a sophisticated contemporary
understanding of how the many units of government, at all levels, relate to one another”
(Cooper et al, 1998, p. 101). As a model, it progresses beyond the vertical top-down
interpretation of the federal system (Rivlin, 1999; Lane, 1999; DiIulio & Kettl, 1999) to
capture a polycentric arrangement composed of overlapping and differentiated
authorities (Imperial, 1998; Wright, 1988). However, this research does not focus on
IGM as either a concept or a model. Nor does it attempt to explore the relative balance
of power in the intergovernmental system or how jurisdictions act in response to a shift
in absolute intergovernmental powers typical of IGM research. That is, unlike many
inquiries into intergovernmental management (Pagano & Johnston, 2000; Radin, 2000;
Guess, 1998; Ellison, 1998; Allen, 1994; Stever, 1993), this research does not focus on
IGM as a response to the effects of devolution (the substitution of subnational decision
making for national decision making), deregulation (reducing regulatory burden on
subnational governments), or decrementalism (the gradual reduction of federal program
funding) (Leach, 1998; Turner, 1990). Empirical studies that have approached IGM from
these perspectives have generally concentrated on the diffusion and management of
new responsibility through variable incentives, obligations, and controls; or focused on
how IGM is employed with regard to specific programs which have local impact, such as
community development block grants or general revenue sharing.
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Instead this research investigates the prevalence of intergovernmental
management activities, specifically, the prevalence with which county-level Information
Technology Directors use such activities in securing critical digital infrastructure
systems under their charge. This focus is grounded in several theoretical notions
discussed in the previous chapter. First among these is that managers foster
intergovernmental relations for reasons including necessity, to promote stability, or to
increase efficiency (Oliver, 1990). Literature on information security (McDonough, 2002;
Posner, 2002; Davies, 2001; Osborne, 2001; Tritak, 2001a; Willemssen, 2001) regularly
highlights these very conditions to motivate managers and leaders to develop
cooperative relationships, thereby removing interorganizational communication barriers
enabling the sharing of best practices.
The second theoretical notion being applied to information security is that IGM is
the application of such broad activities as problem solving, networking, and coping
strategies to maximize goal attainment and minimize the challenges inherent to
intergovernmental interdependencies (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 1998; Nelson, 2001;
Bolman & Deal, 1999; Perry & Kraemer, 1999; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998;
Wright, 1998, 1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; Mandell, 1979). Successful
intergovernmental management involves governments working with other governments
through informal networks or formal partnerships. Success largely depends on
participants sharing a common vision and working together under some sort of
agreement (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). This is especially true of
information security. Yet developing the coordination capabilities needed to effectively
deal with threats to the critical digital infrastructure is complex and challenging (Brock,
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2001a). It involves building trust so that information can be openly shared and
difficulties can be candidly addressed (Dearth, 2000; O’Toole, 1997). It requires that IT
managers not only know their interdependencies but also foster the relationships behind
them (Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 2000).
This is essential for several reasons, for instance, the Center for Technology in
Government (1997b) notes that traditional government services once provided by a
single agency are giving way to complex service programs that require more intricate
exchanges of information. These services increasingly necessitate networking and
innovative management (Monroe, 2002; Nye, 2002). Additionally, as Osborne (2001)
points out, emergency preparation, contingency planning, and risk management are
most durable when grounded by a unified decentralized strategy. However, for such a
strategy to work there must be a nurtured communication network between leaders and
relevant managers (Posner, 2002; Collins, 2001; Tritak, 2001a). Finally, as pointed out
by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (2002), information security
incidents do not respect geographical or administrative boundaries therefore;
management must be prepared to instantly interact with other governments, agencies,
and at the very least departments to contain a system breach. The lack of good
communication breeds confusion, poor coordination, and frustration (Center for
Technology and Government, 1997a). As such, this research is interested the extent
county IT Directors and their staffs use intergovernmental networks.
Problem solving is an ever present activity in information security. As the Center
for Technology and Government (1997a) points out, sometimes the best solution is
found in the common sense and practical experience of the managers involved. In other
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cases, as West and Berman (2001) note, information technologies present challenges
that necessitate employees and managers from different departments, fields, or
organizations to work together in an informal manner. Additionally, fiscal hardships have
spurred many local governments to find ways to pool resources on technology initiatives
and share data (Monroe, 2002). Whatever the case, the nature of information security
provides many opportunities for managing relationships, work, and problems in novel
ways. From the vantage of information security, intergovernmental management is “an
effort and a process where problem identification and strategies to problem resolution
are the guiding notion” (Wright, 1983, p. 431).
Throughout the literature on IT(Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection,
2003; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003; Miller & Gregory, 2002;
Dacey, 2001; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; Wulf, 2001; McCarthy,
1998; Everett, Dewindt, and McDade, 1997; Fraser, 1997), several management
activities are regularly suggested as means to solve problems specific to information
security. These include seeking technical and/or non-technical assistance; seeking
legal/policy guidance; seeking funding/resources; seeking information related to
information security programs; re-negotiate resource sharing/obligations related to an
information security agreement; and re-negotiate roles, duties, or procedures related to
an information security agreement. These activities are the focus of this research.
Like problem solving, coping activities are an ever present activity in information
security. Often local governments must comply with one-size-fits-all directives and
instructions from state and federal agencies (Center for Technology and Government,
1997a). Practices that are suitable in one county may be very unsuited to another.
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Making intergovernmental endeavors even more difficult, IT managers often have to
simultaneously straddle federal, state, and local electoral, budgetary, and legislative
cycles. To better deal with these and other challenges inherent to information security in
an intergovernmental setting, managers often seek out coping mechanisms from
network peers (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Collins, 2001;
U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001b). In that no individual government manager is
likely to change these systemic and environmental conditions, by pooling experiences
and sharing best practices negative consequences can be ameliorated via well-targeted
coping actions such as seeking regulatory or strategic flexibility; seeking legal/policy
guidance; seeking funding/resources or information on information security programs
(Frank, 2002; Hecker, 2002; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998).
The third theoretical notion being applied to information security is that navigating
intergovernmental relations occurs within two distinct planes or environments, vertical
and horizontal, with each often employing specific management activities (SchiavoCampo & Sundaram, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 1999; Wright, 1983). The breadth of
concerned vertical and horizontal stakeholders quickly transform digital infrastructure
protection into a slippery political quagmire. To begin with, there are information security
managers and directors; security specialists and staff; systems analysts; network
managers, administrators, and engineers; webmasters; and technical engineers.
Beyond this technical realm are such state/local intergovernmental players as mayors,
council members, county commissioners, city managers, elected officials, pubic-private
partnerships, chambers of commerce, local utilities, private industry councils, regional
initiatives, community networks, senior executives, appointed administrators, careers
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service managers, and citizens. Even beyond these horizontal actors are state
legislators, governor’s office, congressional members, lobbyists, state agencies, federal
agencies, the military, and the President.
As outlined in the previous chapter, there are several vertical levels of
government actors. This research looks at how county IT Directors/staffs interact with
federal and state agencies above them and sub-county jurisdictions (i.e. cities,
townships, special districts) below them (McDonough, 2000; Intergovernmental
Advisory Board, 1998). Also discussed in the previous chapter is that governments
horizontally interface with external contemporaries (i.e. a county interacting with another
county). Additionally, they horizontally interact ‘intra-governmentally’ with peer
departments and offices within their own government. Further, the interaction between
sub-state governments (i.e. county and local governments) are often treated
horizontally. This research with explore how county IT Directors and staffs engage in
each

of

these

vertical

and

horizontal

relationships

with

regard

to

several

intergovernmental management activities.
Whether

enacted

vertically

or

horizontally,

evidence

suggests

that

intergovernmental management activities are not merely 'add-on' or 'special tasks' but
rather routine administrative functions carried out by managers operating within the
intergovernmental system (Cooper et al., 1998; Ellison, 1998; Allen, 1994; Wright,
1983). Such intergovernmental approaches are necessary when no single agency or
organization has the authority, resources, or expertise to address a problem that cuts
across geographic and political boundaries (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998).
The intergovernmental hurdles associated with information technology and security are
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often cited as challenging and complex (Forman, 2003; Dalton, 2002; Collins, 2001;
Cowings, 2001; Center for Technology in Government, 2000). Many long established
rules and roles must be reassessed according to new and often confusing technologies
and emerging laws. Questions quickly surface as to who has the power to determine
and dictate procedure.
Consider for example, a sample of federal computer intrusion cases being tried
during 2000 under computer crime statute 18 U.S.C. §1030 revealed that 94 percent of
these crimes were interstate or International in scope (CCIPS, 2000). As such, each
case has a unique array of variables that involve an assortment of stakeholders and
public agencies representing different jurisdictions often with competing objectives and
different levels of resources. The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection
(2003) asks the question “…who is responsible for security in this information
infrastructure “commons” and who should pay for it” (p. 51). In a case of political equals,
whose laws or procedures are ultimate, for example, Arizona or Vermont? Turkey or
Austria? The broad array of issues facing leaders and managers include jurisdictionspecific problems, rules regulations, policies, agreements, mandates, funding, discretion
seeking, legitimacy, consensus building, partnerships, task forces, conflicting priorities,
and clashing authority, to list but a few.
Compared to addressing technological issues, many consider the details of
working intergovernmentally to secure cyberspace more challenging (Collins, 2001;
Willemssen, 2001; Center for Technology in Management, 2000). McDonough, (2000)
points out, “The risks of failure are greater, and turf issues can be horrendous. The
incentive

system

to

encourage

collaboration
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does

not

exist”

(p.

5).

The

Intergovernmental Advisory Board (1998) writes, “There are no structural elements in
place that encourage different levels of government to work together. Project
participants are often volunteers, coming from varying backgrounds, who work in
organizations that have different pay scales and reward systems” (p. 7). And the Center
for Technology in Government (1997b) notes,
There are very few incentives for staff to look outside their
program boundaries to share responsibility or information or
to integrate their operations with related programs. Even in
the same agency, programs usually serve to divide rather
than connect groups of people with similar responsibilities (p.
14).
Yet the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001c) avers for infrastructure protection
to succeed, “It is critical that all participating federal, state, and local agencies interact in
a seamless manner” (p. 31). Equally, Symantec (2000) urges governments to engage in
partnerships and improve interorganizational communication and information sharing.
Similarly, Tritak (2001a) notes that sharing information is necessary for technology
managers “…to obtain a more accurate and complete picture of their operational risks,
as well as acquire the techniques and tools for managing those risks” (p. 5). Each of
these suggestions or activities is intergovernmental in scale and management in
application. Each involves bridging different governmental cultures to solve problems,
network, and develop coping skills; the activities at the heart of intergovernmental
management.
Given the importance of critical digital infrastructure protection, this current
research takes a close look at the use of intergovernmental management activities and
interorganizational communication as they play such an important role in protecting
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information systems (White House, 2003; Computer Science & Telecommunications
Board, and National Research Council, 2002; Information Assurance Advisory Council,
2001; McCarthy, 1998). To that end, this research seeks to answer the questions: 1)
which IGM activities do county IT Directors/staffs most often engage in on behalf of
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 2) do county IT
Directors/staffs make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships on behalf of
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 3) is there a relationship
between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors/staff most
often engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure
protection? By discovering the intergovernmental management activities county
managers use to secure the information systems comprising our critical infrastructure,
we will be in a better position to understand our defenses and better protect ourselves
from the largely invisible threats of cyberspace.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

As the of role intergovernmental activities in county level information security has
yet to be studied, this investigation is exploratory. According to Stark and Roberts
(1998), exploratory research is speculative whereby researchers “…make systematic
observations of uncharted and little known phenomena in order to get an initial sense of
what is going on” (p. 17). Babbie (1995) notes that while exploratory studies seldom
provide complete answers to research questions; they are, however, instrumental for
providing insight into relatively new and unstudied subjects and serve to direct future
research. Therefore, the goal of this study was to take the first step, in what will
hopefully be a series, toward building a body of knowledge aimed at understanding
county level information security to better protect local elements of the critical digital
infrastructure.

Observation Unit and Study Population

The observation unit for this research was county government. As discussed in
the introduction and literature review, despite the noted efforts of many counties across
the nation (Barrett, Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Monroe, 2002; Posner, 2002; Gonzales,
2001), poor information security remains rampant among these units of governments
(Kous, 2003; Leazer, 2003; Perlman, 2002b; O’Connell, 2003; Brock, 2000; Dacey,
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2000; PDD-63, 1998; Smith, 1998; Crescenzi, 1996). As such, the information security
of these governments continues to be a concern among security experts yet it remains
largely unexplored (Misra, 2003; American City & County Magazine, 2002; Barrett,
Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Public Technology Inc., 2002; Gilmore Commission, 2001).
For this research, IT Directors functioned as county representatives. IT Directors,
also known as Information Technology Managers, Chief Technology Officers, or Chief
Information Security Officers are generally charged with technology planning;
applications development; establishing strategic relationships with key IT suppliers and
consultants; and IT staffing and training (CIO Magazine, 2002; Gartner Group, 2002;
Perlman, 2002a). As such, they are often the most knowledgeable of all aspects of an
organization’s information technology and security efforts and therefore the most
qualified to comment on the activities which their organization engages.
Specifically, the target population chosen for this research was IT Directors
responsible for constitutional offices in Florida counties, namely; the Board of
Commissioners Office, Clerk of Courts Office, Property Appraiser’s Office, Sheriff’s
Office, Supervisor of Elections Office, and Tax Collector’s Office. The population was
expected to range between 66 Directors (where one IT Director is responsible for all
county constitutional offices) to 396 Directors (where a separate Director is responsible
for each constitutional office). However, a complete population list was not found to
exist, so during October 2003 the researcher developed one from information provided
by county Human Resource Departments, as ‘key informants’. Key informants are
individuals identified by a researcher as possessing unique knowledge on the subject
under study or some other distinctive information (Babbie, 1995; Kumar, Stern, &
93

Anderson, 1993). Curtin (2003) describes a key informant a subject who is tapped to
help gain access and guide data gathering.
Among the advantages associated with the use of key informants is that the
information gathered comes directly from individuals who are deemed competent to
speak on the topic of concern (Day, Blue, & Peake-Raymond, 1998). In addition, by
employing a key informant approach it is possible to acquire rich information from
relatively few individuals. Often used in qualitative research, a limitation with relying on
key informants occurs when the role or experience of the informant is not closely
associated with the phenomena under study (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Denzin,
1989; 1970). Thus, the quality of the data acquired is dependent upon how
knowledgeable and objective the key informants are (Day, Blue, & Peake-Raymond,
1998). Given that county Human Resource Departments are specifically charged with
maintaining an accurate record of current and past employees (Volusia County
Government Online, 2003; Bay County Online, 2001; Hernando County Online, no
date); they possess the unique knowledge sought after, thus minimizing the chief
limitation of using key informants.
To develop a population list, the researcher visited all county websites to obtain
contact information for the various IT Directors. When this information was not available
on the website but an email address was listed, these offices were emailed weekly for
four weeks and asked to provide contact information for their IT director. The researcher
telephoned offices for which no email address was attained. In many instances, it was
necessary to make several calls to the same office to clarify email responses or obtain
missing information. Attempts to collect contact information stopped after a total of four
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weeks. The final number of constitutional offices for which the researcher obtained
contact information was 255 or 64.4 percent of the total 396 possible (see Table 1).

Table 1: Sampling Frame Development
Total Florida County Constitutional Offices
Offices that did not provide contact information for the IT Director
Offices that outsource their IT needs
Offices that declined to participate outright
Sub-total
IT Directors responsible for more than one office

396
-63
-72
-6
255
33

Final list of unique IT Directors included in this study

222

Variable Operationalization

To investigate the three broad research questions of this research (see the end
of the previous chapter), several conceptual definitions were operationalized. It is
important to point out that many ethical considerations inevitably arise when studying
information security and critical infrastructure protection. In that these research findings
will be available to the public, concerted attention was given to selecting which aspects
of information security to explore. In an effort to avoid revealing vulnerabilities or
jeopardizing confidentiality, this inquiry probed only for the frequency that select
activities are conducted. For this research, frequency was defined as:
Frequency: the rate at which a condition occurs in a defined time period.
It was operationalized using an established five-point Likert scale adopted from
the General Social Survey (1998). The ordinal scale is as follows- “weekly”, “monthly”,
“several times a year”, “a few times a year”, and “never”.
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The first question of this research endeavor was “which intergovernmental
management activities do county IT Directors/staffs most often engage in on behalf of
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection”. The concepts
addressed by this question were intergovernmental management activity and
information security which were defined as:
Intergovernmental Management Activity: a problem solving, networking, or
coping activity that melds communication and management to achieve
goals and manage interdependencies that arise from intergovernmental
relations.
Information Security: actions taken to reduce the probability that a threat
will exploit a system vulnerability. This includes measures to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system assets.
Intergovernmental management activity was operationalized into eight activities
regularly cited in the literature as fundamental to information security management (see
Chapters II and IV). These activities were: seek technical assistance; seek NONtechnical assistance; seek information on an information security program or project;
seek funding or resources to improve information security efforts; seek legal or policy
guidance regarding information security; seek regulatory or policy flexibility regarding
information security; attempt to modify duties or procedures of an established
partnership/agreement relating to information security; and attempt to modify resourcesharing or funding obligations of an established partnership/agreement related to
information security.
Although a defined concept in this research, information security was not
explicitly operationalized for this study. This was because this research did not attempt
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to directly measure the state of county information security but rather only the use of
intergovernmental management activities for the purpose of information security.
Therefore, as noted above, the concept of “intergovernmental management activities”
was

operationalized

as

“intergovernmental

-information

security-

management

activities”.
The second question of this research was “do county IT Directors/staffs make
more use of vertical or horizontal intergovernmental relationships on behalf of
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection”. The new concepts
addressed by this question were vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relationships
which were defined as:
Vertical intergovernmental relationships: interactions between lower and
higher levels of governments.
Horizontal intergovernmental relationships:
governments operating at a similar level.

interactions

between

In that the unit of analysis was county, vertical relationships were operationalized
as occurring with: federal units (any office, agency, or department, such as Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Federal Emergency Agency, Department of Homeland
Security, Computer Emergency Response Team, et cetera) and with state units (any
office, agency, or department, such as Florida Department of Law Enforcement, State
Technology Office, Secure Florida, et cetera). Horizontal relationships were
operationalized as occurring with: other Florida counties (any office or department
located in county government different than the respondents, such as another county's
Department of Information Technology, Clerk of Court office, Sheriffs Office, et cetera);
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other governments located within the jurisdiction of the respondent’s county (any part of
a government unit located within the jurisdiction of the respondents county, such as a
city or township et cetera); and with other departments within the respondent’s own
county government.
The third question of this research asked whether there is a relationship between
county demographics and the intergovernmental management activities county IT
Directors/staffs most often engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital
infrastructure protection. The new and wide-ranging concept introduced by this question
was demographics which was defined as:
Demographics are measured characteristics or attributes used to define a
population.
For this research, demographics were operationalized in two ways. First, to
provide for a more rich analysis, select county data publicly available from the U.S.
Census Bureau (2003) was added into the dataset. The specific attributes were: County
Population; Percent of Persons in the County with a Bachelor's Degree or Higher (age
25+); and the Level of Intergovernmental Revenue Received by the County. Second, to
capture attributes specific to each county IT department, the survey probed for unique
demographic information. Demographics specific to each county IT departments were
operationalized as: the county units that fall under the IT Director’s supervision for their
information security needs for; the online services provided by the county itself,
outsourced, or not provided at all; the perceived adequacy of funding the IT Director is
able to apply core information security needs; the percentage of the IT Director’s duties
that focus on information technology or information security related issues; and finally,
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the number of employees the IT Director supervises whose job deals only with
information technology or information security.
This study also attempted to measure two different dimensions of the
respondents’ intergovernmental relationships. These dimensions were relationship
‘importance’ and ‘degree developed’ which were defined as:
Importance: Strongly affecting the course of events or the nature of things;
significant.
Developed: Caused or influenced to acquire a more advanced or mature
role, function, or form.
Relationship importance was operationalized as how important each type of
intergovernmental relationship is to the success of the county’s information security
efforts. It was measured with the following five-point Likert scale adopted from the
General Social Survey (1998), “Extremely Important”, “Very Important”, “Important”,
“Somewhat Important”, and “Not Very Important”. Degree of relationship development
was operationalized as how developed the relationship between the county’s IT
department and each of the five types of governments/departments. It was measured
with the following five-point Likert scale, also adopted from the General Social Survey
(1998),

“Extremely

Developed”,

“Very

Developed”,

Developed”, and “Not Very Developed”.
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“Developed”,

“Somewhat

Research Instrument

The tool of this research was a self-administered Internet survey which was
emailed to respondents. As one of the most frequently used social scientific research
technique, surveys are used to make descriptive assertions about particular populations
(Leedy & Ormond, 2001; Stark & Roberts, 1998). They are particularly appropriate in
situations where the phenomena under investigation are not accessible via direct
observation (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992). Self-administered surveys are
best used in situation were respondents are perceived to possess accurate, readymade answers that they can recall and would be willing to reveal (Dillman, 2000). All
respondents were surveyed at essentially a ‘point in time’ giving this research a crosssectional design (Singleton & Straits, 1998).
There are several benefits of conducting this research with the aid of the World
Wide Web. First, because IT Directors are technology workers in addition to managers,
administering the questionnaire to them in a format they are comfortable with,
electronic, was an attempt to increase the response rate. Second, using email to
distribute the URL of the survey and the Internet to host the survey was also intended to
increase the response rate as individuals working out of town or from home were able to
receive and complete the survey if they checked their email. Third, using the Internet
helped to expedite the distribution and collection phases of data gathering. Fourth, like
traditional mail surveys, email surveys are not beholden to geographic restrictions
enabling access to dispersed populations. A fifth benefit was that by gathering data
electronically, responses were automatically entered as raw data into an aggregate flat
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data file which was imported into statistical software for analysis. By collecting and
compiling data this way, human error which can occur during data entry (Babbie, 1995)
was removed, thus producing a cleaner, more precise dataset.
The survey instrument was developed using the commercial survey service
Surveymonkey.com. Using established and proven survey-software increased the ease
and accuracy with which the survey was circulated, completed, and the data was
complied. The software also tracked in real-time which respondents completed the
survey and which had not. This allowed the researcher the ability to target only nonrespondents for follow-up contact.

Data Collection and Response Rate

Data collection employed a multiple contact strategy (Dillman, 2000) involving
four steps. First, a personalized introductory letter (see Appendix A) was mailed to the
222 unique IT Directors during the first week of November 2003. The letter introduced
the purpose of the study, expressed the need for their participation, and provided
contact information. It also alerted them that in one week they would receive a email
from “infosec@mail.ucf.edu” which would include a hyperlink to the online survey.
Enclosed with the letter was an information sheet containing research details
written with language accessible to participants (see Appendix A). According to the
University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board (2003) providing participants
with all the information they might reasonably need to know about a research endeavor
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is one of the principal researcher’s primary ethical responsibilities. Once participants
have been advised of their role and rights with regard to a study, it is necessary to
formally obtain their voluntary agreement to participate. Collectively these two steps are
referred to as the informed consent process. Specifically, that is “…the process through
which potential research participants are provided with all the information reasonably
needed for them to decide whether to participate. The process additionally provides for
obtaining voluntary agreement to participate in the research” (University of Central
Florida Institutional Review Board, 2003, p. 7).
The second stage of contact occurred one week later, when a personalized email
was sent to each IT Directors (see Appendix B). It briefly reintroduced the research,
listed contact information, and provided a direct hyperlink to the online survey.
Additionally, as part of the informed consent process, the email explained that the
survey begins with a detailed discloser of the research procedures and is directly
followed by a question asking whether they have read the details and voluntarily agree
to participate. They were informed that if they agree to participate, they must check a
box before they begin the survey (see Appendix C). This was included in the email in an
effort to lessen the likelihood that they would be confused by this section of the actually
survey.
Third, one week later, IT Directors who had been identified as non-respondents
were sent a follow-up email (see Appendix D) reminding them of the value of the
research and again providing a direct hyperlink to the online survey. Fourth, and lastly,
the following week, the remaining IT Directors who were identified as non-respondents
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were sent a second follow-up email (see Appendix E) asking for their participation. The
survey remained online until the second week of December 2003.
During data collection, several emails were returned undeliverable due to
inaccurate addresses. While most were subsequently corrected and resent, the
researcher was unable to obtain working emails for 13 IT Directors, resulting in a final
sample size of 209. Of the 209 IT Directors contacted, 125 completed the survey for a
response rate of 59.8 percent. The 125 respondents indicated that they were ultimately
responsible for the IT needs of 149 different constitutional offices as 23 respondents, or
18.4 percent, supervise two or more offices. As such, this response rate represents 37.6
percent of the total 396 constitutional offices in Florida.
Further, the respondents represent 52 different counties or 78.8 percent of the 66
counties included in this study. The 14 counties for which there was no representation
were: Bradford, Calhoun, Franklin, Gadsden, Glades, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jackson,
Okeechobee, Taylor, Wakulla, Walton, and Washington (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Florida Counties with No Representation in this Study
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Independent Variable Coding

As the majority of the absentee counties cluster in the panhandle, a new
independent variable “ZONE”, based on the US Army’s emergency and auxiliary
communications program MARS (US Army, 2004), was introduced (see Figure 2). The
goal of creating a variable that clustered counties by regions was to illuminate
underlying qualities and influential factors not readily perceptible via the standard
demographics already included in this study, such as population. For instance, does any
particular zone exhibit unique patterns in intergovernmental contact? If so what
similarities exist among the counties in that zone versus counties in other zones?

Figure 2: Florida Counties by U.S. MARS Zones

By including this variable, the researcher attempted to capture characteristics
and behaviors potentially unique to counties in Zone 1 even though this area was
under-represented (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Frequency for Independent Variable:
Which zone is the County in
Zone

Cases

Percent

Zone 1

14

11.2

Zone 2

33

26.4

Zone 3

39

31.2

Zone 4

39

31.2

N = 125

Additional inspection of the data revealed an overlap in supervisory status among
several respondents. Specifically, as already noted 23 respondents indicated that they
supervised two or more offices (see Table 3).

Table 3: Frequency for Independent Variable:
“OFFICENU” (Number of Offices Supervised)
Number of Offices

Cases

Percent

1 office

102

81.6%

2 offices

12

9.6%

3 offices

4

3.2%

4 offices

2

1.6%

5 offices

5

4.0%

All 6 offices

0

0%

N = 125

Twenty-one of these 23 respondents were responsible for the Board of
Commissioners Office plus another office(s), generally the Clerk of Court (14 cases) or
the Supervisor of Elections (11 cases). In only four instances did a respondent indicate
that s/he was responsible for a Sheriff’s Office in addition to another office. To control
for effects from overlapping responsibility, two independent variables were created. The
first variable “OFFICE” was created to include only the 102 respondents who supervise
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a single constitutional office (see Table 4). This categorical independent variable was
later used to detect difference between the six types of offices.

Table 4: Frequency for Independent Variable:
“OFFICE” -Which Office do you Supervise
Board of Commissioners
11
Clerk of Court
16
Property Appraiser
15
Sheriff
30
Supervisor of Elections
12
Tax Collectors
18
N = 102

The

second

independent

variable

“Number

of

Offices”

was

created

dichotomously to capture differences between respondents who supervised two or more
offices (23 cases) versus those who supervise a single office (102 cases). The full
dataset of respondents was then used to create six dichotomous independent variables
to capture specific differences between each individual type of office supervised versus
all others (see Table 5).

Table 5: Frequencies for Dichotomous Independent
Variables for Type of Office Supervised (N’s = 125)
Variable
Board of Commissioners
Clerk of Court
Property Appraiser
Sheriff
Supervisor of Elections
Tax Collectors

Yes/No
32/93
30/95
24/101
23/102
34/91
28/97

As noted earlier, county data collected from U.S. Census Department and the
state

of

Florida

were

incorporated

into

the
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final

dataset

to

function

as

independent/control variables. Again these independent variables were County
Population; the Percent of Person’s in the County (over 25) with a Bachelor's Degree or
Higher; and the Level of Intergovernmental Revenue Received. Univariate analysis
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality in conjunction with normal probability
plots (normal Q-Q plots) consistently revealed non-normal distributions due to severe
positive skews in the data. Efforts to correct the variables via data transformations either
failed or masked the true meaning of the data. For example, many county
characteristics, such as population, are not normally distributed across Florida counties.
Since transforming the variables or removing outliers only distorted the data, the
researcher successfully opted to minimize the skew by recoding each continuous
variable as ordinal. In an effort to maintain the true sense of the data, and thus the real
difference between counties, each variable was recoded into groups following natural
breaks in the data while trying to balance equal groups of cases (see Table 6).

Table 6: Independent Variables Recoded as Ordinal from the U.S. Census and
State of Florida
Variable

Groups

Cases

Percent

Population (2000)

99,999 or less
100k – 199,999
200k – 499,999
More than 500k

30
34
41
20

24.0%
27.2%
32.8%
16.0%

Percent of Persons w/ a Bachelor's
degree or higher, age 25+ (2000)

14.9% or less
15 – 22.9%
More than 23%

41
42
42

32.8%
33.6%
33.6%

Total Intergovernmental Revenues:
Federal, State, and Local (Fiscal Year
2000)

11.9 million or less
$12 – 24.9 million
$25 – 74.9 million
More than $75 million

29
34
35
27

23.2%
27.2%
28.0%
21.6%
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Data gathered from survey responses were used to form three additional
independent variables. The first measured the percent of the IT Director’s duties that
focus on IT related issues (PERCENT; N=124). The original question provided six
possible options (100%; 80%; 60%; 40%; 20%; and less than 20%), however, in effort
to lessen the negative skew present in this response distribution, the final three
categories (40%; 20%; and less than 20%) were collapsed in “40% or less” (see Table
7).

Table 7: Percent of Duties Focused on IT Related Tasks
Percent of Duties

Cases

Percent

40% or less

22

16.7%

60%

16

12.8%

80%

39

31.2%

100%

47

37.6%

N = 124

The second variable measured the number of employees, whose job only
supports IT, that the Director supervises (SUPERVIS; N=124). The original responses
options were “0”,”1”,”2”, …to ”25”, and finally “more than 25”. Again to lessen the effects
of a non-normal distribution of responses, the variable was recoded as ordinal (see
Table 8).

Table 8: Number of Employees Supervised (N=124)
Employees

Cases

Percent

0

27

21.6%

1-4

41

32.8%

5-14

27

21.6%

15 or more

29

23.2%
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The final independent variable derived from the survey was a composite, or index
variable. Specifically, a composite variable is created by summing several indicators to
produce a single scale of measurement (Rowe, 2002; SPSS, 1999; Hair et. al, 1998).
Often indicators are selected because they are found to be statistically correlated via
such data reduction tests as factor analysis with Cronbach's Alpha test for reliability.
However, these tests assume normally distributed data. Univariate analysis of the
pertinent factors using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality followed by visual
inspections of probability plots consistently revealed non-normal distributions.
Therefore, tests of reliability were inappropriate for creating this index variable.
While the use of statistical test to extract factors is desired, developing theoretical
grounded composites variables is an acceptable alternative (Borsboom et. al, 2003;
Wollman, 2002) hence this third variable was created to measure the adequacy of
funding for several core IT needs (IBUDGET; N=79). This variable summed seven
questions (see Table 9) that were all measured “Above Adequate” (=1), “Adequate”
(=2), “Below Adequate” (=3), and “Far Below Adequate” (=4), with the additional option
“Not Applicable” (=5). Respondents who did not answer all seven questions or who
selected the option “Not Applicable” for any question were excluded from the index.
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Table 9: Questions Used to Create the Independent Index Variable “Adequacy of Budget”
QUESTION:
How adequate is the funding you are able to apply to each of the following needs:
Above
Adequate

Adequate

Below
Adequate

Not
Adequate

IT equipment/ software/ hardware

6

4.9%

87

71.3%

20

16.4%

8

6.6%

IT security equipment/ software/
hardware

8

6.4%

73

58.4%

26

20.8%

11

8.8%

Hiring outsource vendors

0

0%

68

54.4%

20

16%

10

8%

Hiring IT personnel and support staff

2

1.6%

65

52%

32

25.6%

12

9.6%

Training IT personnel

2

1.6%

68

54.4%

39

31.2%

7

5.6%

Computer security education for NON
IT employees

0

0%

43

34.4%

40

32%

15

12%

Risk assessment/ management

1

0.8%

55

44%

43

34.4%

10

8%

However, in order to construct a more logically intuitive index, it was first
necessary to recode the variables to reverse the scores. The resulting scale ranged
from a summed score of 7, indicating the respondent perceived available funds to be far
below adequate for all IT needs, to a summed score of 28, indicating that the
respondent perceived their budget to be above adequate for all IT needs. To use this
index variable to test for group difference, it was necessary to recode the summed
scored as ordinal (see Table 10).

Table 10: Independent Index Variable for “Budget
Adequacy” Recoded as Ordinal
Index Score
7-11
12-16
17-21
22-28

Groups
Far Below Adequate
Below Adequate
Adequate
Above Adequate

Cases
6
22
46
5

Percent
4.8%
17.6%
36.8%
4.0%

An additional index variable was to be created from a series of eight questions
regarding which online services were provided by the office (see Table 11). Specifically,
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response options were “provided by the county itself”, “outsourced”, or “not provided at
all” with an additional option of “Do Not Know”.

Table 11: Question Regarding Online Services
QUESTION:
Thinking about the areas YOU SUPERVISE, please indicate whether each of the following
ONLINE SERVICES are outsourced, provided by the county itself, or not provided at all:
Permit or License Applications
Searchable Public Records
Voter Registration
Payment of Utility Bills
Payment of Tickets or Fines
Payment of Taxes
Filing electronic employment applications
Requests for services (streetlight repair, potholes, etc.)

However, review of the data showed that many respondents either skipped this
set of questions outright or overwhelming selected “Do Not Know” which would suggest
that they were unaware of whether/or how these services were being provided within
the areas they supervised. As it does not seem typical for a supervisor to –not- know
this information, the conclusion was reached that the question was not clear and
therefore all responses were excluded from this analysis.
In the end, this analysis included nine independent variables (see Table 12).
Based on the responses to these variables, the majority of IT Director in Florida
constitutional offices focus 100 percent of his/her time to the IT related needs of one
office, which has an adequate budget, and is staffed by one to four employees whose
job only supports IT. The average county constitutional office services a population
between 200k and half a million, of which between 15 and 23 percent of individuals over

111

the age of 25 have a bachelor’s degree or higher. Further the average county
intergovernmental revenue received is between $25 million and $74.9 million.

Table 12: Independent Variables
Variable
Type of Office Supervised
Number of Offices Supervised
Number of Employees Supervised
Percent of Duties Related to IT or information security
Adequacy of Budget
County Intergovernmental Revenue Totals
County Population
Percent of County Population with Bachelors Degrees or Higher
State Zones

N
102
125
124
124
79
125
125
125
125

Dependent Variable Coding

The survey was constructed in two parts, whereas the first half collected
information for independent variables, the second half probed for the dependent
variables. Collectively, the survey yielded 50 5-point ordinal dependent variables as
respondents were asked about the frequency that they engage in eight activities with
each of five types of governments (8 x 5 = 40 variables) plus two questions to gauge the
overall importance and development of their relationships with each of five types of
governments (2 x 5 = 10 variables).
Initial visual inspection of the dependent variables overwhelmingly revealed that
IT Directors have an extremely low frequency of intergovernmental contact, regardless
of activity or type of government contacted. Consequently, univariate analysis using
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality in conjunction with probability plots consistently
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revealed non-normal distributions due to these large skews in the data. Efforts to
normalize the distributions through data transformation failed and attempts to collapse
groups masked the true sense of the data. As a result, the decision was made not to
alter the variables but instead to analyze all data with non-parametric tests which do not
require data to be normally distributed. Specifically, the non-parametric tests KruskalWallis One-way ANOVA and Mann-Whitney U for independent samples were selected
and are discussed in the next section.
For the purposes of this analysis, each of these 10 groups of five questions was
seen as a “set” and each set was used to create a separate composite variable to
measure the common underlying dimension (see Table 13). Each index was created by
summing cases were the respondent answered all five indicator questions.

Table 13: Dependent and Index Variables
Dependent Variable Label

Indicators for each Level of
Government

Index
Variable

1. Seek technical assistance

…with Federal: TECHF;
…with State: TECHS;
…with another County: TECHC;
…with another Government located
within the County: TECHG;
…with another Department located within
the County: TECHD

= ITECH
N = 118

2. Seek NON-technical assistance

…with Federal: NONTECHF;
…with State: NONTECHS;
…with another County: NONTECHC;
…with another Government located
within the County: NONTECHG;
…with another Department located within
the County: NONTECHD

= INONTECH
N = 117
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3. Seek information on an IT security
program or project

…with Federal: INFOF;
…with State: INFOS;
…with another County: INFOC;
…with another Government located
within the County: INFOG;
…with another Department located within
the County: INFOD

= IINFO
N = 114

4. Seek funding or resources to
improve IT security efforts

…with Federal: RESOURCF;
…with State: RESOURCS;
…with another County: RESOURCC;
…with another Government located
within the County: RESOURCG;
…with another Department located within
the County: RESOURCD

= IRESOURC
N = 114

5. Seek legal or policy guidance
regarding IT security

…with Federal: LEGALF;
…with State: LEGALS;
…with another County: LEGALC;
…with another Government located
within the County: LEGALG;
…with another Department located within
the County: LEGALD

= ILEGAL
N = 115

6. Seek regulatory or policy flexibility
regarding IT security

…with Federal: FLEXF;
…with State: FLEXS;
…with another County: FLEXC;
…with another Government located
within the County: FLEXG;
…with another Department located within
the County: FLEXD

= IFLEX
N = 115

7. Attempt to modify duties or
procedures of an established
partnership/agreement relating to IT
security

…with Federal: DUTIESF;
…with State: DUTIESS;
…with another County: DUTIESC;
…with another Government located
within the County: DUTIESG;
…with another Department located within
the County: DUTIESD

= IDUTIES
N = 115

8. Attempt to modify resourcesharing or funding obligations of an
established partnership/agreement
related to IT security

…with Federal: OBLIGAF;
…with State: OBLIGAS;
…with another County: OBLIGAC;
…with another Government located
within the County: OBLIGAG;
…with another Department located within
the County: OBLIGAD

= IOBLIGA
N = 115

9. Degree of relationship importance

…with Federal: IMPORTF;
…with State: IMPORTS;
…with another County: IMPORTC;
…with another Government located
within the County: IMPORTG;
…with another Department located within
the County: IMPORTD

= IIMPORT
N =114
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10. Degree of relationship
development

…with Federal: DEVELOPF;
…with State: DEVELOPS;
…with another County: DEVELOPC;
…with another Government located
within the County: DEVELOPG;
…with another Department located within
the County: DEVELOPD

= IDEVELOP
N = 117

The original ordinal scale used for all eight dependent variables measuring an
activity was “Weekly” (=1), “Monthly” (=2), “Several times a year” (=3), “A few times a
year” (=4), and “Never” (=5). In order to construct more logically intuitive index
variables, it was first necessary to recode these variables to reverse the scores. The
resulting scale ranged from a summed score of 5, indicating the respondent never
performed ‘said’ activity with any type of government, to a summed score of 25,
indicating that the respondent performed ‘said’ activity weekly with each type of
government.
The same procedures were undertaken for creating the index variables for the
two questions which gauged the overall importance and development of different
relationships but were measured on different 5-point ordinal scales. The resulting scales
for these two variables ranged from a summed score of 5, indicating the respondent did
not perceive any of his/her intergovernmental relationships as important/developed, to a
summed score of 25, indicating that the respondent perceive all of his/her
intergovernmental relationships as extremely important/developed.
Beyond these 10 indexes variables, five more composite variables were created
by summing the eight activity questions by each type of government. For example, the
composite variable “Frequency of Contact w/ Federal Offices” (IFED; N= 111) was
created by summing responses to TECHF; NONTECHF; INFOF; RESOURCF;
115

LEGALF; FLEXF; DUTIESF; and OBLIGAF. In that eight variables were used to create
the index, the resulting scale ranged from a summed score of 8, indicating the
respondent never contacts federal offices for any of the eight activities, to a summed
score of 40, indicating that the respondent contacts federal offices weekly for all eight
activities. Constructed the same way, the final four index variables were “Frequency of
Contact w/ State Offices” (ISTATE; N= 108); “Frequency of Contact w/ other Counties”
(ICOUNTY; N= 107); “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government located within the
County” (IGOV; N= 111); and “Frequency of Contact w/ another Department located
within the County” (IDEPT; N= 110). To explore the relationships between these 15
dependent index variables and the nine independent variables previously discussed, the
researcher turned to non-parametric testing.

Non-parametric Tests

In instances where parametric assumptions are violated non-parametric test are
preferred because they use the ranks of the data rather than the raw values to calculate
the test statistic (Olsen, 2003; Norusis, 1998; Lehmkuhl, 1996). However, since interval
and ordinal information is lost in the conversion to ranks, these tests are not as powerful
as their parametric counterparts. Further, for the same number of observations,
parametric test are more conservative than non-parametric tests, meaning they produce
fewer false positives or Type I Errors were one incorrectly rejects the null hypothesis
(Chan, 2003; Wuensch, 2001). Using the conventional parametric alpha level of .05 for
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non-parametric tests inadvertently increases the chance of making Type I Errors. To
reduce this probability and make a test more conservative, a lower alpha level should
be set (Hair et. al, 1998). Therefore, to decrease the likelihood of false positives, the
level of required significance for all tests in this analysis was lowered from the standard
parametric level of .05 to .01. Tests approaching significance was set at p ≤ .02.
To test the null hypothesis that all samples come from identical populations, the
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent groups was used. This test is the non-parametric
alternative to ANOVA for independent groups to be used when data violate parametric
assumptions (Norusis, 1998). The Kruskal-Wallis test statistic is calculated on the sums
of ranks for combined groups after data from all groups are ordered (Garson, 2003). A
significant p-value suggests that the differences observed are not coincidence.
However, a significant test does not necessarily mean that every group differs from
every other group; it only means that at least one group differs from the others (Hair et
al. 1998). Therefore, a significant test is interpreted only as an overall difference
between the groups. Unlike its parametric counterpart, ANOVA, there are no post-hoc
tests available for Kruskal-Wallis (SPSS, 1998). Therefore, to determine what is driving
significance, that is which group(s) differ from which other group(s), Mann-Whitney U for
two independent samples was used to test group differences for significant independent
variables.
The Mann-Whitney U test of difference is the nonparametric alternative to the
two-sample t-test (Olsen, 2003). Valid for data which are either continuous or discrete, it
works by comparing the medians of two groups rather then the means and is used to
test the hypothesis that there is no difference between them (Chan, 2003). It computes
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the test statistic ‘U’ by pooling the two samples and listing cases in order by their rank
level and then test whether the ranks are randomly mixed between two samples. When
the size of both groups exceed 20, as is the case for all dichotomous variables created
for this analysis, the sampling distribution of U approaches a normal curve. For this
study, Mann-Whitney tests were conducted only for two purposes:. First, they were
used to further explore significant Kruskal-Wallis tests (note: independent variables
were prepared for Mann-Whitney testing by creating a new dichotomous indicatorcoded (0/1) variable for each group of the independent variable). Second, they were
used in situations were an independent variable was dichotomous and therefore
Kruskal-Wallis testing was not possible (note: no variable recoding needed).
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V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

For this research, reporting test scores and significance levels was the primary
manner used to represent findings. Measures of central tendency, such as means and
standard deviations, were not reported as they generally do not provide a very useful
description of data that is not normally distributed (Olsen 2003; Lehmkuhl, 1996).
However, means were used in figures when they did help illustrate trends. Descriptive
statistics better suited to explain nonparametric data include mode, median, and
percentile rank (Bickel, 2002). After a thorough examination of the data, the researcher
chose to report modes as they most effectively illuminated differences in this particular
data. Specifically, a mode is the most frequently occurring response (Lehmkuhl, 1996).
In non-normally distributed data, it is possible to have no mode however, this situation
did not occur with any variable in this study.

General Analysis

To uncover patterns and norms with regard to this largely invisible population,
frequencies and Crosstabs were initially used to examine the data. Several trends were
observed and noted in this section. However, generalizations made herein presuppose
that study respondents are representative of the true population. Further, these
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generalizations only extend to IT Directors and their departments in Florida
constitutional offices.
In the end, this analysis included 15 dependent index variables. Review of these
variables revealed that the majority of intergovernmental or interorganizational contact
preformed by IT departments in Florida constitutional offices for reasons related to IT or
IT security happens only “A Few Times a Year” or “Never” regardless of the activity (see
Table 14).

Table 14: Total Percent of Respondents who Contact Each Type of
Government only “ A Few Times a Year” or “Never” Regardless of the
Activity
Government Contacted

Percent

Federal

92.8%

State

84.3%

Another County

89.7%

Another Government Located within the Jurisdiction of their County

82.0%

Another Department Located within their County

65.5%

Specifically, 92.8 percent of respondents only contact federal offices a few times
a year or never; 84.3 percent of respondents only contact state offices a few times a
year or never; 89.7 percent of respondents only contact an office in an another county a
few times a year or never; 82 percent of respondents only contact an office in an
another government located within their county jurisdiction a few times a year or never;
and 65.5 percent of respondents only contact departments located within their own
county government a few times a year or never.
Largely consistent with their reported frequency of contact, the percent of
respondents who perceived the overall relationship between their IT Department and
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each the other types of governments as only ‘Somewhat Developed’ or “Not Developed’
was generally much higher than the percent who perceived the relationship as ‘Very
Developed’ or “Extremely Developed’ (see Table 15).

The exception was with

departments located within their own county government

Table 15: Perceived Overall Relationship Development with Each Contact by Percents

Federal

Extremely
Developed

Very
Developed

Developed

Somewhat
Developed

Not Very
Developed

0.0

2.6

2.6

15.4

79.5◄

= 2.6%
State

5.1

= 94.9%
11.1

25.6

= 16.2%
County

2.6
5.1

7.7

27.4

24.6

31.6◄

30.8

= 62.4%
12.8

19.7

= 17.9%
Other Departments

23.9

= 58.1%

= 10.3%
Other Governments

34.2◄

30.8

31.6◄

= 62.4%
26.3◄

17.8

= 50.9%

21.2

10.2

= 31.4%
“◄” : Mode

However, respondents’ perception of relationship development is in slight discord
with perceived importance of several types of governments specifically with regard to
federal and state (see Table 16).
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Table 16: Perceived Importance of Each Contact to Overall IT Success
Extremely
Important
Federal

Very
Important

2.4

8.0

Important

Somewhat
Important

Not Very
Important

8.0

25.6

51.8◄

= 10.4%
State

7.9

= 77.4%
19.3

24.6

= 27.2%
County

0.9
7.0

8.8

19.3

24.3◄

34.2

36.8◄

= 71.0%
13.2

17.5

= 20.2%
Other Departments

17.5

= 48.2%

= 9.7%
Other Governments

30.7◄

21.9

40.4◄

= 62.3%
18.3

= 42.6%

17.4

21.7

18.3

= 40%
“◄” : Mode

These figures would indicate that the relationships counties maintain with federal
and state offices are not as developed as perhaps they should be considering the level
of importance respondents place on these offices with regard to their information
security efforts.
Examining the data according to overall frequency of each activity reveals that
regardless of the type of government contacted, the eight intergovernmental or
interorganizational activities addressed in this research also occur only a few times a
year or less (see Table 17). Specifically, 60.2 percent of respondents seek technical
assistance a few times a year or less; 71.8 percent of respondents seek non-technical
assistance a few times a year or less; 76.3 percent of respondents seek information on
a program or project a few times a year or less; 92.1 percent of respondents seek
funding or resources to improve their information security efforts a few times a year or
less; 87.8 percent of respondents seek legal or policy guidance a few times a year or
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less; 93 percent of respondents seek regulatory of policy flexibility a few times a year or
less; 96.3 percent of respondents attempt to modify duties or procedures of an
established partnership/agreement relating to IT a few times a year or less; and 95.7
percent of respondents attempt to modify resource-sharing or funding obligations of an
established partnership/agreement relating to IT a few times a year or less.

Table 17: Percent of Respondent who Engage in Each Activity “ A Few Times a
Year or Less” Regardless of the Intergovernmental or Interorganizational Contact
Activity

Percent

Seek technical assistance

60.2%

Seek non-technical assistance

71.8%

Seek program or project information

76.3%

Seek resources or funding

92.1%

Seek legal or policy guidance

87.8%

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

93.0%

Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement

96.3%

Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement

95.7%

Of 124 respondents, the largest concentration (37.6 percent) indicated that 100%
of their duties focus on IT or information security related issues (see Table 18).
However, nearly one-third of respondents (“40% or Less” [22] + “60% or Less” [16] =
38/124 = 30.6%) indicated that less than 60% of their duties are dedicated to IT related
issues. This means on average nearly one out of every three constitutional offices in the
state does not have a full-time director supervising critical local information systems.
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Table 18: Percent of Duties Focused on IT Related Tasks
Percent of Duties

Cases

Percent

40% or less

22

16.7%

60%

16

12.8%

80%

39

31.2%

100%

47

37.6%

N = 124

The 38 respondents who indicated that less than 60% of their duties are
dedicated to IT related issues disproportionately reside in Zones 1 and 2 which are the
west and north respectively (see Table 19)5.

Table 19: Zone by Percent of Duties Focused on IT Related Tasks

Zone 1 (west) N=14

40% or
less

60%

80%

100%

5

1

5

3

7

7

10

5

16

14

3

11

20

= 6 (42.8%)
Zone 2 (north) N= 33

9

= 16 (48.4%)
Zone 3 (central) N= 38

3
= 8 (21.0%)

Zone 4 (south) N= 39

5
= 8 (20.5%)

Total N=124

Total= 38 (30.6%)

Specifically, 42.8 percent of Zone 1 respondents and 48.4 percent of Zone 2
respondents are only able focus less than 60% of their duties to IT related issues.
Meaning, the number of constitutional offices in the northern quarter of the state with

5

Once again it should be noted that Zone 1 was under-represented in relation to the other three zones
which could in turn potentially impact findings.
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less than full-time IT Directors is disproportionately higher than the rest of the state.
However, more than half of all respondents (20 out of 39) working in the 17 counties of
Zone 4 in the south of the state indicated that 100% of their duties are dedicated to IT
related issues.
In addition, one-third of all respondents working in Zone 2 counties indicated that
they supervise two or more offices (see Table 20). At the other end of the spectrum,
less than one-sixth of Zone 4 directors (6 out of 39) and less that one-seventh of Zone 3
directors (5 out of 34) supervise two or more offices. However, of the 14 respondents
from Zone 1 in the panhandle, only one (7.1 percent) indicated that s/he supervised two
or more offices.

Table 20: Zone by Number of Offices Supervised
Only One
Office

Two or More
Offices

Zone 1 (west) N=14

13

1 (7.1%)

Zone 2 (north) N= 33

22

11 (33.3%)

Zone 3 (central) N= 39

34

5 (12.8%)

Zone 4 (south) N= 39

33

6 (15.4)

Of 101 respondents, the largest concentration (34.6 percent) indicated that they
supervise between one and four employees (see Table 21). However, one in four
respondents (23 cases or 22.7 percent) indicated that they supervise no employees.
Even more alarming, 47.8 percent of these respondents (11 of the 23 cases) also
indicated that they are part-time Directors. This means that an average of 10.8 percent
of constitutional offices in the state (11 out of 101 cases = 10.8) do not have a full-time
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IT director or any supportive staff ensuring that crucial patches are installed and that
vital data is backed-up.

Table 21: Number of Employees Supervised by Percent of Duties Focused on
IT Related Tasks
40% or
less
0

60%

7

80%

4

100%

Totals

6

6

23 (22.7%)

13

11

35 (34.6%)

3

13

4

22 (21.7%)

3

5

12

21(20.7%)

= 11 (47.8%)
1-4

9

2

= 11 (31.3%)
5-14

2
= 5 (22.7%)

15 or more

1
= 4 (19.0%)

Total N=101

Total= 31 (30.6%)

Of the respondent who indicated that they supervise no employees, 36.3 percent
(12 cases) work for counties located in Zone 2 (see Table 22).

Table 22: Number of Employees Supervised by Zone
[0]

[1–4]

[ 5 - 14 ]

[ 15 + ]

Zone 1 (west) N=14

4
(28.5%)

7◄
(50%)

1
(7.1%)

2
(14.2%)

Zone 2 (north) N= 33

12
(36.3%)

14◄
(42.4%)

5
(15.1%)

2
(6%)

Zone 3 (central) N= 38

4
(10.5%)

7
(18.4%)

14◄
(36.8%)

13
(34.2%)

Zone 4 (south) N= 39

7
(17.9%)

13◄
(33.3%)

7
(17.9%)

12
(30.7%)

Total N=124

27

41◄

27

126

29
“◄” : Mode

Whereas IT departments in the 20 counties of Zone 2 seemed stretched thin for
employees, offices located in the 14 counties of Zone 3, the central band across the
state, appear to be the best staffed of the four zones. Of the respondents working in
Zone 3 counties, only 10.5 percent (4 cases) indicated that they had no employees.
Moreover, 34.2 percent (13 cases) have 15 or more employees and an additional 36.8
percent (14 cases) noted that they have between 5-14 employees.
As this analysis revealed, there appear to be trends in the data which coincide
with zone membership. However, the question arose whether these similarities could
more likely be attributed to underlying economic patterns occurring regionally rather
than management decisions, for instance, regarding the appropriate number of
employees. To explore this notion, the researcher ran Crosstabs between the variable
“Zone” and the variable “Intergovernmental Revenue” and the index “Adequacy of
Budget” and (see Tables 23 and 24).

Table 23: Zone by the Independent Variable “Intergovernmental
Revenue
Less than
$11.9
million

$12 – 24.9
million

$25 – 74.9
million

$75 +
million

Zone 1 (west) N=14

2
(14.2%)

8◄
(57.1%)

4
(28.5%)

0
(0%)

Zone 2 (north) N= 33

18◄
(54.5%)

12
(36.3%)

3
(9%)

0
(0%)

Zone 3 (central) N= 39

2
(5.1%)

9
(23.%)

15◄
(38.4%)

13
(33.3%)

Zone 4 (south) N= 39

7
(17.9%)

5
(12.8%)

13
(33.3%)

14◄
(35.8%)

Total N=124

29
(23.3%)

34
(27.4%)

35◄
(28.2%)

27
(21.7%)
“◄” : Mode
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Based on the overall distribution of intergovernmental revenue, the majority of
counties receive between $12 and $74.9 million. Whereas Zone 3 and specifically Zone
4 receive more monies on average; Zone 1 and particularly Zone 2 receive less. While
intergovernmental revenue provides a glimpse into county funds, it provides an
incomplete picture of overall county budget. Further, the real question here is how
adequately county funds filter to IT departments.
A review of index variable “Adequacy of Budget” reveals that the majority of
Directors in Zones 1, 3, and 4 perceived overall available funds for several core IT
needs to be adequate.

Table 24: Zone by the Index variable “Adequacy of Budget”
Far Below
Adequate
(7-11)

Below
Adequate
(12-16)

Adequate
(17-22)

Above
Adequate
(23-28)

Zone 1 (west) N=8

1
(12.5%)

1
(12.5%)

5◄
(62.5%)

1
(12.5%)

Zone 2 (north) N= 25

3
(12%)

8
(32%)

12◄
(48%)

2
(8%)

Zone 3 (central) N= 24

0
(0%)

6
(25%)

16◄
(66.6%)

2
(8.3%)

Zone 4 (south) N= 22

2
(9%)

7
(31.8%)

13◄
(59%)

0
(0%)

Total N=79

6

22

46◄

5
“◄” : Mode

While the largest concentration of Zone 2 directors (48 percent) also indicated
that their overall IT budget was adequate, a total of 44 percent (12% + 32%) noted that
their budget was below adequate. Specifically, one-third indicated that funds were
below adequate and 12 percent noted that their funding was far below adequate. As
such, one might want to conclude that budgets were driving staffing decisions because
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relative to the other zones, Zone 2 IT departments have smaller staffs; nearly one out of
ever two Directors (48.4 percent) are only able to dedicated 60% or less or their duties
to IT related issues (refer to Table 19); and one-third of Directors simultaneously
supervising two or more constitutional offices (refer to Table 20). However, a total of
40.8 percent of Zone 4 Directors (9% + 31.8%) also indicated that their overall budgets
were inadequate. Yet 30.2 percent of offices in this zone have 15 or more employees
(refer to Table 22); only one in five Directors (20.5 percent) are only able to dedicated
60% or less or their duties to IT related issues (refer to Table 19); and only 15.4 percent
of Directors supervise two or more constitutional offices (refer to Table 20). As such, it
seems that budget adequacy alone was not the driving force behind staffing differences
and the researcher must conclude that there remains an underlying regional quality(s)
or influential dynamic(s), or perhaps some other spurious factor not readily perceptible
via the demographics explored in this research which is the reason of these regional
differences.
Beyond regional differences, collectively the majority of respondents found
funding for each core IT need to be adequate or better (refer to Table 24). However, at
least one in five respondents indicated that it was below or far below adequate.
Specifically, 56 percent, or one out of every two Directors indicated that funding for
computer security education for non-IT employees was below adequate (see Table 25).
Nearly half (48.6 percent) indicated that they did not have enough funding for risk
assessment and risk management. And nearly 40 percent of respondents indicated that
their funding for hiring IT employees was below adequate.
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Table 25: Core IT Needs by Percent of Respondent who Indicated
that Funding was Inadequate
Core IT Needs

Percent

IT equipment/ software/ hardware
(N=121 )

23.1%

IT security equipment/ software/ hardware
(N=118 )

31.3%

Hiring outsource vendors
(N=98 )

30.6%

Hiring IT personnel and support staff
(N=111 )

39.6%

Training IT personnel
(N=116 )

39.6%

Computer security education for NON IT employees
(N=98 )

56.1%

Risk assessment/ management
(N=109 )

48.6%

Further analysis revealed distinct difference according to office type. For
instance, the majority of IT Directors in Board of Commissioners offices (53 percent)
and the largest concentration of IT Directors in Sheriff’s offices (32 percent) supervise
15 or more employees (see Table 26). However, the largest concentration of IT
Directors in Property Appraiser’s offices (33.3 percent) and Supervisor of Elections’
offices (30.4 percent) supervise no employees. Whereas the largest concentration of IT
Directors in Tax Collectors offices (46.4 percent) and Clerk of Court offices (33.3
percent) supervise between one and four employees.
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Table 26: Number of Employees Supervised by Type of Office
Office

[0]

[1–4]

[ 5 - 14 ]

[ 15 + ]

Board of Commissioners (N=32)

3
(9.3%)

6
(18.7%)

6
(18.7%)

17◄
(53.1%)

Clerk of Court (N=30)

5
(16.6%)

10◄
(33.3%)

9
(30.0%)

6
(20.0%)

Property Appraiser (N=23)

8◄
(33.3%)

6
(25.0%)

5
(20.8%)

4
(16.6%)

Sheriff (N=34)

7
(20.5%)

8
(23.5%)

8
(23.5%)

11◄
(32.3%)

Supervisor of Elections (N=23)

7
(30.4%)

10◄
(43.4%)

2
(8.6%)

4
(17.3%)

Tax Collectors (N=28)

7
(25.0%)

13◄
(46.4%)

4
(14.2%)

4
(14.2%)

“◄” : Mode

The different types of offices also have different rates for supervising two or more
offices (see Table 27). For instance, 65.6 percent of IT Directors supervising Board of
Commissioners offices also supervise another office. However, only 11.7 percent IT
Directors supervising Sheriff’s offices also supervise another office.

Table 27: Percent of IT Directors who Supervise
Two or more Office by Type of Office Supervised
Office
Percent
Board of Commissioners
65.5%
Clerk of Court
46.6%
Property Appraiser
37.5%
Sheriff
11.7%
Supervisor of Elections
47.8%
Tax Collectors
35.7%

Finally, the type of office a director supervises also impacts what percent of their
duties will likely focus solely on IT related issues (see Table 28). For instance, 62.5
percent IT Directors supervising Board of Commissioners offices, 100% of their duties
are IT related. However, for IT Directors in Property Appraisers offices, only one in four
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(6 out of 24) report the same, whereas 43.4 percent (“40% of Duties” [12.5%] + “60% of
Duties” [29.1%]) are only able to devote 60% or less of their duties to IT related issues.
In contrast, 82.1 percent (“80% of Duties” [39.2%] + “100% of Duties” [42.8%]) of IT
Directors in Tax Collectors’ offices focus 80% or more of their duties to IT related
issues.

Table 28: Percent of IT Director’s Duties Focused on IT Related Issues by Type of
Office Supervised
Office

[40% of
Duties ]

[ 60% of
Duties ]

[ 80% of
Duties]

[ 100% of
Duties]

Board of Commissioners (N=32)

4
(12.5%)

5
(15.6%)

3
(9.3%)

20◄
(62.5%)

Clerk of Court (N=30)

7
(23.0%)

4
(13.3%)

6
(20.0%)

13◄
(43.3%)

Property Appraiser (N=24)

3
(12.5%)

7◄
(29.1%)

7◄
(29.1%)

6
25.0%)

Sheriff (N=34)

8
(23.5%)

5
(14.7%)

10
(29.4%)

11◄
(32.3%)

Supervisor of Elections (N=23)

4
(17.3%)

3
(13.0%)

4
(17.3%)

12◄
(52.1%)

Tax Collectors (N=28)

2
(71.%)

3
(10.7%)

11
(39.2%)

12◄
(42.8%)

“◄” : Mode

Being exploratory, this study did not endeavor to establish causal relationships
nor was it bound to hypotheses. Instead it sought to uncover patterns, like the ones just
discussed, and to answer the following three questions: 1) is there a relationship
between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors most often
engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure protection;
2) which IGM activities do county IT Directors most often engage in on behalf of
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 3) do county IT Directors

132

make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships on behalf of information
security and critical digital infrastructure protection? However, to help facilitate this
analysis, these questions were tested as hypotheses. These findings and the
conclusions are discussed next.

Question 1: Prevalence of IGM Activity

The first research question inquires into which IGM activities county IT Directors
most often engage in as part of their information security efforts. As noted in the
previous chapter, statistics such as mean and standard deviation do not provide useful
descriptions of non-normally distributed data. Therefore, the researcher examined
frequencies and modes as they most effectively describe the current data .
To recap, respondents were asked to indicate how often they engage in eight
activities with each of five intergovernmental partners (federal, state, county, other
governments, and other departments) using a scale of 1-5 [“Weekly” (=5), “Monthly”
(=4), “Several times a year” (=3), “A few times a year” (=2), and “Never” (=1)]. Of the 40
resulting questions, 31 (77.5 percent) had a mode of “Never” while nine had a mode of
“A few times a year” (see Table 29). None had modes of “Weekly”, “Monthly”, or
“Several times a year”.
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Table 29: The Nine Activities with Modes of ‘A Few Times a
Year or Less’ rather than ‘Never’
Activity
Seek technical assistance from a STATE office
Seek technical assistance from another COUNTY
Seek technical assistance from a another DEPARTMENT
Seek program or project information from a STATE office
Seek program or project information from another COUNTY
Seek program or project information from a another DEPARTMENT
Seek legal or policy guidance from a STATE office
Seek legal or policy guidance from another COUNTY
Seek legal or policy guidance from a another DEPARTMENT

Of the nine questions for which “A few times a year” was the mode, they were
equally divided among three activities; seek technical assistance; seek program or
project information; and seek legal or policy guidance. Beyond the fact that only these
three activities have modes other than ‘Never’, another dynamic clearly evident was that
each of these more frequently performed activities occurs only with either a State office,
another County, or another Department within the respondents own county. However,
patterns of vertical or horizontal relationships are addressed in the next section.
Another way to determine which IGM activities county IT Directors most often
perform was to look at frequencies. Doing so revealed that of the eight activities,
seeking technical assistance was the most frequently preformed activity (see Table 30).
Examining all 40 combinations of ‘activity by partner’ revealed that of the five most
frequently performed activities ‘seeking technical assistance’ appears on the list three
times, while ‘seeking non-technical assistance’ and ‘seeking program or project
information’ each appeared once. It should also be pointed out that four of five activities
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occur horizontally with other Departments within the respondents own county or with
another Government within the jurisdiction of the respondents county.

Table 30: Five Most Frequent Activities by Percent of Respondents who Perform the
Activity Several Times a Year or More
Activity
Percent
Seek technical assistance from another Department in own county
31.1%
Seek non-technical assistance from another Department in own county
17.6%
Seek technical assistance from another Government in the county

14.9%

Seek technical assistance from a State office

12.5%

Seek program or project information from another Department in own county

12.2%

While the earlier examination of modes revealed that the largest concentration of
respondents ‘seek legal or policy guidance’ “A Few Times a Year” (whereas the majority
of respondents “Never” perform five of the other activities), a review of frequencies
revealed that this activity is rarely performed more than a few times a year regardless of
the intergovernmental contact.
Another important facet of exploring the frequency of IGM activities was to look
which activities occur the least. Again, examining all 40 combinations of ‘activity by
partner’ revealed that seeking to modify either the duties/procedures or the
resources/funding obligations of an established partnership/agreement relating to IT
with either a Federal office or another county rarely occurs (see Table 31). Another
infrequent activity is seeking resources or funding from another County.
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Table 31: Five Least Frequent Activities by Percent of Respondents who Never Perform
the Activity
Percent
Activity
94.8%
Seek to modify duties/procedures of an agreement with a Federal office
94.8%
Seek to modify resource/funding obligations of an agreement with a Federal office
Seek to modify duties/procedures of an agreement with another County

87.0%

Seek resources or funding from another County

85.5%

Seek to modify resource/funding obligations of an agreement with another County

81.9%

In reference to research Question One, which IGM activities county IT Directors
most often engage in as part of their information security efforts, the data indicated that
seeking technical assistance followed by seeking non-technical assistance and
program/project information are the most frequently performed activities. The data also
indicated that the least frequently performed activities are seeking to modify either the
duties/procedures

or

the

resources/funding

obligations

of

an

established

partnership/agreement relating to information technology.

Question 2: Vertical vs. Horizontal Relationships

The second research question inquires whether county IT Directors make more
use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships as part of their information security efforts.
As with research Question One, exploring frequencies helped to delineate which
intergovernmental relationships county IT Directors most often call upon. Examining the
frequency of each activity as performed with each type of contact revealed that ‘other
Departments within the respondents own county’ were most frequently contacted for six
of the eight activities (see Table 32). For the other two activities, seeking
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regulatory/policy flexibility or legal/policy guidance, State offices were most frequently
contacted.

Table 32: Most Frequent Partner for Each Activity
Activity
Seek to modify duties/procedures of a agreement with…
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility from…

Partner
another Department in own county
State

Seek program or project information from…

another Department in own county

Seek legal or policy guidance from…

State

Seek NON-technical assistance from…

another Department in own county

Seek to modify resource/funding obligations of a
agreement with…
Seek resources or funding from…
Seek technical assistance from…

another Department in own county
another Department in own county
another Department in own county

Examining the frequency of each activity as performed with each type of contact
revealed that Federal offices were contacted the least for six of the eight activities (see
Table 33). Of the other two activities, seeking legal/policy guidance was performed the
least often with other Governments with the respondents county and seeking
resources/funding was performed the least often with other Counties.

Table 33: Least Frequent Partner for Each Activity
Activity
Seek to modify duties or procedures of a
partner/agreement with…
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility from…
Seek program or project information from…
Seek legal or policy guidance from…
Seek NON-technical assistance from…
Seek to modify resource/funding obligations with…
Seek resources or funding from…
Seek technical assistance from…
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Partner
Federal
Federal
Federal
another Government in the county
Federal
Federal
another County
Federal

In reference to Research Question Two, whether county IT Directors make more
use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships as part of their information security efforts,
the data indicated -horizontal- as six of the eight activities were most often performed
with other departments in the respondents county. Further, six of the eight activities
were performed the least often vertically with Federal offices.
However of the eight activities, two were performed most often vertically with the
State and two activities were performed least often horizontally with either other
Counties or other Governments located within the respondents county. This led the
researcher to conclude that while IT Directors make more use of horizontal relationship,
vertical relationships are also important to county information security efforts.

Question 3: Demographics and IGM Activity

The third research question inquires whether there are relationships between
office/county demographics and the IGM activity of IT Directors as part of their of
information security efforts. To address this question Kruskal-Wallis tests were run to
determine whether respondents answers in the 15 composite variables differed
according to each of the independent variables. Tests are presented by the independent
variables and the null hypotheses in each instance was that there is no overall
difference between groups.
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Office Supervised
The first point of exploration was to determine whether respondents answers in
the 15 composite variables differed according to the type of office they supervised.
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences returned four of the 15 test significant
at .01 (see Table 34).

Table 34: Kruskal-Wallis Tests Significant at p≤.01 for the Independent Variable “Office
Supervised” & the Composite Dependent Variables
Variable

H*

Sig.

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL Offices

32.92

.000

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ another GOVERNMENT in the County

22.49

.000

Index of Frequency to Seek Funding or Resources

20.12

.001

Index of Relationship Importance

19.22 .002
*NOTE: all DF = 5

Of the four significant variables, two pertain to overall interaction with a types
government- “Frequency of Contact with Federal Offices” (H=32.92; p=.000) and
“Frequency of Contact with Other Governments within the Jurisdiction of Your County”
(H=22.49; p=.000); one pertains to an IGM activity- “Frequency to Seek Funding or
Resources” (H=20.12; p=.001); and one pertains to the perceived importance of each
type of government to the success of the office- “Relationship Importance” (H=19.22;
p=.002). In each of these instances, the null hypothesis was rejected as there was
evidence of an overall significant difference between groups.
Since a significant Kruskal-Wallis test does not denote that every group differs
from every other group, Mann-Whitney tests were employed to determine specifically
which group(s) differ from which other group(s).
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Contact with Federal Offices
For the first significant index, “Frequency of Contact with Federal Offices”, the
differences between groups of three dichotomous variables proved statistically
significant at .01, specifically, “Board of Commissioners versus all other offices”
(U=796.5 p=.003), “Sheriffs versus all other office: (U=671 p=.000), and “Tax Collectors
(U=749 p=.008) versus all other offices” (see Table 35).

Table 35: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Frequency
of Contact with Federal Offices” by Independent Dichotomous Variables
for Type of Office Supervised

“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01

Variable

U

Sig.

Board of Commissioners
Clerk of Court
Property Appraiser
Supervisor of Elections
Sheriff
Tax Collector

796.5
862.0
733.0
908.0
671.0
749.0

.003◄
.029
.051
.987
.000◄
.008◄

| “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Based on the scale of the dependent index variable (where a score of 8 indicates
no contact across all eight activities and a score of 40 indicates weekly contact across
all eight activities), Figure 3 reveals that on average, Board of Commissioners offices
and Sheriffs offices contact federal offices at a higher frequency than the other types of
offices, while Tax Collectors offices contact federal offices less frequently.
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the office
40
32
24
16
8

11.5

9.7

Board/ non-Board

11.6

all others

9.6

Sherrif/ non-Sheriff

9

10.5

Tax Collector/ nonTax Collector

Figure 3: Frequencies of Index “Contact with Federal Offices” by Dichotomous “Board of
Commissioners ”, “Sheriff”, and “Tax Collector” Variables

To further explore which actions are driving the significance of these
relationships, and thus the frequency of contact with federal offices, Mann-Whitey tests
were run between each of the three significant dichotomous variables and the eight
indicator variables that comprise the index variable “Frequency of Contact with Federal
Offices”.

“Board of Commissioners Offices”

Starting with Board of Commissioners offices (see Table 36), the frequency with
which this type of office contacts federal offices statistically differs from other types of
offices for two activities; “seeking program information” (U=947; p=.002) and “seeking
legal or policy guidance” (U=973.5; p=.005), while “seeking regulatory or policy
flexibility” (U=1089.5; p=.017) is approaching significance.
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Table 36: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index
Factors of “Frequency of Contact w/ Federal Offices”
Variable

U

Sig.

Seek technical assistance

1128.5

.037

Seek non-technical assistance

1225.5

.165

Seek program or project information

947.0

.002◄

Seek resources or funding

1152.0

.176

Seek legal or policy guidance

973.5

.005◄

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

1089.5

.0179

Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement

1224.0

.202

Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement
1294.5
.708
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these
significant activities and whether the respondent supervised a Board of Commissioners
office or not, revealed that on average this type of office more frequently engages in
each of these three activities then other types of offices (see Figure 4).

Seek program or project information

5

Seek legal or policy guidance

4

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

3
2

1.73 1.73

1.4

1.3 1.28 1.16

1
Board

All Others

Figure 4: Frequencies of Significant Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Contact with Federal
Offices” by “Board of Commissioners Versus All Others”
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“Sheriff’s Office”

The frequency with which Sheriff’s Offices contact federal offices (see Table 37)
statistically differs from other types of offices for two activities included in the index;
“seeking non-technical assistance” (U=1045.5; p=.003) and “seeking resources or
funding” (U=714.5; p=.000). While the frequency with which they “seek legal or policy
guidance” from federal offices (U=1033.5; p=.017) approaches significance.

Table 37: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Sheriff’s Office” by Index Factors of
“Frequency of Contact w/ Federal Offices”
Variable

U

Sig.

Seek technical assistance

1171.0

.077

Seek non-technical assistance

1054.5

.003◄

Seek program or project information

1165.5

.141

Seek resources or funding

714.5

.000◄

Seek legal or policy guidance

1033.5

.0179

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

1345.5

.898

Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement

1281.0

.731

Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement
1236.5
.188
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for each these
significant activities and whether the respondent supervised a Sheriffs Office or not,
revealed that on average this type of office more frequently engages in each of these
three activities then other types of offices (see Figure 5).
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5

Seek non-technical assistance

4

Seek resources or funding

3

Seek legal or policy guidance

2

1.59 1.72 1.59

1.17 1.15 1.34

1
Sheriff

All Others

Figure 5: Frequencies of Significant Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Contact with Federal
Offices” by “Sheriff’s Office Versus All Others”

“Tax Collector’s Office”

The frequency with which Tax Collectors Offices contact federal offices (see
Table 38) does not statistically differ from other types of offices for any specific activity
in the index. However, the frequency with which they seek legal or policy guidance from
federal offices (U=913.0; p=.019) is approaching significance.

Table 38: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Tax Collector” by Index Factors of
“Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL Offices”
Variable

U

Sig.

Seek technical assistance

1022.5

.066

Seek non-technical assistance

1017.5

.048

Seek program or project information

965.5

.046

Seek resources or funding

964.5

.042

Seek legal or policy guidance

913.0

.0199

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

1075.5

.191

Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement

1136.0

.716

Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement
1120.5
.168
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02
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Contact with Another Government in the County
Referring back to the Kruskal-Wallis tests run to determine if there were groups
differences between type of office supervised and the 15 index variables, a second
significant index was “Frequency of Contact with another Government located within the
Jurisdiction of Your County”. Running Mann-Whitney tests between this variable and the
six dichotomous office variables revealed that the difference between “Board of
Commissioners office versus all other offices” (U=659 p=.000) was statistically
significant (see Table 39).

Table 39: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Frequency of
Contact with another Government located within the Jurisdiction of Your
County” by Independent Dichotomous Variables for Type of Office Supervised
Variable

U

Sig.

Board of Commissioners
Clerk of Court
Property Appraiser
Supervisor of Elections
Sheriff
Tax Collector

659.0
954.0
730.5
828.5
1144.0
780.0

.000◄
.111
.102
.526
.633
.035

“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01

| “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Based on the scale of the dependent index, where a score of 8 indicates no
contact across all eight activities and a score of 40 indicates weekly contact across all
eight activities, Figure 6 illustrates that on average, Board of Commissioners offices
contact other governments located within the jurisdiction of their county at a higher
frequency than the other types of offices.
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40
32
24
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16

11.2
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All Others

Figure 6: Frequency of Index of “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government in Your County
Jurisdiction” by Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners”

To further explore which activities are driving the significance of this relationship,
Mann-Whitey

tests

were

run

between

the

dichotomous

variable

Board

of

Commissioners and the eight indicator variables that comprise this index. As evident in
Table 40, the frequency with which a Board of Commissioners office contacts other
government offices located within the jurisdiction of its own county statistically differs
from other types of offices for all but one activity- seeking to modify resource or funding
obligations with a partner or agreement (U=1118.5; p=.053).

Table 40: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index
Factors of “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government in Your County Jurisdiction”
Variable

U

Sig.

Seek technical assistance

930.0

.002◄

Seek non-technical assistance

868.5

.001◄

Seek program or project information

914.0

.002◄

Seek resources or funding

944.5

.000◄

Seek legal or policy guidance

1004.0

.007◄

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

976.5

.003◄

Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement

893.0

.000◄

Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement
1118.5
.053
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02
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Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for the seven
statistically significant activities and whether the respondent supervises a Board of
Commissioners office or not illustrates that on average this type of office more
frequently engages in each of these activity with other government offices located within
the jurisdiction of its own county then do other types of offices (see Figure 7).

5
4.5

seek technical

4

2
1.5

seek resources/ funding
1.95
1.63
1.56
1.11
1.29
1.24
1.17
1.24

2.5

seek information

1.52
1.65
1.68
1.68
1.55

3

2.71
2.32
2.23

3.5

seek non-technical

1

seek legal guidance
seek regulatory flexibility
attempt to modify duties
attempt to modify obligations

Board

all others

Figure 7: Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government Located within the
Jurisdiction of Your County” by “Board of Commissioners ” versus All Others

Seeking Funding or Resources
The third index denoted significant by Kruskal-Wallis testing was “Frequency of
Seeking Funding or Resources”. Again, Mann-Whitney testing revealed the only
statistically significant difference between groups occurs between the dichotomous
variable “Board of Commissioners office versus all other offices” (U=889.5 p=.008) (see
Table 41).
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Table 41: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Frequency of
Seeking Funding or Resources” by Independent Dichotomous Variables for
Type of Office Supervised
Variable

U

Sig.

Board of Commissioners
Clerk of Court
Property Appraiser
Supervisor of Elections
Sheriff
Tax Collector

899.5
988.5
736.0
949.5
1078.5
964.5

.008◄
.098
.067
.837
.124
.206

“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01

| “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

To further explore which activities are driving the significance of this test, MannWhitney tests were run between this dichotomous variable and the five indicator
variables that comprise this activity index (see Table 42). Two tests were significant for
groups differences; “seeking resources/funding from another government within the
jurisdiction of your county” (U=944.5; p=.000) and “seeking resources/funding from
other department within your own county” (U=996.0; p=.009).

Table 42: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index
Factors of “Frequency of Seeking Funding or Resources”
Variable

U

Sig.

from Federal

1152.0

.176

from State

1297.5

.737

from Another County

1158.5

.044

from Another Government Located within the Jurisdiction of their County

944.5

.000◄

from Another Department Located within their County
996.0
.009◄
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these two
significant activities and whether the respondent supervises a Board of Commissioners
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office or not, illustrates that on average this type of office more frequently engages in
these activity then other types of offices (see Figure 8).

5
4

seek resources from
other governments

3
2

1.52

1.77
1.11

1.39

seek resources from
other departments

1
Board

All Others

Figure 8: Significant Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Seeking Resources or Funding” by
“Board of Commissioners Versus All Others”

Overall Relationship Importance
The fourth and final index denoted significant in Kruskal-Wallis testing was
“Overall Relationship Importance”. While Mann-Whitney testing between this index and
the six dichotomous office variables revealed no statistically significant differences
between groups, “Board of Commissioners office versus all other groups” approached
significance at p=.019 (U=918.0) (see Table 43). However, because no test was
significant at .01, the researcher failed to reject the null hypotheses that there was no
differences between groups.
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Table 43: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Overall
Relationship Importance” by Independent Dichotomous Variables for Type of
Office Supervised
Variable

U

Sig.

Board of Commissioners
Clerk of Court
Property Appraiser
Supervisor of Elections
Sheriff
Tax Collector

918.0
1078.5
976.0
950.5
1207.0
898.0

.019◄
.407
.795
.849
.732
.095

“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01

| “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Because Board of Commissioners was approaching significance, the researcher
opted to further explore which activities were driving the test. As such, Mann-Whitney
tests were run between this dichotomous variable and the five indicator variables that
comprise this activity index (see Table 44). Two tests were significant for groups
differences; “overall relationship importance of other governments within the jurisdiction
of your county” (U=782.0; p=.001) and “overall relationship importance of other
departments within your own county” (U=890.5; p=.008).

Table 44: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index
Factors of “Overall Relationship Importance”
Variable

U

Sig.

from Federal

1234.0

.715

from State

1178.5

.479

from Another County

1114.0

.247

from Another Government Located within the Jurisdiction of their County

782.0

.001◄

from Another Department Located within their County
890.5
.008◄
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these two
significant activities and whether the respondent supervises a Board of Commissioners

150

office or not, illustrates that on average this type of office more frequently engages in
these activity then other types of offices (see Figure 9).

5
3.68
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3

2.9
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1
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Figure 9: Significant Indicator Variables for Dependent Index “Overall Relationship Importance”
by “Board of Commissioners Versus All Others”

Percent Duties Focuses on IT Related Issues
The second point of exploration probed to determine whether respondents’
answers in the 15 composite variables differed according the percent of their time
dedicated to IT and IT security related issues. This independent variable was included
as the researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the percent of
respondents time dedicated to IT related issues and the need for the office to seek
outside assistance. Specifically, the less time a respondent had to tend to IT related
issues, the more likely s/he would might need to seek assistance.
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences produced one test approaching
significance at less than .02. The near significant index was “Frequency of Contact with
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Other Governments Located within the Jurisdiction of Your County” (H=10.275; DF=3;
p=.016). However, because the test was not significant at .01, the researcher did not
explore this variable any further and failed to reject the null hypothesis as there was no
evidence of an overall difference between groups.

Population with Bachelors Degree or Higher
The third point of exploration probed to determine whether respondents’ answers
in the 15 composite variables differed according to the percent of county population with
Bachelors degrees or higher. This independent variable was included as the literature
on IT Security (as discussed throughout Chapter II) points to the importance of having
qualified IT employees on staff and the role post-secondary education plays in
developing this workforce. The researcher reasoned that a county with a larger pool of
educated applicants would more easily be able to staff its offices with qualified
employees versus counties with a smaller of pool applicants with post-secondary
degrees. Moreover, the better educated employees are, the more likely that they would
be able to solve problems on their own and thus less likely to need to seek outside
assistance. As such, the researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the
percent of county population with Bachelors degrees or higher and the need for the
office to seek outside assistance.
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences produced one test significant at
.01. Specifically, this test pertains to overall interaction with the state, “Frequency of
Contact with State Offices” (H=11.72; DF=2; p=.003). Therefore, the null hypothesis
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was rejected as there was evidence of an overall significant difference between groups.
To determine specifically which group(s) differ from which other group(s), MannWhitney tests were employed between the index and dichotomous variables for each of
the groups (see Table 45).

Table 45: Mann-Whitney Tests for Index “Frequency of Contact w/ State
Offices” by Dichotomous Variables of “Percent of County Population, age
25+, which Hold Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher”
Dichotomous Variable

U

Sig.

14.9% or less w/ bachelors degree or higher

1070.0

.064

15 – 22.9% w/ bachelors degree or higher

1008.5

.125

23% or more w/ bachelors degree or higher
758.5
.001◄
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

These tests revealed significant differences in frequency of contact with State
offices between counties where 23 percent or more of the population have bachelors
degrees or higher versus all other counties (U=758.5; p=.001). Based on the scale of
this index variable, where a score of 8 indicates no contact across all eight activities and
a score of 40 indicates weekly contact across all eight activities, Figure 10 reveals that
on average, counties where 23 percent or more of the population have at least a
bachelors degree contact state offices at a lower frequency than counties with a smaller
population of residents with a similar education.
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Figure 10: Frequencies of Index “Frequency of Contact w/ State Offices” by Percent of County
Population, age 25+, which Hold Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher”

To further explore which actions are driving the significance of this test, hence
the frequency of contact with state offices, Mann-Whitey tests were run between the
eight indicator variables that comprise the index variable and the dichotomous variable
created to capture differences between this population versus the others. As evident in
Table 46, the frequency with which offices serving counties where “23 percent or more
of the population (age 25+) have at least bachelor’s degrees” “seek technical assistant
from the state” statistically differs (U=1133.5; p=.006) from counties with a lower
percentage of post-secondary graduates. Differences between groups approach
significance with regard to two other state-related activities, namely, “seeking nontechnical assistance” (U=1128.0; p=.014) and “seeking program or project information”
(U=111.5; p=.011).
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Table 46: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous Variable “23% or More of Population Hold
Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher” by Index Factors of “Frequency of Contact w/ State Offices”
Variable

U

Sig.

Seek technical assistance

1133.5

.006◄

Seek non-technical assistance

1128.0

.0149

Seek program or project information

1111.5

.0119

Seek resources or funding

1149.0

.022

Seek legal or policy guidance

1164.0

.024

Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

1289.5

.211

Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement

1267.5

.187

Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement
1279.0
.164
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01 | “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02

Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these three
activities and whether the respondent does or does not supervise an office in a county
where 23 percent or more of the population have at least bachelor’s degrees revealed
that, on average, offices in counties with a higher percent of post-secondary graduates
less frequently contact state offices for these activities then other offices in counties with
a lower percent of post-secondary graduates (see Figure 11).
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Figure 11: Significant Factors from “Frequency of Contact w/ STATE Offices”
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Adequacy of Funding
The forth point of exploration probed to determine whether respondents’ answers
in the 15 composite variables differed according to the overall perceived adequacy of
funds s/he is able to apply to the core IT needs as measured in the composite variable
“Adequacy of Budget”. This independent variable was included as the researcher
reasoned that an office with insufficient funds to meet its needs would more likely need
to seek outside assistance.
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences produced two test approaching
significance at less than .02. The near significant indexes were “Frequency of Contact
with Other Governments Located within the Jurisdiction of Your County” (H=10.49;
DF=3; p=.019) and “Overall Relationship Importance” (H=9.83; DF=3; p=.020).
However, because neither test was significant at .01, the researcher failed to reject the
null hypotheses that there is no overall difference between groups.

Non-significant Demographic Variables
This research also probed to determine whether respondents’ answers in the 15
composite variables differed according five other independent variables, however none
of these proved statistically significant. The first non-significant variable was the
“number of offices supervised”, specifically if an IT Director supervised two or more
offices versus supervising just one (see Table 47). This dichotomous independent
variable was included as the researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the
number of office supervised and the need for the office to seek outside assistance.
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Table 47: Mann-Whitney Test for the Independent Variable “Supervise Only One Office”
Variable

U

Sig.

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices

857.0

.333

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices

867.5

.720

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES

736.5

.188

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County

739.0

.072

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County

701.5

.123

Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance

957.5

.357

Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance

881.5

.250

Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information

733.5

.073

Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding

1046.0

.997

Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance

887.0

.227

Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

938.5

.390

Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership

791.5

.076

Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership

936.0

.503

Index of Relationship Importance

997.0

.914

Index of Relationship Development

846.0

.163

The second non-significant variable looked at “the number of employees
supervised” by each IT Director (see Table 48). This variable was included as the
researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the number of IT employees on
staff and the need for the office to seek outside assistance. That is, the more employees
in an office, the less likely the need would arise to seek outside assistance.
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Table 48: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “Number of Employees Supervised”
Variable

H*

Sig.

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices

8.752

.033

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices

2.844

.416

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES

1.199

.753

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County

6.248

.100

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County

1.412

.703

Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance

2.449

.485

Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance

.342

.952

Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information

1.053

.788

Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding

4.043

.257

Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance

2.284

.516

Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

.088

.993

Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership

1.588

.662

Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership

.198

.978

Index of Relationship Importance

2.339

.505

Index of Relationship Development

2.394
.495
*NOTE: all DF = 3

The third non-significant variable was the size of the county population the
respondent serviced (see Table 49). This was explored as the researcher suspected
that offices in counties with larger populations might have more sophisticated IT
systems which might in turn lead to and/or require more intergovernmental an
interorganizational contact.
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Table 49: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “Number of Office Supervised”
Variable

H*

Sig.

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices

.875

.831

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices

6.500

.090

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES

5.827

.120

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County

1.299

.729

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County

.654

.884

Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance

3.736

.291

Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance

4.308

.230

Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information

.375

.945

Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding

1.119

.773

Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance

1.682

.641

Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

3.480

.323

Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership

.074

.995

Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership

.943

.815

Index of Relationship Importance

2.685

.443

Index of Relationship Development

4.437
.218
*NOTE: all DF = 3

The forth non-significant variable was the level of intergovernmental revenue
received by the county the respondent serviced (see Table 50). This variable was
included as the researcher suspected that there might be a positive relationship
between the amount of intergovernmental funding received and the rate of
intergovernmental an interorganizational contact.
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Table 50: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “County Intergovernmental Revenue”
Variable

H*

Sig.

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices

1.431

.698

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices

8.394

.039

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES

6.669

.083

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County

.810

.847

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County

.582

.901

Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance

3.018

.389

Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance

3.756

.289

Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information

.520

.914

Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding

1.476

.688

Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance

2.934

.397

Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

4.088

.252

Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership

1.247

.742

Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership

1.192

.755

Index of Relationship Importance

3.801

.284

Index of Relationship Development

3.580
.311
*NOTE: all DF = 3

The fifth and final non-significant variable was the zone of the state which the
county, hence office, is located (see Table 51). This variable was included as the
researcher attempted to capture any regional characteristics and behaviors thus
illuminate underlying qualities and influential factors not readily perceptible via other
demographics. Specifically, does any particular zone exhibit unique patterns of
intergovernmental contact. It should be noted that Zone 1 (see Figure 2) was
underrepresented in this study which could have contributed to test outcomes.
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Table 51: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “ Zone”
Variable

H*

Sig.

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices

2.341

.505

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices

4.958

.175

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES

5.226

.156

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County

.755

.860

Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County

3.335

.343

Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance

1.084

.781

Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance

3.809

.283

Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information

1.780

.619

Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding

1.376

.711

Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance

3.50

.320

Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility

4.773

.189

Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership

.318

.957

Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership

.859

.835

Index of Relationship Importance

.796

.850

Index of Relationship Development

3.598
.308
*NOTE: all DF = 3

In reference to Research Question Three, which under-lays the various points of
exploration just discussed, the data indicated that there is a relationships between
certain office/county demographics and the IGM activity of IT Directors. Specifically, a
relationship exists between the IGM activities of an IT Director and: the type of office
supervised; the percent of duties which the Director focuses on IT related issues; the
percent of county population with post-secondary education; and the overall adequacy
of IT budget.
Conversely, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between
the IGM activity of an IT Director and: the regional zone in which an office/county is
located; the number of employees which the IT Director supervises; the number of
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offices which the IT Director supervises; the population size of the county; or the level of
intergovernmental revenue received by the county in which the office is located.

Summary

An analysis of the data obtained from this electronic survey of 125 IT Directors of
constitutional offices of Florida counties has been presented in this chapter. Grounded
in the literature on information technology and security, as well as the theory of
intergovernmental management, this analysis explored the relationships between nine
independent variables and 15 dependent index variables. Through univariate analysis, it
was determined that most variables violated the assumptions of parametric tests due to
heavily skewed data or non-normal distributions. While the skews of most independent
variables were lessened via ordinal recoding, none of the dependent variables could be
corrected without losing valuable information. This proved to severely limit the intended
analysis as parametric tests were no longer appropriate. In light of the violated
assumptions, non-parametric tests were used, specifically, Kruskal-Wallis and MannWhitney.
Since non-parametric tests are not as conservative as parametric tests in
preventing Type I errors, the significance level was lowered from .05 to .01. However,
as Hair at al (1998) note, by attempting to lessen the chance of committing Type I
Errors one concurrently reduces the power of the statistical test which dictates the
probability of successfully finding differences when they actually exist. Therefore, the
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statistical results presented here most likely underestimate true difference as the
researcher increased the probability of committing Type II errors, that is, failing to reject
a null hypothesis when it is actually false.
To explore research questions one and two descriptive statistics, specifically
modes and frequencies were examined. Analysis revealed that county IT Directors most
often seek intergovernmental assistance horizontally, from other Departments within
their own governments. Further, they seek intergovernmental assistance the least often
vertically, from Federal offices. The most frequently performed intergovernmental
activity was seeking technical assistance, however seeking program/project information
was also perform more frequently then the six other activities explored in this research.
The two least frequently performed activities were seeking to modify either the
duties/procedures

or

the

resources/funding

obligations

of

an

established

partnership/agreement relating to IT.
To explore research question three, whether there were relationships between
select office/county demographics and the IGM activity of IT Directors, non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent groups were used when the independent variable
had three or more groups. Eight of the nine independent variables satisfied this
condition (the ninth independent variable was dichotomous, “supervise one office
versus supervise more than one office” therefore Mann-Whitney U was used, however,
no statistical relationships were found). Testing these eight variables with each of the 15
indexes resulted in 126 tests of which five were statistically significant at .01. These
significant tests were followed up with Mann-Whitney U tests to determine specifically
which group(s) differ from which other group(s). Of these tests, seven were statistically
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significant. Finally, in an effort to determine what was driving the significance, MannWhitney U tests were re-run between the seven groups which proved statistically
different and the underlying factors of the relevant index variable. Of these tests, 14
were statistically significant.
Four of the five significant Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that differences between
respondents intergovernmental and interorganizational behaviors were due to difference
in the type of office supervised. Specifically, the frequency with which a respondent:
contacts federal offices; contacts offices in other governments located within county
jurisdiction; seeks funding or resources; and the overall perceived importance of their
relationships with different governments were not the same for all six types of offices.
Further exploration revealed that most of the differences occur between IT
departments in Board of Commissioner’s offices versus the IT departments of other
types of constitutional offices. While perhaps it could be expected that Board of
Commissioners offices would have a higher level of INTRA-county horizontal contact as
this office is often the anchor for county-wide programs; however data revealed that this
higher contact extended beyond the county. In particular, when compared to other
constitutional offices, IT departments in Board of Commissioners offices more frequently
contact other governments located within the jurisdiction of their county for seven of the
eight activities included in this research (the exception being “seeking to modify
resource/funding obligations with a partner/agreement” for which differences were not
significant).
IT departments in Board of Commissioners offices also more frequently contact
federal offices to seek program/project information and regulatory/policy flexibility than
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other offices. Additionally, they contact federal offices to seek legal/policy guidance
more frequently than the other offices with the exception of Sheriff’s offices which
contact federal offices to seek legal/policy guidance the most frequently. The IT
departments in Sheriff’s offices also contact federal offices seeking non-technical
assistance and resources/funding more frequently than the other types of offices, even
Boards of Commissioners. At the other end of this spectrum, IT departments in Tax
Collectors offices are the least likely to contact a federal office, particularly for legal or
policy guidance.
Board of Commissioners offices also more frequently seek resources/funding
from other departments within its county than do the other types of offices. Further the
data suggests that compared to other types of constitutional offices, Boards of
Commissioners place a higher level of relationship importance on both other
departments within its own county as well other government within the jurisdiction of its
county.
Exploring the fifth significant Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that on average, offices
in counties with a higher percent of post-secondary graduates (23 percent or more) less
frequently contact state offices seeking technical assistance, non-technical assistance,
or program/project information then do offices in counties with a lower percent of postsecondary graduates. However, it is not know if that is because the employees are truly
more competent.
The

analysis

presented

in

this

chapter

examined

the

prevalence

of

intergovernmental and interorganizational contact and activities as preformed by IT
Directors in Florida county constitutional office as part of their information security
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efforts. Findings are limited to this populations and are no generalizations should be
beyond this population. However, the patterns and trends uncovered here serve as the
first step toward understanding this unseen population and for developing a baseline for
future comparison studies. The implications of these findings, the limitations, as well as
suggested future research are discussed next in the final chapter.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this research was to explore the roles of intergovernmental
management, activity, and communication in protecting the information systems of our
critical infrastructure. Specifically, the aim was to investigate how county-level
Information Technology Directors use intergovernmental relations and activities in
securing critical information systems under their charge. To that end, this research
sought to answer the questions: 1) which IGM activities do county IT Directors/staff
most often perform; 2) do county IT Directors make more use of vertical or horizontal
IGM relationships; 3) is there a relationship between office/county demographics and
the IGM activities its IT Director/staff most often performs? The significance of the
findings are twofold as there are theoretical implications as well as practical
implications. Each of which are presented in this final chapter.

Theoretical Implications

The impetus for this research was not to test suppositions of the theory of
Intergovernmental Management. Rather, the theory was used to guide research
questions in an effort to discover and explain patterns of activity. Despite this fact, the
research findings do have theoretical connotations which add to the body of research on
intergovernmental management.
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First, these findings challenge the theoretical notion that IGM involves the regular
application coping strategies, in addition to problem solving and networking (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001, 1998; Nelson, 2001; Bolman & Deal, 1999; Perry & Kraemer, 1999;
Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; Wright, 1998, 1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983;
Mandell, 1979). While these three activities are presented in the literature as unique
functions, they naturally overlap in practice. For instance, a manager might employ
coping strategies to best solve a certain problem however, not all problems can be
solved using these solutions.
Of the eight activities explored in this research, three activities fall more closely
inline with the application of coping strategies rather mere problem solving activities
(see Chapter III for distinctions). Specifically, seeking regulatory/policy flexibility;
seeking to modify the duties/procedures of an established partnership/agreement; and
seeking

to

modify

the

resources/funding

obligations

of

an

established

partnership/agreement are all fundamentally coping strategies. Likewise, two activities
fall more closely inline with problem solving activities rather than coping strategies,
specifically, seeking technical assistance and seeking non-technical assistance.
However, of all eight activities in this study, the respondents performed the three coping
activities the least often and performed the two problem solving activities the most
frequently. Therefore, findings from this research would suggest that employing coping
strategies is not a regular a part of intergovernmental management as the literature
would imply.
Indeed local governments are regularly required to comply with vague policies
and implement ill-fitted programs from state and federal agencies. In such situations,
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where a policy must be adhered or a program produces unintended negative outcomes,
the literature states that a primary function of intergovernmental management is to
provide coping mechanisms (Agranoff, 2000; Bohte & Meier, 2000; Cooper et al., 1998;
Center for Technology and Government, 1997a; Stever, 1993; Turner, 1990; Stenberg,
1984). Specifically, localities often revert to coping strategies to attempt to either change
official policy/program specifics or they seek regulatory/statutory relief, flexibility, or
waivers (Radin, 2000; Wright, 1983).
Yet, employing coping techniques and mechanisms do more than just
accommodate jurisdictional idiosyncrasies; they inadvertently test and refine the details,
structure, and overall viability of the very relationships and initiatives they preserve. By
challenging policies, rules, procedures, and relationships, coping strategies, enacted via
intergovernmental management, extend the principle of checks and balances and
enliven experimentation and innovation. By implementing reactive coping techniques,
intergovernmental managers can more effectively and efficiently fulfill mutual goals
without a prolonged period of laboring through legislative channels (Chi, 2000, Radin,
2000). However adaptation and innovation require an investment of time and resources
which often works to discourage such endeavors. When these barriers can be
overcome, the coping function of intergovernmental management has the ability to
generate more mature initiatives and foster progress (Falcone and Lan, 1997).
However, based on the discrepancy between the literature and these study
findings, either the bulk of policies governing county IT Departments in Florida
constitutional offices are adequate and on target or IT Directors lack the time and
resources to develop innovative solutions. Thus the theoretical implication of this finding
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is that either coping strategies are not a regular function of IGM or that only particular
types of

government offices are prone to use of coping strategies regularly. Only

additional research could determine which is truly the case.
These

research

findings

have

another

implication

for

the

theory

of

intergovernmental management. Specifically, these findings support the notion that IGM
occurs within two distinct environments, vertical and horizontal, with each often
employing specific and distinct management activities (see Chapter II for discussion).
As outlined in Chapter III, this research looked at how county IT directors interact
vertically, with federal and state agencies above them, as well as horizontally, with
external contemporaries including other counties, other governments located within the
jurisdiction of the respondents own county, and other departments within the
respondents own county. Analysis of the data found that while county IT Directors make
more use of horizontal IGM relationships- they also make vertical contacts as part of
their information security efforts.
Specifically, the data indicated that six of the eight activities were most often
performed horizontally with other departments in the respondents county and two
activities were most often performed vertically with the State. The two activities most
often performed vertically are seeking regulatory/policy flexibility and seeking
program/project information. It should be noted that it was anticipated to find that
seeking regulatory/policy flexibility would be performed most often vertically as it is
primarily a coping strategy which are regularly employed within subordinate/ordinate
relationships. Thus the only way these problems can be addressed is vertically. Yet as
mentioned in the prior discussion, this activity is rarely performed by the study
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population (93 percent perform this activity only a few times a year or less). Other
problems, however, can be addressed through horizontal efforts. Included among the
six activities that are regularly performed horizontally are the predominantly problem
solving activities; seeking technical and non-technical assistance. This would suggest
that county IT Directors most often attempt to solve problems horizontally rather than
vertically.
Taken together, findings from this research do not support the theoretical
supposition that coping strategies are a regularly performed intergovernmental
management activity. However, this research does support the assumption that IGM
does indeed occur in both vertical and horizontal environments, whereby certain
activities are more likely to be performed in one environment versus the other.

Practical Implications

Beyond the two theoretical implications of this research just discussed, there are
also four distinct practical implications. The first practical implication of this research
begins with the newly acquired knowledge that overwhelmingly, county IT Directors in
Florida constitutional offices rarely -if ever- contact federal offices regarding IT related
issues- be it to seek technical assistance or legal guidance, et cetera. This knowledge
has practical significance because the federal response to critical infrastructure
protection is driven in part by policies which state that federal agencies should be
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providing outreach to state and local governments to aid their infrastructure protection
efforts (see Chapter II for discussion).
This federal strategy, supported in large part by Presidential Decision Directive
63 of 1998, the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the newly created
Department of Homeland Security, promotes a strong policy preference for consensusbuilding and voluntary cooperation rather than regulatory actions. Indeed, the U.S.
General Accounting Office avers for infrastructure protection to succeed, “It is critical
that all participating federal, state, and local agencies interact in a seamless manner”
(2001c, p. 31). To this end, several federal offices have been tasked to work with state
and local governments “…to ensure that systems are created and well managed to
share threat warning, analysis, and recovery information among government network
operation centers…” (Executive Order 13231, 2001, section 5a). Toward this end,
collaborative pubic-private endeavors have been designed for sharing best practices;
evaluating new technologies; raising cybersecurity awareness; increasing criminal
justice activities; and developing national security programs to deter future cyber
threats.
Yet, as discussed in Chapter V, the literature on information security suggests
that local, state, and national agencies have yet to truly function in the spirit of
cooperation, do not share enough information, and generally lack a coordinated working
plan to deal with cyber attacks. This current research supports this assertion as study
respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they never contact federal agencies for six
of eight intergovernmental activities. Therefore, it appears that a main path of the
national strategy, federal-to-local, is not an effective channel for disseminating elements
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critical

to

information

security

including

best

practices,

risk

management,

alerts/advisories, incident handling, and legislation.
This leads directly into the second practical implication of this research, namely
the knowledge that local IT Directors, specifically

those responsible for county

constitutional offices, are more like to turn to a State office than a federal office for IT
related assistance. Knowing that state offices, rather federal offices, are more preferred
by local governments as a point of contact for IT related issues provides program and
policy makers with a prudent direction from which to set about improving the national
strategy.
Yet this research also found that the county IT Directors/staffs in this study
population rarely initiate contact other government offices or departments for IT related
assistance. Recall that all of the activity-related questions asked in the survey were
presented in an active voice, for example, …how often do you or your office seek to or
attempt to ‘xyz’. This research did not probe to find out how the directors/offices
responded to being contacted. As such, the third practical implication of this research is
by knowing that county IT Directors/staffs in the study population are not likely to initiate
contact with other government offices on their own -program and policy makers could
consider revising the national strategy whereby federal or state offices initiate regular
interaction and thereby actively disseminate information rather than function as passive
resources.
The fourth practical implication of this study goes beyond constitutional offices to
the larger arena of public affairs. That is, knowing that IT Directors/staffs in the study
population do not wholly operate in accordance with the national infrastructure
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protection strategy by contacting federal offices, should serve to alert program and
policy makers to the possibility that IT Directors in other types of offices in other types of
local government may also slip through the national strategy. The implication of this to
the various public affairs sectors, such as criminal justice, public administration, and
social work, rest in the reality that beyond the 66 counties in Florida, there are over
87,000 units of local government providing vital services to the American public ranging
from public safety, to health and social welfare, to public works (refer to Chapter II for
full discussion). The operation of these local offices depends on the critical digital
infrastructure, whether it is to supply them with power, to correctly route their financial
transactions, or to enable them to communicate with the public. Therefore, the provision
of such vital services depend on the unfettered operation of CDI.
These vital services are at the core of public affairs. For example, if a computer
network supporting the criminal justice system were breached or cut off from other CDI
elements, Fire Rescue, EMS, police, and others might be unable communicate to one
another during emergencies. Dangerous fugitives or potential terrorists could
unknowingly be admitted into the country or released from custody because police are
unable access databases containing criminal histories. If a computer network supporting
the public administration sector were compromised, programs supporting social
security, unemployment, official records, passport applications, and drivers licenses, to
name but a few, could be brought to a standstill. If a computer network supporting the
social work and social services sector were penetrated or exploited, vital services from
food stamps to Medicaid could not be provided because client files would inaccessible,
corrupt, or even erased. Overall, numerous essential daily services could grind to a halt
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if key elements of the CDI or any element therein were maliciously breached. In
conjunction with our reliance on secure information networks, the findings of this current
study point to the need for all public affairs sectors to determine the effectiveness of
interorganizational and intergovernmental management and communication in the
information security efforts of their local offices. It is critical that each sector, from
criminal justice, to public administration, to social work be certain that its computer
networks are supported by effective policies and procedures which are in accordance
with the national infrastructure protection strategy.
As the literature reviewed for this research consistently avers, threats to the
critical digital infrastructure do not just pertain to the information technology industry but
rather to all sectors of the critical infrastructure and all parts of government. From
regional correctional facilities to branch offices of the Department of Children and
Family Services, local government offices increasingly rely on information and
communication technologies to provide and improve the services they provide. As such,
more and more units of local government, much like Florida county constitutional
offices, are likely to retain their own IT Director or employ one between two or more
offices. Literature on information management highlights three responsibilities unique to
IT managers, (1) anticipating and understanding technological change, (2) anticipating
and understanding information security, and (3) maintaining effective communication
between IT and non-IT divisions. Merging these ideas, managers musty approach
information security as a mosaic, whereby each piece, or element, is understood in
terms of the effect on the sum total. This also requires a mindfulness of elements which
exist outside of a manager’s immediate area of responsibility or authority, such as other
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organizations with which relations take place. This is perhaps most especially true with
regard to government information systems, for as the Center for Technology and
Government (1997a) points out, "No government information system stands completely
on its own. Each system is implemented in a work environment that includes people,
processes, organizational relationships, and other systems" (p. 36). Therefore, if other
units of local government follow

patterns of behavior similar to Florida county

constitutional offices, then best practice are not being shared, risk assessment is
partitioned, and incident handling is fragmented, thus leaving the security of the critical
digital infrastructure, and hence public affairs, in jeopardy.

Limitations

By and large there are five limitations to this research. First, an operational
limitation stems from the ethical considerations inherent in studying security issues. The
need to obscure specific details intrinsic to the configuration of each county’s
information security naturally curtails the potential depth of analysis. However, despite
this limitation, this research was able ascertain the current breadth and interplay
between intergovernmental activities and information security in Florida counties.
There are three limitations with the design of the research. Specifically, when
conducting email or Internet surveys, there can be considerable variation among
respondents systems, such as different screen sizes, set preferences, and email clients,
such as Microsoft Outlook, GroupWise, or Hotmail. The various system permutations
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can result in disparities between the visual design of the questionnaire, such as
misalignment (Dillman, 2000). However, in a personal correspondence to the
researcher (dated 03/27/03), a technician at Surveymonkey.com reassured that the
company was aware of this issue and they continually test and modify their
programming to compensate for such variations. Thus, lessening this limitation. The
third limitation of this research was the narrow study population. While this drawback
limits generalizability, the findings can be used as a baseline for future comparison
studies with counties in other states and as well as city governments. As such, this
research serves as a first step to illuminate the prevalence of intergovernmental
management activities in information security efforts.
The fourth limitation is due to the fact that IT Directors were asked to quantify the
intergovernmental activities of the staffs they supervise. Although IT Directors were
asked to provide this second-hand observation, in this instance, they are functioning as
Key Informants reporting the activities that regularly occur in the offices under their
purview.
The fifth limitation is due to the non-normal distributions of the data. While every
effort was made to produce a sound and rigorous examination of the issues under
study, unavoidable limitations in the data restricted the statistical depth of this analysis.
Because the alpha level was lowered to increase to power of the non-parametric tests,
the statistical findings of this analysis should be viewed as conservative as true
significant differences may have existed where none were reported.
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Future Research

This research sought to investigate how county-level Information Technology
Directors use intergovernmental relations and management activities as part of their
information security efforts. However, to determine if intergovernmental assistance does
indeed improve information security as claimed by the federal government and others, a
future study should simultaneously assess the success each office has had in securing
the information systems under their charge (i.e. noting rates of intrusion and denial of
service) along with patterns and rates of intergovernmental activity.
It would be equally valuable for a future study to employ personal interviews to
qualitatively explore why Florida county IT Directors rarely engage in intergovernmental
contact. In particular, is it because they are able to solve most problems on their own?
Perhaps because they turn to private or non-governmental sources for help? Or do they
limit outside input, hence interaction, in an effort to protect their turf?
A third direction for future research would be to explore the information security
of the 18 percent of Florida constitutional office that outsource their IT needs. As noted
in Chapter V, when developing the population list for this current research, 72 offices
indicated that they hire a private company to take care of their information technology
and security. In actuality, this number is most likely much higher as the researcher was
unable to determine the IT Director for 63 other offices, even after multiple attempts,
leading the researcher to believe that many of these offices do not have one on staff.
Nonetheless, offices without a public IT Director were not included in this research as a
private vendor could not function intergovernmentally in the truest sense. This creates
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many questions, such as where do these vendors turn for IT assistance or
legislative/policy guidance? How do these contracted vendors interact with the myriad of
government offices involved in critical infrastructure protection, such as Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, State Technology Office of Florida, the FBI, and
Department of Homeland Security, to name but a few? And perhaps the most pertinent
question which could be answered from the convergence of the studies proposed here,
which offices are the most secure- the ones supervised by a county IT Director who
rarely engages in intergovernmental contact; the ones supervised by a county IT
Director who regularly engages in intergovernmental contact; the ones supervised by a
private vendor who rarely contacts government offices; or finally, the ones supervised
by a private vendor who regularly contacts government offices?
A fourth area for future research would address differences between the
structure of IT departments in the various zone of the state which were identified here.
Specifically, a qualitatively study using focus groups could help to determine what is
driving the differences. The insight gained could then be utilized to attempt to gauge the
effectiveness of the variously configurations and develop state-wide standards and best
practices.
A final direction for future research would address the issue of generalizability.
As noted in the previous section, the knowledge gained from this study can only be
transferred to the larger public affairs arena to alert program and policy makers to the
possibility that IT Directors may be slipping through the national strategy. However,
these study findings, in and of themselves, can not be generalized to different
populations. Therefore, future research should expand beyond constitutional offices,
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counties, and the state of Florida to explore information security in different settings and
local government environments. Only then would there be a clear picture as to the role
and effectiveness of intergovernmental management and communication in securing
local elements of the national critical infrastructure.

Concluding Remarks

From military operations to hospital nursing stations, networked computers have
come to play a role in most every sphere of modern public affairs. The literature
reviewed for this research indicates that a well-coordinated large-scale cyber attack has
the potential to disrupt daily life in America and across the global. As cyber attacks
become more sophisticated, the risk to ALL networked systems increases. Whether
public or private, whether federal, state, or local, the threat is equally real.
Consequently, county leaders must respond accordingly to understand the
threats, take measures to protect themselves, and determine how they will respond in
the event that they are attacked, or if parts of the critical digital infrastructure were
rendered inoperable. Along side their national and subnational peers, county
Information Technology Directors work on the frontlines trying to balance public
demands and entrepreneurial growth with the realities of cyber security and national
defense. By working intergovernmentally, they make use of innate networks, seek to
solve problems, and to a lesser extent employ coping strategies.
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The rise of the Information Age challenges us to update antiquated modes and
ideas of security, government, privacy, and borders. Information security incidents do
not respect geographic or administrative boundaries therefore, management must be
prepared to instantly interact with other governments, agencies, and at the very least
departments, to contain a system breach. The lack of good communication can breed
confusion, poor coordination, and loss of services. The U.S. General Services
Administration firmly states that intergovernmental management will be the challenge
for information security the next 20 years (McDonough, 2002). Several converging
conditions support this position including a demonstrated need to integrate distinct
databases to meet homeland security needs and the presence of program overlap
between numerous agencies in a time of budget deficits. Collectively, these and other
conditions point toward the growing importance of integrated systems and collaboration
which are at the heart of intergovernmental management.
In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on
Homeland Security, the U.S. Comptroller General stated the indisputable need to
“…clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, states, and local entities
and build a framework for partnerships for coordination, communication, and
collaboration” (Walker, 2002, p. 4). Discerning the roles of interorganizational and
intergovernmental management, activities, and communication in the information
security efforts of local government is a necessary step toward these ends.
Critical digital infrastructure protection is a complex social, economic, and
administrative issue that affects the health, welfare, and security of citizens in all
communities. Without assessing the effectiveness of intergovernmental collaboration
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and communication, which lay at the heart of the federal protection strategy, our
national security remains vulnerable. Only by examining actual information security
efforts, as this current research has done, will we be able to effectively protect our
critical digital infrastructure from the largely invisible threats discussed in here. As
illustrated in this chapter, the findings of this current research have both theoretical and
practical implications. It is the express hope of this researcher that they be used to
generate dialogue as well as a deeper inquiry into the intergovernmental and local
dimensions involved in protecting the U.S. critical digital infrastructure and ensuring our
modern way of life.
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«first» «last»
«Title»
«street»
«city», «state» «zip»
November 4, 2003
Dear «salutation» «last»,
My name is Joah Devenny, I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Central Florida. Next week I will
conduct a survey that explores how Florida county Information Technology Directors interact with their
peers to stay on top of changing technology and threats. I am writing you to ask you to take part in this
valuable research.
You have been chosen to participate because of the critical role you play in protecting local aspects of the
critical digital infrastructure. By learning how you interact with your peers, officials will be able to develop
policies better suited to your actual day-to-day activities, rather than what they think you do.
On Monday, November 10th, you will receive an email from infosec@mail.ucf.edu. This email will include
a hyperlink to a web survey hosted by surveymonkey.com.
**The survey is ONLY 16 questions and will take just 7 minutes to complete.
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations. You will
ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers and basic questions about your county.
Your participation is voluntary and responses will be strictly CONFIDENTIAL. Only summary data will be
discussed in the final report. For more details of this research, please review the enclosed information
sheet.
To verify the authenticity of this research request feel free to call the UCF Public Affairs Doctoral Program
at (407)-823-0170. Should you have any question please contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064.
Thank you for your consideration,
Joah Devenny, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate/Principle Researcher
Advisory Committee
Eileen Abel, Ph.D.
Stephen Holmes, Ph.D.
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D.
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D.

184

Research Information Sheet
Please read the following information to decide if you would like to participate in this study. This
information will be represented to you in the survey. It will be followed by a question asking whether you
have read the study procedure and voluntarily agree to participate. If you agree, please check the box
that will be provided in the survey.
Research title:

Critical Digital Infrastructure Protection and the Intergovernmental
Activities of Information Technology Directors in Florida Counties

Research purpose:

To investigate how county-level Information Technology Directors use
intergovernmental relations and management activities in securing
critical information systems and assets under their charge.

What you will be asked
to do:

You will be asked 1) to click on a hyperlink you will receive in a email
which will take you to an Internet survey; 2) you will then be asked to
answer 16 non-sensitive multiple-choice questions.

Time required:

Seven (7) minutes

Risks:

There are no known risks for participation.

Benefits and
Compensation:

There is no compensation or other direct benefit to you for
participation.

Confidentiality:

All answers will be kept in an encrypted data file in the researcher’s
secure office. Your identity and the county you work for will be kept
confidential and not used in any report.

Voluntary participation:

Your participation is voluntary. There is no penalty for not
participating. You do not have to answer any question you do not
wish to answer.

Right to withdraw from
the study:

You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without
consequence

Whom to contact if you
have questions:

Joah Devenny, M.A., Doctoral Candidate, Public Affairs Doctoral
Program, Orlando, FL 32816; (352)795-5064 -or- Eileen Abel, Ph.D.,
Research Supervisor, (407)823-0170.

Whom to contact about
your rights:

UCF-IRB Office of Research, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207,
Orlando, FL 32826; (407) 823-2901.
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Dear {recipient},
A few days ago, you should have received a letter asking you to take part in an important survey on
information security approved by the University of Central Florida.
Specifically, this research explores how county Information Technology Directors interact with other
governments. Please volunteer a moment of your time to represent {xx county} and share your
experiences.
** The survey is ONLY 16 questions and takes just 7 minutes to complete.
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations.
** You will ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers for 10 activities plus 6 basic
questions about your county.
To complete the survey please click the link below or type the link into a browser window.
[Survey Link]
The survey begins with dome general information about the research. It is followed by a question asking
whether you have read the details and voluntarily agree to participate. If you agree, you will be asked to
check the box provided before you begin the survey.
Should you have *any* question please feel free to contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064.
Thank you for your valuable time,

Joah Devenny, M.A.
Principle Researcher
Advisory Committee
----------------Eileen Abel, Ph.D.
Stephen Holms, Ph.D.
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D.
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D.
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Intergovernmental Information Security Activities
of Florida Counties
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this important research.
Please take a moment to read the following study details.
Research Purpose: To investigate how county-level Information Technology Directors use
intergovernmental relations and management activities in securing critical information systems and assets
under their charge.
What you will be asked to do: You were already asked to click on a hyperlink to take you to this survey;
now you will be asked to answer 16 multiple-choice questions.
Risks: There are no known risks for participation.
Benefits and Compensation: There is no compensation or other direct benefit to you for participation.
Voluntary participation: Your participation is voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. You do
not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer.
Right to withdraw from the study: You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without
consequence
Confidentiality: All answers will be kept in an encrypted data file in the researcher’s secure office. Your
identity and the county you work for will be kept confidential and not used in any report.
Whom to contact about participants' rights: UCF-IRB Office of Research, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite
207, Orlando, FL 32826; (407) 823-2901.
Please select one of following statement:
[ ] I have read the study description just provided and I voluntarily AGREE to participate in the study.
[ ] I have read the study description just provided and I DO NOT AGREE to participate in the study.
Next -- >>
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Thank you for agreeing to participate. For all questions, the following definition is implied:
Information Security: actions taken to reduce the probability that a threat will exploit a system
vulnerability. This includes measures to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------1. Which Florida county do you work for?
[drop box with all counties listed]
2. Please select ALL of the following county units that fall under your supervision for their information
security needs:
ALL county departments and offices fall under my supervision
Board of County Commissioners
Clerk of Court
Property Appraiser's Office
Supervisor of Elections' Office
Sheriffs Office
Tax Collector's Office
County Administration/Management
Emergency Management
Fire and Rescue Services
Health and Human Services
Public Works
Utilities
Other (please specify)
3. Thinking about the areas YOU SUPERVISE, please indicate whether each of the following ONLINE
SERVICES are outsourced, provided by the county itself, or not provided at all:
Currently
outsourced

Currently provided by
the county itself

Permit or license application
Searchable Public Records
Filing electronic employment
applications
Requests for services (streetlight
repair, potholes, etc.)
Payment of Utility Bills
Voter Registration
Payment of Tickets or Fines
Payment of Taxes
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Not currently
provided

4. How adequate is the funding you are able to apply to each of the following needs?
Above
Adequate

Adequate

Below
Adequate

Far Below
Adequate

Not
Applicable

IT equipment/
software/ hardware
IT security
equipment, software,
and hardware
Hiring outsource
vendors
Hiring IT personnel
and support staff
Training IT personnel
Computer security
education for NON IT
employees
Risk assessment/
management
5. Faced with shrinking budgets, counties often require managers to perform more than one job. For
example, a county might combine the job of "Administrative Services Director" with that of "Facilities
Management Director".
Thinking about your own job, what percent of your duties focus on information technology or information
security related issues?
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
less than 20%
6. How many employees do you supervise whose job deals ONLY with information technology or
information security?
[drop box with 0-“25 or more” listed]
<< -- Previous

Next -- >>

-----------------------------------------------------------------
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The final 10 questions ask how often YOU OR YOUR STAFF engage in certain activities with the each
following TYPES of governments.
FEDERAL: any office, agency, or department, such as FBI, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security,
CERT, etc...
STATE: any office, agency, or department, such as FDLE, State Technology Office, Secure Florida, etc...
OTHER FLORIDA COUNTIES: any office or department located in ANOTHER county government, such
as another county's Department of Information Technology; Clerk of Court office; Sheriffs Office; etc...
OTHER GOVERNMENTS LOCATED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF YOUR COUNTY: any part of a
government unit located within the jurisdiction of your county, such as a city or township; etc...
OTHER DEPARTMENTS WITHIN YOUR COUNTY
<< -- Previous

Next -- >>

-----------------------------------------------------------------

How often do YOU OR YOUR STAFF engage in the following activities with each of the following types of
governments:
7. Seek technical assistance related to information security...
Weekly

Monthly

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments
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Several
times a
year

A few times
a Year

Never

8. Seek NON-technical assistance related to information security...
Weekly

Monthly

Several
times a
year

A few times
a Year

Never

A few times
a Year

Never

A few times
a Year

Never

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments

9. Seek information on an information security program or project...
Weekly

Monthly

Several
times a
year

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments

10. Seek funding or resources to improve information security efforts...
Weekly

Monthly

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments
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Several
times a
year

11. Seek legal or policy guidance regarding information security...
Weekly

Monthly

Several
times a
year

A few times
a Year

Never

A few times
a Year

Never

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments

12. Seek regulatory or policy flexibility regarding information security...
Weekly

Monthly

Several
times a
year

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments

13. Attempt to modify duties or procedures of an established partnership/agreement relating to
information security...
Weekly

Monthly

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments
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Several
times a
year

A few times
a Year

Never

14. Attempt to modify resource-sharing or funding obligations of an established partnership/agreement
related to information security...
Weekly

Monthly

Several
times a
year

A few times
a Year

Never

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments

15. Overall, how IMPORTANT is each of the following TYPE of government to the success of your
information security efforts...
Extremely
Important

Very
Important

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located WITHIN
the jurisdiction of your county
Other departments in YOUR county
governments
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Important

Somewhat
Important

Not very
Important

16. Overall, how DEVELOPED is the relationship between your IT department and each of the following
TYPES of government...
Extremely
Developed

Very
Developed

Developed

Somewhat
Developed

Not very
Developed

Federal
State
Other Florida Counties
Other governments located
WITHIN the jurisdiction of your
county
Other departments in YOUR
county governments

<< -- Previous

Next -- >>

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for your valuable time.
Should you have any questions or would like to receive an electronic summary of the research findings,
please contact:
Joah Devenny, M.A.
Principle Research
Public Affairs Doctoral Program
University of Central Florida
Orlando, FL 32816
infosec@mail.ucf.edu
352-795-5064

<<-- Previous

Click here to close window.
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Dear {recipient},
Last week you should have received an email asking you to take part in an important survey, approved by
the University of Central Florida, which explores how county-level Information Technology Managers
interact with other governments.
If you have not yet completed the survey, please know that your participation is *VERY IMPORTANT*.
Only YOU can shed light on this important aspect of information security.
By learning how you and your peers interact, policy makers will be able to develop legislation better
suited to YOUR day-to-day activities rather than what they THINK you do. Please take a moment of your
time to represent {xx county} and share your experiences.
** The survey is ONLY 16 questions and takes just 7 minutes to complete.
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations.
** You will ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers for 10 activities plus 6 basic
questions about your county.
To complete the survey please click the link below or type the link into a browser window.
[Survey Link]
Should you have any question please contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064 or Dr. Eileen Abel at
(407) 823-3967.
Thank you for your cooperation,

Joah Devenny, M.A.
Principle Researcher
Advisory Committee
--------------------Eileen Abel, Ph.D.
Stephen Holms, Ph.D.
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D.
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D.
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Dear {recipient},
It was a pleasure speaking with you on the phone today regarding the important role you play in
protecting local information security systems. Also, thank you for allowing me to explain my current
research into how county-level Information Technology Managers interact with other governments.
I’d like to take a quick moment to remind you how vital this research is to understanding how you and
your government peers interact. The findings of this research will help policy makers develop legislation
better suited to YOUR day-to-day activities.
Your participation is *VERY IMPORTANT*. Only YOU can shed light on this important aspect of
information security. Please take a moment of your time to represent {xx county} and share your
experiences.
** The survey is ONLY 16 questions and takes just 7 minutes to complete.
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations.
** You will ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers for 10 activities plus 6 basic
questions about your county.
To complete the survey please click the link below or type the link into a browser window.
[Survey Link]
Should you have any question please contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064 or Dr. Eileen Abel at
(407) 823-3967.
Thank you for your cooperation,
Joah Devenny, M.A.
Principle Researcher
Advisory Committee
---------------------Eileen Abel, Ph.D.
Stephen Holms, Ph.D.
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D.
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D.
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